

N-5160 14-16 APR 45

FILE

~~SECRET~~

N-5160

DECLASSIFIED SECRET

140-32727

EIGHTH AIR FORCE TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

OPERATION No.

948 - 14 APRIL 1945

951 - 15 APRIL 1945

954 } 16 APRIL 1945
955 }

Instructors Reading this Document

Sign Below

(File No. _____)

Name _____

Date _____

JUN 21 1965

Classification changed to

RESTRICTED

17 JUN 1946

by authority of SAC of S, G-2, WDGS

by

Ray M. Stroupe

RAY M. STROUPE

Capt., Inf

COPY No. 29

DECLASSIFIED

N-5160

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
VIII FIGHTER COMMAND
APO 634

25 September 1945

SUBJECT: Tactical Mission Reports of Operations, 14, 15 and 16 April 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D.C.
(Through Channels).

Submitted herewith are the Tactical Mission Reports for Eighth
Air Force Operations on 14, 15 and 16 April 1945.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

for *Robert H. Terrill*
ROBERT H. TERRILL,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
AC of S., A-3.

JUN 21 1965

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

By authority of
CG, VIII Fighter Cmd.
Initials *C. S. M. L.*
Date *13.5.45*

COPY NO. 29

EIGHTH AIR FORCE
TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

14 APRIL 1945

FIELD ORDER NO.

1972

TARGETS

TWENTY-TWO (22) ENEMY DEFENSIVE
INSTALLATIONS, CONSISTING OF ANTI-
AIRCRAFT AND ARTILLERY POSITIONS
AND STRONGPOINTS COVERING THE
GIRONDE ESTUARY IN SOUTHWEST FRANCE.

OPERATION NO.

948

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPORT OF OPERATIONS

Annexes

Routes and Targets

Bombing

Weather

Statistics

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

REPORT OF

EIGHTH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

14 April 1945

1. IDENTIFICATION.

- a. Operation No. 948 (Codeword: "Venerable").
- b. Assigned Targets.

Twenty-two (22) enemy defensive installations, consisting of anti-aircraft and artillery positions and strongpoints covering the Gironde estuary in southwest France. (See paragraph 3,b.(2) for specific targets.)

2. INTRODUCTION.

a. As part of the German plan to deny to the Allies port facilities in liberated countries, the enemy maintained a pocket of resistance at the mouth of the Gironde River, the entrance to the port of Bordeaux, long after substantially all of France had been reclaimed. In December 1944 an air-ground operation, entitled "Independence", was planned to eliminate this pocket. Three small-scale operations by the Eighth Air Force against a coastal battery in the Pointe de la Coubre and a large scale attack by RAF Bomber Command against Royan - both localities in the Gironde estuary area - were undertaken under this plan. "Independence" was temporarily abandoned on 9 January 1945 but in early April this operation was revived and renamed "Venerable".

b. Operation "Venerable" was to combine the efforts of the First U.S. Tactical Air Force (specifically two of its four sub-forces, the 42nd Bomb Wing and the Western French Air Force), the Eighth Air Force, Sixth Army Group (contributing a ground force of French troops referred to as the Army Detachment of the Atlantic) and some French naval units. The air forces were to attack strongpoints and artillery emplacements selected by the ground forces prior to, during, and after D-day. Meetings were held at the headquarters of First U.S. Tactical Air Force at which representatives of all the aforementioned commands participated in the overall planning. The ground attack was to be preceded by air assaults designed to soften the enemy defenses. The Western French Air Force was to commence operations on 13 April and the Eighth Air Force and the 42nd Bomb Wing were to begin their missions on 14 April. Since the ground attack was to be launched immediately after the second day of Eighth Air Force operations, D-day was to be determined by the Eighth Air Force based upon weather on or after 15 April.

3. EIGHTH AIR FORCE PLANNING.

a. Weather.

Although earlier forecasts indicated the possibility of visuals in southern Germany, the 2200-hour weather conference of 13 April forecast 5-9/10 low cloud and 3-9/10 middle cloud over all of Germany. In western France 2-5/10 small cumulus from 2000-6000 feet, 3-5/10 middle cloud from 15,000-18,000 feet, and 0-3/10 patchy cirrostratus from 22,000-24,000 feet was indicated. Base weather conditions were forecast as satisfactory for take-off. There was a possibility that a front moving eastward might cause substantial middle cloud in the area of western France towards the afternoon.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

b. Target Selection and Force Assignment.

(1) On 13 April decision was made to initiate the first phase of the heavy bombardment aspect of operation "Venerable". At the 1600-hour conference of that day it was decided to employ the entire 2nd Air Division and part of the 3rd Air Division in connection with "Venerable". The balance of the Eighth Air Force was to attack certain communication targets north of Regensburg as requested by SHAEF through USSTAF. At 2200 hours 13 April, weather developments having precluded the possibility of visuals in southern Germany, the mission against these communication targets was cancelled; to the units thus made available other targets in the area of the Gironde estuary were assigned. Due to the late hour at which this decision was made and the special nature of the briefing material, these additional groups of the 1st and 3rd Air Divisions could not be readied in time to reach their targets as early as the units previously assigned. Consequently the attack was planned in two waves, with an interval of approximately one hour between waves - this interval was subsequently reduced to one-half hour due to necessity for delaying the first wave of bomber forces to enable the 3rd Air Division units to travel the considerable distance between their assembly area at Givet and the time control point at Orleans. Contemplating a continuation of attacks on "Venerable" targets on 15 April, 3rd Air Division was requested to draw their first wave force from those units assigned to drop Napalm fire bombs on the following day; this was to insure adequate time for loading this type of incendiary in its initial adaptation to heavy bomber use.

(2) The bombers were to operate in four forces, this being determined in a large measure by the revision in plans to accommodate the units initially detailed to objectives in Germany. The lead force in the first wave (Forces I and II) had as its principal task the neutralization of the heavy anti-aircraft defenses in the area. The specific assignments were;

FIRST WAVE

<u>Target Number</u>	<u>Locality</u>	<u>Type of Target</u>	<u>Grid Reference GSGS 4249, 6 M</u>	<u>Number of Sqs</u>
--------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------	--	--------------------------

Force I - 3rd Air Division (B-17's)

(Tactical Unit - group of three 12-aircraft or four 9-aircraft squadrons)

Sub-Force Ia

7	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	3x155 mm guns; 4 heavy AA guns.	353771	3
137	Royan	Heavy AA guns.	349758	2
33	Royan (Fort de Royan)	3x75 mm AA guns; light AA positions; strongpoint.	365744	2
1A	Royan/Pointe de Vallieres	4x88 mm AA guns.	348758	2

Sub-Force Ib

15	Pointe de Grave	4x88 mm AA guns.	337679	3
19	Pointe de Grave	4x165 mm guns casemated; 2x77 mm guns casemated; 3x75 mm AA guns.	308650	3
24	Pointe de la Coubre-Royan (Le Fort).	2x105 mm guns casemated.	302785	3
27A	Pointe de la Coubre	Heavy AA guns.	232843	3
29	Pointe de la Coubre	4x240 mm guns casemated.	239847	4

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

FIRST WAVE (Continued)

Target Number	Locality	Type of Target	Grid Reference GSGS 4249, 6 M	Number of Sqs
<u>Force II - 2nd Air Division (B-24's)</u>				
(Tactical Unit - combat wing of 6-18 sqs each consisting of 6-10 aircraft)				
7	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	See Force I		4
24	Royan/Pointe de la Coubre (Le Fort)	See Force I		4
32	Royan/Pointe de Susac	6x75 mm coastal guns; 2x120 mm coastal guns; light AA guns	401699	6
11	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	6x155 mm guns, casemated; 3x75 mm AA guns; 4x37 mm guns; ammunition depot.	344760	6
33	Royan (Fort de Royan)	See Force I		6
17)	Pointe de Grave	4x155 mm guns, casemated;	343693	4
38)	(in close proximity)	4x105 mm guns, casemated.	340691	
19	Pointe de Grave	See Force I		3
18	Pointe de Grave	3x77 mm guns, casemated	342628	3
28	Pointe de la Coubre	2x220 mm coastal guns, casemated; 4 medium AA guns.	214835	3
27	Pointe de la Coubre	4x150 mm guns, casemated.	229839	3
26	Pointe de la Coubre	4x138 mm guns, casemated.	239840	3

SECOND WAVE

<u>Force III - 3rd Air Division (B-17's)</u>				
(Tactical Unit - combat group of three 12-aircraft or four 9-aircraft sqs)				
8	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strongpoint.	349779	3
7	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	See Force I and Force II		5
10	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strongpoint.	348771	2
12	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strongpoint.	348767	4
11	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	See Force II		4
137	Royan	See Force I		2

<u>Force IV - 1st Air Division (B-17's)</u>				
(Tactical Unit - combat group of three 12-aircraft squadrons)				
33	Royan (Fort de Royan)	See Force I and Force II		9
1	Royan-Medis	Strongpoint.	408755	9
33A	Royan	Strongpoint; various batteries; possible headquarters building; railway AA guns.	388754	9

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Note: a. With the exception of three targets (1A; 27A, 33A) all target numbers refer to a target designation sheet submitted by the French ground forces to all air forces involved in operation "Venerable".

b. Targets numbered 7 and 33 were assigned to units of three separate forces; targets numbered 137, 19, 24 and 11 were assigned to units of two separate forces. Second priority targets for all forces were to be any objective assigned to other units as their first priority targets. All bombing was to be accomplished visually and, therefore, no other priorities were established.

c. Bomber Flight Plan.

(1) The weather forecast indicated the possibility of a front moving eastward and threatening overcast conditions in the target areas where visual conditions were prerequisites for bombing. Against this contingency attacks were planned as early as practicable and to facilitate this, aircraft of Forces I and II, which constituted the first wave, were to be dispatched to buncher beacons near Paris and Givet, respectively, where they would be able to assemble much closer to the target area under conditions of sufficient light (shortly after civil twilight at 0631 hours D.B.S.T.). Forces III and IV, taking off later because of the late decision as to their mission, were to assemble over England departing from Southwold (0724 hours) and Beachy Head (0738 hours), respectively. It was planned, furthermore, to employ P-51 aircraft as weather scouts.

(2) Since routes were almost entirely over friendly territory, the principal considerations were requirements of approaches to and withdrawals from the target area. After assembling, the various forces were to proceed to Orleans, France. From this common point two slightly divergent south-southwesterly courses were to be followed, the more westerly of which, via control point 4502-0019 W, would position the bomber formations to attack from an initial point north of Bordeaux and southeast of the target area, while the other would carry the bombers to control point 4433-0003 E and south of Bordeaux to initial points west of Bordeaux and south or southwest of the respective objectives. The order of the forces at the Orleans common point en route southward was to be: Force I - to split into two formations which would follow separate routes, sub-Force Ia proceeding to control point 4502-0019 W, sub-Force Ib to control point 4433-0003 E; Force II, Force IV; and Force III. Due to the necessity for circuitous routings in a majority of cases to enable the most satisfactory bombing runs, the attack order was to be: Sub-Force Ia followed at a considerable interval by sub-Force Ib; Force II, Force III and Force IV. The same sequence was to be maintained on the withdrawal except in the case of Force IV which was to fly parallel to and west of the withdrawal route common to the other forces.

(3) The main factors in selection of the bombing runs and immediate withdrawals to rally points were ease of target identification and, in the early stages of the operation, avoidance of unnecessary exposure to anti-aircraft defenses. For planning purposes winds at altitude were predicted from 210° at 25 knots, so light as to render them relatively unimportant and surface winds, which were significant in avoiding obscuration of aiming points by bursts from preceding units, were expected to be from 180° at 10 knots. The sun position was to average 120° azimuth at an elevation of 36°. All bombing runs were to be generally away from the sun to eliminate glare; other factors in determination of the specific lines of approach are as follows:

(a) Force I (3rd Air Division) had as its principal assignment the neutralization of heavy anti-aircraft installations - fragmentation clusters were to be carried for this purpose - eight of its nine objectives being of that type. This force comprised two distinct

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

formations. Sub-Force Ia with its objectives situated in the immediate Royan sector was to make a southeast to northwest approach down the Gironde estuary from its initial point north of Bordeaux, avoiding the defenses on Pointe de Grave; this bombing run, to be made at an altitude of 23,000-25,000 feet, was designed to facilitate identification of targets by reference to coastal configuration and immediately after attacking (time over target 0936 hours) the bombers were to turn northeast to avoid the Pointe de la Coubre defenses. Sub-Force Ib flying independently of sub-Force Ia from Orleans was to pass south of Bordeaux and make its approach on a southwest to northeast heading from an initial point 20 miles off shore over the Bay of Biscay; the leading units were to attack batteries on Pointe de Grave and continue across the mouth of the estuary and just south of Royan whose anti-aircraft defenses were to have been bombed by sub-Force Ia 37 minutes earlier; the following units were to proceed from the same initial point to its objective on the north side of the estuary generally in the Pointe de la Coubre area, and after attacking turn northeast for the purpose of avoiding concentrated anti-aircraft defenses centering around La Rochelle. Altitude of attack was set at 22,000 feet; times over target 1013-1016 hours; four chaff-dispensing Mosquitoes were to precede this force.

(b) Force II (2nd Air Division) following the same route and closely behind sub-Force Ib to their common control point 4433-0003 E was to utilize two initial points, both situated west of Bordeaux wherever south-to-north bomb runs were to be initiated against assigned objectives in the Royan, Pointe de Grave and Pointe de la Coubre sectors (times over target 1019-1033 hours). In consideration of the efforts to neutralize anti-aircraft defenses in the immediate target areas by Force I units the approaches were designed to facilitate target identification and obtain the maximum advantage from bomb spillage; for the same reason it was practicable to stipulate a bombing altitude of 15,000 feet which would provide accurate sighting. All units were to veer east of the La Rochelle anti-aircraft installations after executing their attacks.

(c) Force III (3rd Air Division) was to reach the target area (time over target 1057-1103 hours) approximately 25 minutes after Force II, using the initial point north of Bordeaux (same for sub-Force Ia) to make southeast-to-northwest runs down the Gironde estuary to its objectives located in close proximity in the Royan sector. Ease of identification and utilization of bomb spillage were the principal factors in determining the approach. After bombing the force was to turn northeast away from the La Rochelle area. Bombing was to be performed at 23,000 feet.

(d) Force IV (1st Air Division), proceeding over the route passing south of Bordeaux, was to utilize the initial point approximately 20 miles off shore, common to sub-Force Ib. Making southwest-to-northeast bombing runs across the mouth of the Gironde, its targets in the Royan sector were to be attacked (time over target 1123-1135 hours) approximately 20 minutes after completion of the Force III bombing. The approaches afforded good check points for identification of the targets and after bomb releases, units were to continue on approximately the same headings until the defensive areas around La Rochelle had been passed. Altitudes of attack were to be at 18,000 feet. Four Mosquitoes were to dispense chaff ahead of these bombers.

Note: See "Routes and Targets" Annex for Over-all Plan showing details of bomber routes and timings and Flak Map for relationship of routes to known enemy anti-aircraft defenses. Target Assignments (by units) and Flight Order and Interval are also found in this Annex.

d. Fighter Support.

No enemy fighters were based in the Royan area and possibilities of interception were practically non-existent. None of the 15 Eighth Air Force fighter groups were required, therefore, to support the bomber forces.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

4. EXECUTION.

a. Targets Bombed.

All twenty-two (22) designated first priority targets; three (3) of the first priority targets were attacked by other than assigned units as second priority and one unidentified battery was bombed as an opportunity target. (See paragraph 4.d.(6) for specific targets bombed).

b. Take-off and Assembly.

(1) Pursuant to plans there were four bomber forces participating in this operation. Force I was comprised of seven B-17 groups (25 squadrons) of 3rd Air Division; Force II of four B-24 combat wings (45 squadrons) of 2nd Air Division; Force III of six B-17 groups (20 squadrons) of 3rd Air Division; and Force IV of nine B-17 groups (27 squadrons) of 1st Air Division.

(2) Force I (3rd Air Division) and Force II (2nd Air Division) were dispatched to their Continental assembly areas where they were scheduled to begin forming shortly after civil twilight (0631 hours D.B.S.T.). This involved take-offs from home bases as early as 0440 hours. Force I units experienced some difficulty in picking up the bunchers in the Paris area but managed to accomplish formations by using Gee pilotage and flares. Although this force was to fly as two formations, sub-Force Ia consisting of the first, second and third groups and sub-Force Ib consisting of the fourth through the seventh groups, an over-all assembly was effected. Force II assembled in the Givet area approximately 125 miles northeast of Paris. One group of the third combat wing, delayed an hour on take-off by a runway accident, flew the mission independently and one group of the second combat wing, which was slow in forming, was out of position at the Division assembly line and fell into the position of the group which was delayed at base; otherwise assemblies were made as planned.

(3) Force III (3rd Air Division) and Force IV (1st Air Division) were unable to take off as early as the other two forces due to the change in plans which resulted in their participation in operation "Venerable". Using their normal assembly areas their respective units formed without difficulty and departed the English coast on time in generally good formation.

(4) A total of 1161 heavy bombers sortied on this mission: 264 B-17's in Force I (3rd Air Division) (111 in sub-Force Ia and 153 in sub-Force Ib); 336 B-24's in Force II (2nd Air Division); 220 B-17's in Force III (3rd Air Division) and 341 B-17's in Force IV (1st Air Division).

c. Penetration.

Briefed routes to the target areas were followed with only minor variations except in the case of the B-24 group of Force II which by-passed the Orleans common point in an attempt to make up time lost as a result of the delayed take-off. Force I split up as planned into two formations, sub-Force Ia and sub-Force Ib, at the above common point, whence they proceeded over slightly divergent courses. Lead units of the various forces were generally ahead of schedule but formations were so spread out that trailing groups reached the various initial points at the briefed time.

d. Target Area.

(1) General.

In the target area all forces reported nil low and medium cloud with cirrus cloud (varying from 3-9/10) above bombing altitudes.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Downward visibility was estimated as 20-35 miles and horizontal visibility was unlimited. These conditions were even more favorable than forecast. In general, the squadrons of all forces attacked their assigned primaries by the prescribed visual technique. There were some instances of single aircraft or squadrons visually bombing their second priority targets, i.e. targets listed in the field order as first priority for other units. Such bombing was usually the result of misidentification or inability to identify smoke-obscured objectives. In several cases, squadrons effected second runs in an effort to overcome difficulties in target identification or because of interference by other units during the bomb run.

(2) Force I (3rd Air Division).

(a) The primary mission of this lead force was the neutralization of anti-aircraft defenses in the area of the Gironde estuary, fragmentation clusters being carried for all such targets. By virtue of the varying distances traversed by sub-Force Ia and sub-Force Ib between Orleans, their separation point, and their initial points north of Bordeaux and west of Bordeaux over the Bay of Biscay, respectively, the former began its bomb run approximately 36 minutes before the latter.

(b) Sub-Force Ia, comprised of three B-17 groups totaling nine squadrons, bombed the four assigned anti-aircraft positions in the Royan sector, targets 7, 137, 33 and 1A, without untoward incident. Attacks were carried out from 21,550-24,880 feet (briefed 23,000-25,000 feet) at 0931-0945 hours (briefed for lead unit, 0936 hours).

(c) In sub-Force Ib, which consisted of four B-17 groups of ten squadrons, the lead unit released on three anti-aircraft positions, targets 15 and 19, on Pointe de Grave on the south side of the estuary; the following units proceeded over the estuary to attack an anti-aircraft position situated midway between Royan and Pointe de la Coubre, target 24, and an anti-aircraft emplacement and a heavy coastal battery on Pointe de la Coubre, targets 27A and 29. A number of squadrons were forced to make additional bombing runs because of interference and difficulties of target identification and one unit had its bombs strike a B-24 squadron assigned to the same target, No. 24, causing two losses, although prior to release the B-24's were observed off to the right. Attacks were executed from 21,000-23,050 feet (briefed 22,000 feet) at 1009-1024 hours (briefed 1013-1016 hours) except for a single squadron which released at 1041 hours after a second bombing run.

(d) In Force I there were 261 effective sorties. Two B-17's carried leaflets only and 259 B-17's participated in the attacks dropping 610.4 tons; 254 releasing 598.9 tons on first priority targets and 5 dropping 11.5 tons on second priority targets, i.e., first priority objectives of other units.

(3) Force II (2nd Air Division).

(a) This force made up of four B-24 combat wings having an aggregate of 45 squadrons, followed closely behind sub-Force Ib to initial points west of Bordeaux. Force I having made attacks to neutralize the anti-aircraft installations, this and the following formations had as their task the reduction of the defenses directed against ground assault. The first and second combat wings were to attack installations in the immediate Royan sector, targets 7, 24, 11, 33 and 32; the third combat wing targets on Pointe de Grave, 17, 38, 19 and 18; and the fourth combat wing objectives on Pointe de la Coubre, 28, 27 and 26. All units attacked their first priority targets with the exception of one squadron which bombed a gun position which was not assigned, an opportunity target, and another which was ineffective as a result of premature release caused by a radio bomb release malfunction. There was some interference as the numerous squadrons made separate sightings and as a consequence there was

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

considerable maneuvering and many deviations from the briefed altitude. As previously related, aircraft of one squadron were hit by bombs from a B-17 unit.

(b) Force II units carried out their attacks from altitudes of 13,000-17,250 feet (briefed 15,000 feet) at 1018-1046 hours (briefed 1019-1033 hours) except for the three squadrons which were 50 minutes behind schedule as a consequence of delays on take-off. In this force there were 315 attacking B-24's, the same number of effective sorties, dropping 1017.4 tons; 304 aircraft releasing 984.4 tons on first priority targets; 2 aircraft releasing 7.0 tons on second priority targets, and 9 aircraft releasing 26.0 tons on an opportunity target.

(4) Force III (3rd Air Division).

(a) This force, the second provided by 3rd Air Division, comprised six B-17 groups, a total of 20 squadrons, had as its objectives six closely grouped ground positions, targets 8, 7, 10, 12, 11 and 137, constituting the core of the Royan defenses. Lead units of this formation which were flying ahead of schedule began their attack before the main body of the preceding force had completed its withdrawal from the general target area and consequently the planned 30-minute interval between the first wave, Forces I and II, and the second wave, Forces III and IV, did not materialize. All units succeeded in bombing their assigned objectives although there were instances where two and even three runs were required as a result of interference, identification difficulties and personnel failures.

(b) Attacks by Force III were made from altitudes of 18,180-21,250 feet (briefed 23,000 feet), the majority of units having descended to facilitate identification of targets which were becoming obscured by smoke developing in this area; bombing times were 1040-1138 hours (briefed 1057-1103 hours), the wide range being attributed to the lengthening of the small formation en route to the target area and multiple bombing runs. In this force there were 218 B-17's completing effective sorties. Two dropped leaflets only and 216 released 645.3 tons, all on their designated first priority targets.

(5) Force IV (1st Air Division).

(a) The nine B-17 groups, totalling 27 squadrons, making up this force had for their objectives three strong defensive positions and emplacements in the immediate Royan sector, targets 33, 1 and 33A. Many units reported difficulty in identifying their assigned aiming points due to smoke from bursts of preceding formations. Second runs were made in several cases to overcome the limitation on visibility and one unit used H2X techniques to align its bombing run where check points were not evident. There were several cases of faulty identification within the immediate target area but all first priority targets and one second priority target were attacked.

(b) Bombing was accomplished at 1102-1156 hours (briefed 1123-1135 hours), a majority of units attacking earlier than planned but others were behind schedule as a result of multiple bomb runs. In this 1st Air Division force there were 338 effective B-17 sorties. Three aircraft dropped leaflets only and 335 bombed with 1036.7 tons; 323 releasing 1001.2 tons on first priority targets and 12 releasing 35.5 tons on a second priority target.

(6) Bombing Results.

The assessment of available photographic cover of these attacks, which involved 1125 heavy bombers dropping a total of 3309.8 tons, reveals the following results, with which are tabulated pertinent bombing data:

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

Target Number	Sorties	Aircraft Attacking	Total Bombs Dropped	Results
<u>FORCE I</u>				
7	37	35	1316x120 Frag.	Good
27A (Second Priority)		1	38x120	
137	24	24	901x120	Fair
33	25	24	893x120	Fair
27 (Second Priority)		1	38x120	
1A	25	24	876x120	Good
19 (Second Priority)		1	38x120	
15	29	27	1020x120	Fair
19	28	27	1019x120	Good
24	29	27	1026x120	Good
137 (Second Priority)		1	38x120	
27A	30	29	1083x120	Good
137 (Second Priority)		1	38x120	
29	37	37	74x1000 HE 74x2000 HE	Fair-Good
	264	259	74x1000 HE 74x2000 HE 8324x120 Frag.	

FORCE II

7	33	32	78x2000 HE 10x1000 5x70 IB	Good
24 (Second Priority)		1	3x2000 HE	
24	34	26	65x2000 HE 8x1000	Very Good
32	32	29	84x2000 HE 14x1000 14x70 IB	Very Good
27 (Second Priority)		1	4x2000 HE	
11	37	37	118x2000 HE 14x1000 19x70 IB	Fair
33	36	34	105x2000 HE 24x1000	Good
17 and 38	30	26	80x2000 12x1000	Poor-Fair
19	25	24	72x2000 8x1000 2x500	Good

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FORCE II (Continued)

<u>Target Number</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Aircraft Attacking</u>	<u>Total Bombs Dropped</u>	<u>Results</u>
18	28	17	56x2000 10x1000	Good
Unidentified Btry (T.O.)		9	25x2000 2x1000	Very Good
28	27	27	92x2000 12x1000 2x70 IB	Very Good
27	27	26	81x2000 HE 14x1000	Fair-Good
26	27	26	82x2000 12x1000 2x500	Fair
	336	315	945x2000 140x1000 4x500 40x70 IB	

FORCE III

8	28	28	168x1000 HE	Good
7	48	47	282x1000	Good
10	20	19	226x500	Very Good
12	48	48	150x1000 268x500	Good
11	50	49	587x500	Very Good
137	26	25	78x1000 144x500	Fair
	220	216	678x1000 1225x500	

FORCE IV

33	113	111	1307x500 HE	Good
1	109	106	214x1000 1017x500	Good
33A 1 (Second Priority)	119	106 12	1253x500 142x500	Fair-Good
	341	335	214x1000 3719x500	

Note: See "Bombing" Annex for diagrammatic bomb plots and extracts of interpretation reports.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

(7) Enemy Opposition.

Meager, inaccurate predictor controlled fire was encountered over the Gironde estuary by units of Force I and Force II, but no effective opposition developed.

e. Withdrawal.

The briefed return routes were followed without important deviations, the main bodies of the respective forces flying in the order of attack, i.e., sub-Force Ia, sub-Force Ib, Force II, Force III, Force IV. The necessity for multiple bomb runs in many instances together with the considerable lengthening of several formations in the course of the flight to the target area, resulted in numerous units returning independently. With the exception of Force III, which was considerably ahead of schedule at the target, the lead elements of the other forces were a few minutes late on arrival at the English coast; straggling units were in a number of cases far behind their main bodies.

f. Sorties, Losses, Battle Damage, and Claims.

(1) Bombers.

A total of 1161 bombers sortied on this operation and made 1132 effective sorties, including 7 aircraft dropping leaflets. A total of 1125 bombers released 3309.8 tons; 1097 aircraft dropping 3229.8 tons on their first priority targets; 19 aircraft dropping 54 tons on second priority targets and 9 aircraft dropping 26 tons on a target of opportunity. Two B-24's of Force II were lost as a result of being struck by the fragmentation bombs of another unit. There were 5 cases (1 B-17 and 4 B-24) of category "E" (salvage) damage, and 8 cases of limited battle damage (5 category "A", 1 category "AC" and 2 category "B"). For the most part, the category "E" casualties arose out of take-off and landing accidents. Five of the 8 limited battle damage instances were occasioned by anti-aircraft fire; the remainder by other causes. Force I experienced one instance of category "AC" damage. Force II reported 5 cases of category "A" and 2 cases of category "B"; Forces III and IV gave negative reports.

(2) Fighters.

Of the 29 P-51 sorties, 26 P-51's were effective as weather scouts.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

A black and white photograph of a topographic map. The map is covered with a network of lines and points, likely representing a communication or transportation network. A prominent line runs diagonally from the lower-left towards the upper-center. In the lower-left corner, there is a cluster of points connected by lines, possibly indicating a specific area of interest or a hub. The map itself shows various terrain features, including hills and valleys, and a grid system. A scale bar is visible at the bottom left, and the text "DECLASSIFIED" is printed at the top.

DECLASSIFIED

FLAK MAP # 114A 14 APRIL 1945 (SECRET)

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

TARGET ASSIGNMENTS

14 April 1945

CHART REF. NO. +	TARGET	FORCE ++	T.O.T.	ALTITUDE		
<u>1ST AIR DIVISION - FORCE IV</u>						
A { 33	Strong point	351st, 457th, 401st Gps (9 Sqs)	1123	18,000		
A { 1	Strong point	305th, 92nd, 306th Gps (9 Sqs)	1129	18,000		
{ 33a	Various Batteries & Strong points	384th, 303rd, 379th Gps (9 Sqs)	1135	18,000		
<u>2ND AIR DIVISION - FORCE II</u>						
B { 7	Casemated Guns & Heavy AA	2nd CW: 445th Gp (4 Sqs of 8 a/c)	1019	15,000		
{ 24	Casemated Guns	389th Gp (4 Sqs of 8 a/c)				
B { 11	Casemated Guns & Heavy AA	14th CW: 491st Gp (6 Sqs of 6 a/c)				
{ 33	Strong point	44th Gp (6 Sqs of 6 a/c)				
{ 32	Coastal Guns	392nd Gp (6 Sqs of 6 a/c)				
C { 17 & 38	Casemated Guns	96th CW: 458th Gp (4 Sqs of 9 a/c)	1027	15,000		
{ 19	Casemated Guns	467th Gp (3 Sqs of 9 a/c)				
{ 18	Casemated Guns & Heavy AA	466th Gp (3 Sqs of 9 a/c)				
D { 28	Coastal Guns & 4 Medicine Flak Guns	20th CW: 448th Gp (3 Sqs of 9 a/c)	1033	15,000		
{ 27	Casemated Guns	93rd Gp (3 Sqs of 9 a/c)				
{ 26	Casemated Guns	446th Gp (3 Sqs of 9 a/c)				
<u>3RD AIR DIVISION - FORCE I</u>						
Sub Force Ia						
E { 7	Heavy AA Battery	96th Group (3 Sqs)	0936	25,000		
{ 137	Heavy AA Battery	388th Group (2 Sqs)	0936	23,500		
{ 33		388th Gp (1 Sq) & 452nd Gp (1 Sq)	0936	23,500		
{ 1A		452nd Gp (2 Sqs)	0936	22,000		

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

TARGET ASSIGNMENTS (Continued)

14 April 1945

CHART REF. NO. +	TARGET	FORCE ++	T.O.T.	ALTITUDE
---------------------	--------	----------	--------	----------

3RD AIR DIVISION - FORCE I (Continued)

Sub Force Ib

F	(15	Heavy AA Battery	94th Gp (3 Sqs)	1013	22,000
	19	Heavy AA Battery	94th Gp (1 Sq) & 447th Gp (2 Sqs)		
G	(24	Heavy AA Battery	447th Gp (2 Sqs) & 486th Gp (1 Sq)	1016	22,000
	27a	Heavy AA Battery	486th Gp (3 Sqs)		
	(29	Casemated Guns	487th Gp (4 Sqs)		

3RD AIR DIVISION - FORCE III

H	(8	Strong point	100th Gp (3 Sqs)	1101	23,000
	7	Heavy AA Battery	100th Gp (1 Sq) & 390th Gp (4 Sqs)		
J	(10	Strong point	493rd Gp (2 Sqs)	1107	23,000
	(12	Strong point	493rd Gp (1 Sq) & 490th Gp (3 Sqs)		
	(11	Heavy AA Battery	34th Gp (3 Sqs) & 385th Gp (1 Sq)		
	(137	Heavy AA Battery	385th Gp (2 Sqs)		

+ Letters refer to time control groupings.

++ Tactical Unit: 1st Air Division - Group of 36 B-17's, of 3 sqs of 12 a/c.

2nd Air Division - Combat Wing of 8 to 18 sqs of 6 to 9
B-24's.

3rd Air Division - Group of 36 B-17's of 3 sqs of 12 a/c
or 4 sqs of 9 a/c.

NOTE: See Flight Order and Interval.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
- 2 -

DECLASSIFIED

DESCRIPTION OF TARGETS

14 April 1945.

TARGET

1ST AIR DIVISION

No. 33 Strong Point
3x75 mm AA, light AA positions and miscellaneous strong points.

No. 1 Strong Point

F. B. Various batteries and strong points.

2ND AIR DIVISION

No. 28 2x220 mm Coastal Guns and 4 Medium Flak Guns.

No. 27 4x150 mm Guns, Casemated.

No. 26 4x138 mm Guns, Casemated.

No. 24 2x105 mm Guns, Casemated.

No. 11 6x155 mm Guns, Casemated.

3x75 mm AA

4x37 mm AA

Ammo Depot

No. 33 Strong Point
3x75 mm AA, Light AA positions and miscellaneous strong points.

No. 7 3x155 mm Guns, Casemated.

3x75 Heavy AA

No. 32 6x75 mm Coastal Guns
2x120 mm Coastal Guns
Light AA

No. 17 & 4x155 mm Guns, Casemated.
No. 38

4x105 mm Guns, Casemated.

No. 19 4x165 mm Guns, Casemated.
2x77 mm Guns, Casemated.
3x75 mm Heavy AA

No. 18 3x77 mm Guns, Casemated.
Heavy AA

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DESCRIPTION OF TARGETS (Continued)

TARGET

3RD AIR DIVISION.

No. 29 4x240 mm Guns, Casemated

Heavy Flak Battery

No. 24 Heavy Flak Battery

No. 7 Heavy Flak Battery

No. 137 Heavy Flak Battery

No. 33 Strong Point
Heavy Flak Battery.

No. 19 Heavy Flak Battery.

No. 15 Heavy Flak Battery.

F. B. Flak Battery

4 - 88 AA Guns

No. 137 Heavy Flak Battery

No. 11 Heavy Flak Battery

No. 12 Strong Point

No. 10 Strong Point

No. 7 Heavy AA Battery

No. 8 Strong Point

Note: Number of targets refers only to general target areas and not to any specific points.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FLIGHT ORDER AND INTERVAL

14 April 1945

Force I - 3rd Air Division - to Royan Area.

Ia - (T.O.T. 0936 hours) - using control point 4502-0019 W.

96th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 338th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes.

Ib - (T.O.T. 1013-1016 hours) - using control point 4433-0003 E.

452nd Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes; 94th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 minutes;
447th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 minutes; 486th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 minutes;
487th Gp (4 Sqs).

+ 7 minute interval before next following formation reaches common point at Orleans.

Force II - (T.O.T. 1019-1033 hours) 2nd Air Division - to Royan Area.

2nd CW (8 Sqs of 8 a/c): 2 minutes;
14th CW (18 Sqs of 6 a/c): 6 minutes;
96th CW (10 Sqs of 9 a/c): 3 minutes;
20th CW (9 Sqs of 9 a/c).

+ 27 minute interval before next following unit reaches common point at Orleans.

Force IV - (T.O.T. 1123-1135 hours) 1st Air Division - to Royan Area.

351st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 457th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
401st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 305th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
92nd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 306th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
384th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 303rd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
379th Gp (3 Sqs).

+ 3 minute interval before next following unit reaches common point at Orleans.

Force III - (T.O.T. 1101-1107 hours) 3rd Air Division - to Royan Area.

100th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes; 390th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
493rd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 490th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
34th Gp (3 Sqs).

+ NOTE: Forces I, II, III and IV are arranged in order of penetration at common point at Orleans, but due to varying approaches to target area the attack order was to be - Forces I, II, III and IV.

DECLASSIFIED

TARGETS

PRIMARIES AS LISTED ON TARGET ASSIGNMENT SHEET

DECLASSIFIED

TRACK CHART


DATE 14 APRIL 1945

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY 1st Air Div. (A)

2nd " (B,C,D)

3rd " 1st T.F. (E,F,G)


3rd " 2nd T.F. (H,I,J)



DECLASSIFIED

TRACK CHART
14 APRIL '45
1ST A.D.

Route Followed By 1ST DIVISION



DECLASSIFIED

TRACK CHART

TARGET

Primary

DEFENSES IN

DATE

14 APR. 1945

BORDEAUX AREA


2CBW

2ND AD.

Route followed by BRIEFING

389 ACTUAL

445



DECLASSIFIED

DEGLASSIFIED

Primary

DEFENSES IN

DATE 14 APR. 1945

Route followed by BRIEFING

491 ACTUAL


392

25

BORDEAUX AREA

14 CBW

2ND A.D.



DECLASSIFIED

TRACK CHART

TARGET

Primary

DEFENSES IN

14 APR. 1945

BORDEAUX AREA


20 CBW
2ND A.D.

Route followed by BRIEFING

446 ACTUAL

93

448



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TRACK CHART

TARGET
Primary DEFENCES IN
BORDEAUX AREA

DATE 14 APR. '45


96CBW
2ND A.D.

Route followed by BRIEFING

458 ACTUAL


466

467



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Target: Royan Area (First Priority).

Date: 14 April, 1945.

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 1125.

Tons of Bombs Dropped: 3309.8.

1. Diagrammatic Bomb Plots.
2. Excerpts from Interpretation Report No. B 571 (R), and Interpretation Report S.A. 3577.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



S. A. 3577
TACTICAL TARGETS IN ROYAN AREA
14 APR 1945

DIAGRAMMATIC BOMB PLOT NO. 2

Area of H.E. Bursts
Area of Fragmentation Bursts
Target Area

Photographic Background: G.S.C.S. 4250 6N/5
Neg. No. 177538

S. A. 3577
TACTICAL TARGETS IN ROYAN AREA
14 APR 1945

DIAGRAMMATIC BOMB PLOT NO. 2

////// Area of H.E. Bursts
..... Area of Fragmentation Bursts
□ Target Area

Photographic Background: G.S.G.S. 4250 6M/3
Neg. No. **P7-305645**



~~DECLASSIFIED~~

EXCERPT FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B 571 (R)

TARGET: ROYAN AREA

DATE: 14 APRIL, 1945

Target No. 1

A very heavy concentration of craters is spread over the entire target area covering the whole area with a layer of sand. The only remaining elements of the defended area are a few sections of trenches on the far south and one barely visible on the north. One building remains intact in the area.

Target No. 7

The attack is concentrated on the center of the target and extends to a highway to the north. All positions have received very near misses - and spoil has made it impossible to recognize all the positions. Two emplacements can be seen filled with sand.

Target No. 8

There are at least four craters within this strongpoint though the main weight of the attack is concentrated south of it in the adjacent town. Three weapons pits have been obliterated by spoil, and a near miss has probably damaged the house and adjoining shed in the strongpoint area.

Target No. 10

The weight of the attack is concentrated directly upon this strongpoint in the center of the target area. Five craters are visible around a possible underground shelter. Craters have rendered the outline of the target unrecognizable.

Target No. 11

The main concentration of bombs fell directly in the target area extending across the road to the northwest. Casemates are still intact, but all have suffered probable damage from near misses. The command post received a direct hit and a near miss. Of seven open emplacements in front of the casemates, only three, positions 1, 4, and 7, are visible on these photographs. The wooded area to the rear of the battery containing ammunition stores and personnel housing has been completely blanketed by craters which have obliterated all installations within the area.

Target No. 12

The weight of the attack is concentrated in the southern part of the target area. Two open emplacements in this southern area have been demolished by hits. There are at least four craters on the perimeter firing trench of a small strongpoint. Near hits have probably damaged a small shelter in the center of the target.

Target No. 15

No bomb craters can be found in the target area. There is a large concentration of craters on the beach and in shallow water northeast of the target.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

EXCERPT FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B 571 (R)

14 April, 1945

Target No. 17

There are no craters in the target area. A small concentration of craters are 250 feet south of the battery and some 300 feet southwest of the beach.

Target No. 18

At least 18 craters can be counted in the target area - a few craters are spread out to the rear and in the water in front of the battery. Each casemate has suffered at least one near miss - and only one supporting flak gun can be found after the bombing.

Target No. 19

Target not covered.

Target No. 24

The weight of the attack is concentrated in the battery area and extends southwest along the beach. Several near hits have probably damaged one of the two casemates and one of four open emplacements in this battery. A concentration of near hits has severely damaged four houses, possibly quarters southwest of the target.

Target No. 26

There is a fair concentration of craters spread over a wide area on and about the target. No. 2 and 3 casemates suffered three near misses each and one bomb landed at the rear of No. 4 position, removing the protecting sand on that side of the casemate. No structural damage can be seen on any of the elements of the battery.

Target No. 27

The weight of the attack is concentrated across the battery area and extending north. One direct hit and two near hits have severely damaged three casemates. One near miss has probably damaged a blast walled shed to the rear of one casemate.

Target No. 28

The weight of bombs fell in the battery area and extending north into the adjacent woods. A near miss has probably damaged one of four open emplacements in the battery. There is also a concentration of five emplacements in the eastern half of the target area.

Target No. 29

There is a good concentration of craters in the target area. No. 1, 2 and 3 positions have several near misses each and there are craters within 100 yards of No. 4 position. No. 2 and 3 positions may be heavily damaged. Spoil has been deposited in half of each emplacement. All communication lines between the positions have been broken.

Target No. 32

The main weight of bombs fell in the target area extending north along the beach. None of the six positions have been hit directly, but a near miss slightly to the rear between positions 1 and 2 has probably damaged these two positions. There is a large crater at the entrance to a large underground shelter in the rear of the battery area. A concentration of 15 craters is visible slightly southeast of the battery in an area of communication trenches and weapon pits.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

EXCERPT FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B 571 (R)

14 April, 1945

Target No. 33

The target is smothered with a heavy concentration of craters - no area being missed. All emplacements have been destroyed or damaged. The roof of the large shelter in the center of the fort has been caved in. One, possibly two guns remain in open emplacements, but their condition cannot be determined. The area of crater concentration extends north-east blanketing point 036030 where all installations are destroyed or heavily damaged.

Target No. 38

There is a small concentration of craters in the target area. One crater is within 50 feet of each of the No. 1, 2 and 3 casemates. In the rear of the battery, two underground shelters are blanketed with craters - several direct hits or near misses. No structural damage can be seen.

Target No. 137

At least twenty craters are visible in the target area - the main concentration near the northwest corner. No direct hits have been made on the four positions, but the northwest position has been possibly damaged by a near miss.

Target No. 33A

A very heavy concentration of craters is seen immediately east and south of the target. Some few craters are seen in the yard and there is damage to flak wagons, but the extent cannot be determined from this cover.

Target No. 27A

There are several craters south and east of the battery, but none can be seen on the target. No damage can be found.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3577.

TARGET: TACTICAL TARGETS IN ROYAN AREA.

DATE: 14 APRIL, 1945.

Target No. 1

Eight concentrations totalling more than 600 H.E. bursts are seen blanketing the area of the strong point, with probable hits on six gun emplacements and a group of unidentified buildings to the southwest. One concentration of more than 50 bursts is seen blanketing a group of unidentified barracks type buildings and extending into adjacent open fields, 1500 yards southeast of the strong point. In a lightly built-up area and open fields, 1200 yards west of the strong point, are seen at least 60 bursts.

Target No. 1-A

Patterns of fragmentation bursts are seen covering the area of the pinpoint and north of the point for a distance of 2000 yards.

Target No. 7

Patterns of fragmentation and H.E. bursts are visible completely blanketing the target areas. Two waves of approximately 285 bursts are seen, of which 60 are on the strong point area and eight effect near hits to the casemated guns. The small scale of the photographs does not permit an accurate statement on installations hit, but two probable hits on the gun barbettes in the strong point can be seen. Approximately 63 bursts are visible in a wooded area one and one-half miles northeast of target No. 7.

Target No. 8

Two groups totalling more than 100 H.E. bursts are visible across the target area, and through the central section of the village, south of the target area. A group of at least seven H.E. bursts blanket the buildings within the strongpoint, scoring probable hits on all the buildings. A cluster of five H.E. bursts is visible in a small settlement and road junction 400 yards north of the target.

Target No. 10

A pattern of fragmentation bursts and a heavy concentration of H.E. bursts totalling approximately 175 are seen blanketing the strong point, with fifteen probable hits on the installations in the target area.

Target No. 11

At least 300 H.E. bursts are seen blanketing the target area and extend north into open fields and south into the entrance of the La Gironde River, with possible direct hits on all six 155 mm guns and near hits on the three 75 mm guns in casemates.

Target No. 12

Two concentrations of H.E. bursts, totalling approximately 200, and a string of fragmentation bursts are seen covering the target area and installations, with probable hits on an unidentified building in the center of the area and at least one barbette.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3577 (Continued) 14 April, 1945

Target No. 15

Two strings of fragmentation bursts are seen extending from the water across a jetty blanketing Target No. 40, then across a small built-up area and into the target area. Very few bursts fell in the target area with the greater part landing in the water. Due to the poor quality of the photographs the bursts in the target area cannot be pinpointed.

Target No. 18

Approximately 24 bursts are visible in and near the target area, with at least 10 bursts on the target. More than 15 bursts are seen on the banks of the Gironde River, 6,750 yards southeast of the target.

Target No. 19

Approximately 15 H.E. bursts are visible in the northeast and southeast target area, with possible hits seen on one or more casemates, while fragmentation bursts are seen to blanket most of the target area. Strings of fragmentations are seen in the water to the northwest and in an open area to the east and northeast of the target.

Target No. 24

A group of H.E. bursts is seen blanketing the target area and a second group is visible just to the east with a few possible bursts extending on the target but hits cannot be determined because of the scale of the photographs. A large concentration of fragmentation bursts is seen on a wooded area and the shore immediately east of the target.

Target No. 26

The target area is blanketed by three groups of H.E. bursts scoring probable hits on all four casemates. Several bursts are scattered in the wooded area just north of the target area.

Target No. 27

Two compact groups of H.E. bursts have blanketed the target area. Early bursts of the first are seen scoring one direct and one near hit on one gun and one probable hit on another. The second group of bursts, seen through thin smoke, can be plotted directly across the target area scoring probable hits. A group of about 8 bursts is visible on the beach east-southeast of the target.

Target No. 27A

A wide concentration of fragmentation bursts is seen blanketing the target and adjacent woods and fields from the beach to a point 1500 yards inland.

Target No. 28

The target area is blanketed by at least 50 H.E. bursts with scattered bursts extending into immediately adjacent woods and beaches.

Target No. 29

Four groups, totalling approximately 125 H.E. bursts, can be seen to blanket the southeastern three-fourths of the target area scoring many probable hits or near hits on the southern three gun positions. The greater portion of two groups of bursts fell into the wooded area just east of the target.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3577 (Continued) 14 April, 1945

Target No. 32

Although at least 35 bursts are visible in or very near the target area, no direct hits on the guns themselves can be seen. A total of at least seven very near hits to five of the guns are visible. One string of bombs is visible extending from the target across the beach and woods immediately to the northeast.

Target No. 33

At least eight concentrations of H.E. bursts are seen in and adjacent to the target area with at least 95 hits in the target area and many hits on the residential buildings adjacent to the target area. A large concentration of fragmentation is seen across the target area and extends northwest into open fields, residential area, secondary roads and southeast into the water. Several strings of fragmentation bursts and a large concentration can be seen in the water approximately 500 yards southeast of the target.

Target No. 33A

A string of fragmentation clusters and later a group of H.E. bursts can be seen to blanket the target area with one near H.F. hit on the building and many by frags.

Target No. 33B

Three concentrations totalling more than 225 H.E. bursts are seen blanketing the pinpoint, adjacent industrial type buildings, rail sidings, business/residential section and open fields. Two concentrations totalling more than 120 bursts are seen extending across a lightly built-up area just east of the pinpoint. Extending across the road over rail bridge, woods, and open fields, 500 yards east of the pinpoint, is seen a concentration of more than 60 bursts and 1000 yards further east a few scattered bursts are seen on open area.

Target Nos. 38, 17

Two groups of H.E. bursts are seen blanketing the western-most casemates with probable hits on three of the four gun emplacements. These bursts extend across the target area from the water southward into a small built-up area. A third group of bursts is seen, approximately 750 yards west of the target blanketing the shore and extending into the water, with possible hits on two untargeted casemates. A fourth group of bursts is seen, approximately 3000 yards west of the target, on a wooded area just south of the shore-line.

Target No. 137

A large concentration of fragmentation bursts is seen across the target area and extending northwest into open fields and secondary roads and southeast into the water. Nine H.E. bursts are seen in the target area with near hits on two of the four 88 mm. gun flak battery.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA

14 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL. ON LDR	DROPPED ON LDR
<u>Rovan/Medis</u>								
351A	39	3 min	18,000	1102½	X	141x500HE	1	11
351B	42	3 min	17,400	1104	X	150x500HE	1	12
351C	40	3 min	18,600	1104	X	155x500HE	1	12
457A	30	3 min	18,000	1106½	X	142x500HE	1	11
457B	57	3 min	17,300	1107	X	131x500HE	1	10
457C	32	3 min	18,600	1107½	X	155x500HE	1	12
401A	46	3 min	18,000	1114½	X	25x500HE 124x500HE	1	12
401B	44	3 min	17,400	1115	X	41x500 HE 102x500HE	1	11
401C	30	3 min	18,700	1117	X	18x500 HE 123x500HE	1	11
305A	40	2 min	18,200	1135½	X	160x500HE	1	11
305B	16	2 min	17,700	1114	X	153x500HE	1	10
305C	25	2 min	18,750	1114½	X	161x500HE	1	11
92A	17	3 min	18,400	1121	X	24x500 HE 72x1000HE	1	11
92B	28	3 min	17,150	1124	X	23x500 HE 72x1000HE	1	11
92C	39	3 min	19,000	1154	X	22x500 HE 70x1000HE	1	11
306A	35	3 min	18,150	1127	X	161x500HE	1	11
306B	16	2 min	17,600	1129	X	159x500HE	1	11
306C	35	2½ min	19,200	1128	X	154x500HE	1	10
384A	39	2 min	18,100	1156	X	142x500HE	1	12
384B	47	1 min	18,000	1132	X	153x500HE	1	12
384C	49	1 min	18,880	1133	X	152x500HE	1	12
303A	40	30 sec	18,100	1136½	X	156x500HE	1	12
303B	52	30 sec	17,900	1137	X	142x500HE	1	11

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

14 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
-------	-------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------	--------------------

1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Roman/Medis (Continued)

308C	45	1 min	19,075	1138	X	156x500HE	1	12
379A	52	90 sec	18,120	1140	X	164x500HE	1	13
379B	46	90 sec	17,800	1139	X	166x500HE	1	13
379C	50	1 min	19,100	1141	X	164x500HE	1	13

2ND AIR DIVISION

Le Fort Gun Emplacement

445	05	12 min	15,000	1018	X	4x1000 HE 18x2000HE 2xM47 IB	1	7
445	07	15 min	14,500	1018 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	2x1000 HE 15x2000HE 1xM47 IB	1	6
445	10	14 min	15,500	1018 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	2x1000 HE 21x2000HE 1xM47 IB	1	7
445	12	15 min	16,200	1020	X	2x1000 HE 24x2000HE 1xM47 IB	1	8
389	06	9 min	15,900	1021 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	18x2000HE 4x1000 HE	1	7
389	05	6 min	15,550	1022	X	24x2000HE 2x1000 HE	1	8
389	06	8 min	15,000	1024	X	18x2000HE 2x1000 HE	1	6

Le Fort

491	10	5 min	15,000	1037	X	4x1000 HE 16x2000HE 4xM47 IB	1	6
491	05	6 min	15,500	1037	X	2x1000 HE 24x2000HE 3xM47 IB	1	5
491	13	5 min	14,500	1038	X	2x1000 HE 20x2000HE 3xM47 IB	1	5
491	06	7 min	16,000	1037 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	2x1000 HE 20x2000HE 3xM47	1	5

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

14 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR
-------	---------------	---------------	----------	-----------------	-------------	-----------------	---------------	----------------

2ND AIR DIVISION (continued)

La Fort (Continued)

491	05	5 min	15,500	1039	X	2x1000 HE 20x2000 HE 3xM47 IB	1	5
491	350	6 min	15,000	1041	X	2x1000 HE 18x2000HE 3xM47 IB	1	5

Fort De Royan

44	362	4 min	14,800	1019	X	6x1000HE 16x2000HE	1	5
44	14	4 min	15,500	1019	X	4x1000 HE 15x2000HE	1	4
44	12	4 min	14,500	1020	X	2x1000 HE 20x2000HE	1	5
44	05	4 min	14,200	1020	X	4x1000 HE 15x2000HE	1	4
44	12	4 min	14,700	1021	X	4x1000 HE 19x2000HE	1	5
44	352	4 min	13,500	1033	X	4x1000 HE 20x2000HE	1	5

Point De Susac

392	08	4 min	15,000	1022½	X	12x2000HE 4x1000 HE 4xM47 IB	1	4
392	356	2 min	15,500	1023	X	16x2000HE 2x1000 HE 2xM47 IB	1	4
392	0	2 min	16,600	1024	X	20x2000HE 2x1000 HE 2xM47 IB	1	5
392	10	3 min	16,400	1025	X	14x2000HE 2x1000 HE 2xM47 IB	1	4

Point De Grave

458	11	10 min	15,000	1029¼	X	4x1000 HE 12x2000HE	1	4
458	09	10 min	14,650	1029½	X	4x1000 HE 24x2000HE	1	7
458	09	10 min	14,400	1030	X	2x1000 HE 20x2000HE	1	5

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

14 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
-------	-------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------	--------------------

Point De Grave (Continued)

458	352	10 min	13,800	1029-3/4	X	2x1000 HE 24x2000HE	1	6
467	10	3 min	15,800	1029-3/4	X	4x1000 HE 24x2000HE	1	7
467	353	3 min	15,300	1030	X	2x1000 HE 24x2000HE 2x500 IB	1	7
467	02	3½ min	16,000	1030½	X	2x1000 HE 24x2000HE	1	7
466	360	5 min	13,000	1117½	X	4x1000 HE 24x2000HE	1	7
466	13	4 min	14,800	1116	X	2x1000 HE 25x2000HE	1	8
466	03	4 min	14,400	1117	X	6x1000 HE 32x2000HE	1	8

Point De La Coubre

448	08	17 min	15,000	1041	X	6x1000 HE 28x2000HE	1	8
448	13	17 min	15,350	1042½	X	3x1000 HE 32x2000HE 1xM47 IB	1	8
448	15	17 min	14,500	1043	X	3x1000 HE 32x2000HE 1xM47 IB	1	8
93	03	6 min	16,500	1042	X	4x1000 HE 29x2000HE	1	8
93	360	6 min	17,200	1046	X	8x1000 HE 26x2000HE	1	8
93	10	6 min	16,200	1045	X	2x1000 HE 30x2000HE	1	8
446	14	5 min	14,100	1046	X	6x1000 HE 28x2000HE	1	8
446	08	4 min	14,500	1046½	X	3x1000 HE 26x2000HE 2x500 IB	1	8
446	15	3 min	13,500	1046½	X	3x1000 HE 28x2000HE	1	7

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

14 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR
-------	------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------	-------------------

3RD AIR DIVISION

Target No. 7

96A	319	6 min	23,430	0931	X	456x120 FRAG	1	11
96B	314	6 min	24,080	0931	X	398x120 FRAG	1	9
96C	320	6 min	22,750	0932	X	462x120 FRAG	1	12
100D	327	6 min	19,600	1044	X	60x1000 HE	1	9
390A	330	5 min	21,110	1045	X	54x1000 HE	1	8
390B	331	5 min	20,600	1045	X	54x1000 HE	1	8
390C	317	5 min	20,100	1104	X	54x1000 HE	1	8
390D	335	5 min	20,070	1047	X	60x1000 HE	1	9

Target No. 137

388A	331	6 min	24,040	0934	X	454x120 FRAG	1	11
388B	325	6 min	24,880	0935	X	447x120 FRAG	1	11
385B	320	8 min	21,250	1105	X	144x500 HE	1	11
385C	328	8 min	20,110	1106	X	78x1000 HE	1	12

Target No. 33

388C	325	6 min	23,390	0938	X	442x120 FRAG	1	11	
452A	316	6 min	22,425	0943		X	451x120 FRAG	1	11

Target No. 1

452B	335	6 min	22,780	0945	X	454x120 FRAG	1	11
452C	327	6 min	21,550	0945	X	422x120 FRAG	1	11

Target No. 15

94A	048	6 min	22,400	1009	X	340x120 FRAG	1	8
94B	046	6 min	23,050	1012	X	340x120 FRAG	1	8
94C	048	6 min	21,490	1013	X	340x120 FRAG	1	8

Target No. 19

94D	030	6 min	21,365	1012		X	337x120 FRAG	1	8
447A	040	7 min	22,516	1019	X		340x120 FRAG	1	8
447B	045	7 min	23,025	1019	X		342x120 FRAG	1	8

Target No. 24

447C	030	6 min	22,016	1041	X		380x120 FRAG	1	9
------	-----	-------	--------	------	---	--	--------------	---	---

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

14 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
-------	-------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------	--------------------

3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Target No. 24 (continued)

447D	033	6 min	21,516	1022	X	342x120 FRAG	1	8
486A	030	6 min	22,510	1017	X	304x120 FRAG	1	7

Target No. 731

486B	025	6 min	22,366	1018	X	378x120 FRAG	1	9
486C	030	6 min	22,015	1020	X	380x120 FRAG	1	9
486D	070	6 min	21,000	1020	X	325x120 FRAG	1	8

Target No. 29

487A	019	6 min	22,450	1021	X	18x1000 HE 18x2000 HE	1	8
487B	016	6 min	22,500	1022	X	18x1000 HE 18x2000 HE	1	8
487C	039	6 min	21,950	1024	X	20x1000 HE 20x2000 HE	1	9
487D	010	6 min	21,450	1022	X	18x1000 HE 18x2000 HE	1	8

Target No. 8

100A	333	6 min	20,450	1040	X	54x1000 HE	1	8
100B	330	6 min	20,900	1041	X	60x1000 HE	1	9
100C	330	6 min	20,100	1043	X	54x1000 HE	1	8
493C	331	6 min	18,700	1052	X	120x500 HE	1	9
490A	320	6 min	20,500	1054	X	72x1000 HE	1	11
490F	320	6 min	20,800	1055	X	78x1000 HE	1	12
490C	330	6 min	19,925	1055	X	148x500 HE	1	12

Target No. 11

34A	327	6 min	20,050	1057	X	144x500 HE	1	11
34B	334	6 min	20,600	1059	X	155x500 HE	1	12
34C	335	6 min	19,900	1105	X	144x500 HE	1	11
385A	327	6 min	20,350	1105	X	144x500 HE	1	11

Target No. 10

493A	022	6 min	18,180	1138	X	108x500 HE	1	8
493B	012	9 min	18,330	1120	X	118x500 HE	1	9

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO Royan, Bordeaux area

Authorized for reproduction

of _____ copies

Copy No. _____

Eighth Air Force

Sig _____

Date _____

1st 2nd 3rd BOMBARDMENT DIVISIONS

DATE 14 April 1945

0400 - 1300 Hrs.

By authority of

C. C. Eighth Air Force

Initials _____

Date _____

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

Sea Level

Bases

England

Channel

France

Contrails: M. to D.S.R. with medium cld. 4 - 6/10 ci.st.

2 - 4/10 Ac.

3 - 5/10 Ac.

Vis: (Aloft) Unlimited Downward: 30 mi.

0 - 3/10 Sc. 10/10 Sc.

3 - 5/10 Cu.

Vis: 1 - 2000 yds. locally 500 yds. (Light Fog)

FOG PATCHES

Target

REPRODUCTION IN ACTION

Authorized for reproduction of 1st BOMBARDMENT DIVISION copies
 Copy No. 14 Apr. 45
 Eighth Air Force
 Date 0530-1450 Hrs.

SECRET
 By authority of
 C. G. Eighth Air Force
 Initials _____
 Date _____

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

Sea Level

Bases England

Sea (channel)

Continent

Visi: 2 - 3 Mi.

0 - 3/10 Sc.

3

-

5/10

Sc.

4

-

6/10 Sc.

10/10 Sc.

4 - 6/10 Sc.

0

-

3/10

Ac.

3

-

5/10

Ac.

L. N. P. contrails with Ac. & above 21000'

Visi: Unrestricted aloft
 Downward: 20 - 30 Mi.

DECLASSIFIED

WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Bordeaux area

Authorized for reproduction of _____ copies

Copy No. _____
Eighth Air Force

2nd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 14 Apr 45
0420-1430 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____

30,000

No contrails

25,000

2 - 4/10 Ci. 3 - 6/10 Ci

20,000

0 - 3/10 Ac.

15,000



10,000

Vis: Unrestricted aloft Downward: 20-30 Mi.

5,000

2 - 5/10 Sc.

10/10 St.



Sea Level

Vis: 2-3000 Yds. (later 3-600 Yds.)

Bases England

Sea
(channel)

Continent

Targets

DECLASSIFIED


WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Royan

3rd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 14 Apr. 45
0420-1345 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____

of _____ copies
Authorized for reproduction
Copy No. _____
Eighth Air Force
Sig _____
Date _____



~~DECLASSIFIED~~

WEATHER OPERATIONAL FORECAST - 14 APRIL 1945

1. Base to Target.

Scattered clouds with light fog, locally fog in patches becoming scattered to broken clouds. 0-3/10 stratus or stratocumulus base 3000-4000 feet, tops 5000 feet becoming 10/10 over channel base nil to 500 feet, tops 2000 feet becoming patchy ground fog over assembly area. 2-5/10 small cumulus base 2000 feet, tops 6000 feet at target. Nil middle cloud becoming 2-4/10 altocumulus, base 14,000 feet, tops 15,000 feet over assembly area and 3-5/10 base 15,000 feet, tops 18,000 feet at target. 4-6/10 cirrostratus base 24-26,000 feet, tops 28-30,000 feet becoming 5-8/10 base 26,000 feet, tops 28-30,000 feet with 0-3/10 patchy and base 22,000 feet, tops 24,000 feet at target. Freezing level 8000 feet, light to moderate rime in middle cloud. Visibility unrestricted aloft becoming 5 miles plus at base.

2. Target to Base.

Broken clouds with haze. 2-5/10 base 3000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet becoming tops 4-5000 feet over bases. Middle and high cloud reverse of route out. Freezing level 8000 feet, light to moderate rime in middle cloud. Visibility unrestricted aloft becoming 5 miles plus at base.

3. Winds.

	<u>Base to 48° North</u>		<u>48° North to Target</u>	
Surface	160°	10 Knots	180°	10 Knots
5,000 feet	160	10	190	10
10,000	170	10	200	15
15,000	170	10	200	20
20,000	180	10	210	25
25,000	180	10	220	25
30,000	180	10	220	25

4. Temperatures

Surface	18 Deg. C
5,000 feet	09
10,000	-01
15,000	-12
20,000	-23
25,000	-36
30,000	-48

5. Indicated and True Altitude, and Mean Temperature.

<u>Indicated Altitude</u>	<u>True Altitudes</u>			<u>All Divisions Mean Temps.</u>
	<u>3rd Div.</u>	<u>2nd Div.</u>	<u>1st Div.</u>	
10,000	10,189	10,039	10,339	09.0° C
12,000	12,219	12,069	12,369	07.0
14,000	14,248	14,098	14,398	05.0
16,000	16,287	16,137	16,437	03.0
18,000	18,325	18,175	18,475	01.0
20,000	20,365	20,215	20,515	-01.0
22,000	22,366	22,216	22,516	-03.5
24,000	24,404		24,554	-05.5
26,000	26,447		26,597	-07.5
28,000	28,436			-10.0

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

14 April 1945

6. Remarks.

Front located 40 miles W. of target with line of 8-10/10 large cumulus tops 8-10,000 feet. Risk of 10/10 in eastern bases on return 600-1000 feet, tops 3-4000 feet. Contrails moderate persistent above 21,000 feet. Dense persistent above 25,000 feet.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED - 14 APRIL 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

Take-Off

(0530-0630 Hours) Nil to 3/10 stratocumulus base 4000 feet tops 5000 feet. Nil to 3/10 cirrus, above 23,000 feet. Visibility 2-3 miles.

Route Out

3-5/10 stratocumulus base 4-5000 feet tops 6-7000 feet over England and channel, becoming 4-6/10 over France with one large 10/10 patch from 47° N. to 46° N. becoming closer in target area. Nil to 3/10 altocumulus, 13,000 feet over England and channel, increasing to 3-5/10 at 15,000 feet over Northern France, decreasing to nil over target. 0-3/10 cirrus base above 23,000 feet increasing to 3-5/10 over France.

Target

Royan (1130 Hours) No low or medium cloud. 3-5/10 cirrus base above 23,000 feet. Air to air visibility unlimited. Air to ground visibility 20-30 miles

Return Route

Nil low cloud, becoming 3-5/10 stratocumulus base 3-4000 feet top 5-7000 feet over channel and England. Nil middle cloud, becoming 4-7/10 altocumulus base 10-12,000 feet north of 47° N. becoming 8-10/10, base 8-10,000 over mid-channel and England. High cloud became unobserved north of 47° N. Rain over England on return. Visibility in rain, 2 miles.

Bases on Return

(1400-1450 Hours) 3-5/10 stratocumulus base 3-4000 feet tops 5000 feet. 7-10/10 altocumulus, base 5-8000 feet with rain, but 4-6/10 base 10-12,000 feet in northmost bases. 6-8/10 cirrus, base estimated 25,000 feet in northern bases, but unobserved otherwise. Rain - visibility 2-3 miles in rain.

Remarks

Light non-persistent contrails in middle cloud and above 21,000 feet. Winds more westerly than forecast. Temperatures warmer.

2ND AIR DIVISION

Bases at Take-off

(0420-0646 Hours) Clear. Visibility 2-3000 yards, lowering during take-off to 3-600 yards. Surface wind ESE-SE, 3-8 mph.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED (Continued)

14 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Route Out

Nil low clouds becoming 10/10 stratus over the channel, tops 2-3000 feet becoming 2-5/10 stratocumulus at continental coast to assembly area, base 1-2000 feet, tops 3-4000 feet decreasing slowly along route to target to nil. Nil medium clouds becoming nil-3/10 in patches, base 14,000 feet, tops 18,000 feet in assembly area becoming nil in target area. Nil high clouds becoming 2-4/10 in assembly area increasing slowly to 3-6/10 in the target area above 25,000 feet. Visibility unrestricted aloft.

Targets

Heavy gun emplacements near 4530 N. - 01 W. (1018-1116 Hours). Nil low clouds or medium clouds with 3-6/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Downward visibility 20-30 miles.

Return Route

Nil low clouds becoming 3-5/10 cumulus, base 2-3000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet over North France becoming 4-7/10 stratocumulus and cumulus over England, base 3-4000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet, with occasional patch of stratus between 500-1000 feet in the base area. Nil medium clouds over France becoming 5-8/10, base 10,000 feet, tops unobserved, over England. 3-6/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet increasing to 6-9/10 above 20,000 feet over England. Visibility unrestricted aloft.

Bases on Return

(1255-1430 Hours) 4-7/10 stratocumulus and cumulus, base 2-3000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet with an occasional patch of stratus between 500-1000 feet. 5-8/10 medium cloud, base 10,000 feet, tops unobserved. 6-9/10 cirrus above 20,000 feet. Visibility 3-6 miles. Surface winds ESE-SE, 12-16 mph.

Remarks: Nil contrails. Temperatures as forecast. Winds 40-50° more westerly than forecast, but velocity as forecast.

3RD AIR DIVISION

Take-Off

(0420-0640 Hours) 3-6/10 cirrus base 20,000-25,000 feet. Visibility 1600-3500 yards.

Route Out

Nil-3/10 stratocumulus tops 5000 feet becoming 7-10/10 tops 5000-6000 feet over channel and breaking inland to 2-4/10 patches to the target. Nil middle cloud except 10/10 altostratus tops 10-12,000 feet between 4800 N. - 0000 and 4500 N. - 0000. Variable coverage cirrus generally 3-6/10 in North becoming 6-9/10 base 26,000 feet in southern France. Visibility 5-10 miles in haze over England and France becoming unrestricted aloft.

Target

Royan (0935-1110 Hours) Nil low and medium cloud and 6-9/10 cirrus base 26,000 feet. Downward visibility 20-35 miles. Horizontal visibility unrestricted.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED (Continued)

14 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Return Route

Similar to route out except over Northern France and England where high cloud became 6-8/10 cirrostratus base 20-22,000 feet. Middle became 6-9/10 base 9-10,000 feet and over the channel 5-7/10 low cloud tops 5-8000 feet becoming patchy West of the bases.

Bases on Return

(1215-1345 Hours) Variable nil-3/10 stratocumulus base 5000 feet, tops 7000 feet. 5-8/10 altocumulus base 8-10,000 feet, 8-9/10 cirrus base 20-22,000 feet. Visibility 2-4 miles in haze.

Remarks

Moderate persistent contrails above 20,000 feet in target area. Winds reported slightly stronger and 40-60° more to northwest than forecast. Heavy layer cloud 50-100 miles West of target.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY

14 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 1</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 33</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA - FLAK BATTERY & STRONG POINT NO. 33A</u>	<u>TOTAL 1ST DIV.</u>
A/C Sorties	109	113	119	341
A/C Credited Sorties	108	112	119	339
A/C Effective Sorties	107 a	112 a	119 a	338
A/C Bombing	106	111	118	335
1st Priority	106	111	106	323
2nd Priority	0	0	12 b	12
Total Bombs (Tons)				
1st Priority (HE)	361.3	326.7	313.2	1001.2
2nd Priority (HE)	0	0	35.5	35.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0

a One aircraft dropped leaflets only.

b Twelve aircraft - Royan Area Strong Points 030048 on Illus. 734.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

14 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION

	<u>ROYAN</u> <u>AREA NO. 24</u>	<u>ROYAN</u> <u>AREA NO. 7</u>	<u>ROYAN</u> <u>AREA NO. 11</u>	<u>ROYAN</u> <u>AREA NO. 33</u>
A/C Sorties	34	33	37	36
A/C Credited Sorties	34	33	37	34
A/C Effective Sorties	26	33	37	34
A/C Bombing	26	33	37	34
1st Priority	26	32	37	34
2nd Priority	0	1 c	0	0
Total Bombs (Tons)				
1st Priority (HE)	69.0	83.0	125.0	117.0
(IB)	0	.2	.7	0
2nd Priority (HE)	0	3.0	0	0
Number A/C Lost	2	0	0	0
Unknown	2	0	0	0
Combat Damage	2	0	0	0
Cat. "A"	1	0	0	0
Cat. "B"	1	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	2	0	0	0
AA	1	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0
Casualties				
Wounded	5	0	0	0
M.I.A.	12	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0

c One aircraft - Royan Area No. 24.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

14 April 1945

DECLASSIFIED2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)

	<u>ROYAN</u> <u>AREA NO. 32</u>	<u>POINTE de La</u> <u>COUBRE NO. 27</u>	<u>POINTE de La</u> <u>COUBRE NO. 26</u>	<u>POINTE de La</u> <u>COUBRE NO. 28</u>
A/C Sorties	32	27	27	27
A/C Credited Sorties	30	26	26	27
A/C Effective Sorties	30	26	26	27
A/C Bombing	30	26	26	27
1st Priority	29	26	26	27
2nd Priority	1 d	0	0	0
Total Bombs (Tons)				
1st Priority (HE)	91.0	88.0	88.5	98.0
(IB)	.4	0	0	.1
2nd Priority (HE)	4.0	0	0	0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	1	5 e	See Tgt 27	See Tgt 27
Cat. "A"	0	4		
Cat. "B"	0	1		
Cat. "E"	1	0		
Cause of Damage	1	5 e	See Tgt 27	See Tgt 27
AA	0	4		
Other	1	1		
Casualties				
Killed	7	0	0	0
Wounded	1	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0

d One aircraft - Pointe de La Coubre Tgt 27.

e This is the combat damage for all Pointe de La Coubre targets.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

14 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)

	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 17-38</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 18</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 19</u>	<u>TOTAL 2ND DIV.</u>
A/C Sorties	30	28	25	336
A/C Credited Sorties	26	26	24	323
A/C Effective Sorties	26	26	24	315
A/C Bombing	26	26	24	315
1st Priority	26	17	24	304
2nd Priority	0	0	0	2
T.O.	0	9	0	9
Total Bombs (Tons)				
1st Priority {HE}	86.0	61.0	76.5	983.0
{IB}	0	0	0	1.4
2nd Priority {HE}	0	0	0	7.0
T.O. {HE}	0	26.0	0	26.0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	2
Unknown	0	0	0	2
Combat Damage	2	1	0	11
Cat. "A"	0	0	0	5
Cat. "B"	0	0	0	2
Cat. "E"	2	1	0	4
Cause of Damage	2	1	0	11
AA	0	0	0	5
Other	2	1	0	6
Casualties				
Killed	11	0	0	18
Wounded	2	0	0	8
M.I.A.	0	0	0	12
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0

DECLASSIFIED

14 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION

TASK FORCE I

	ROYAN AREA NO. 7	ROYAN AREA NO. 137	ROYAN AREA NO. 33	ROYAN AREA FLAK BAT. 108005 ILLUS. 728 NO. 1 A	POINTE de GRAVE NO. 29
A/C Sorties	37	24	25	25	37
A/C Credited Sorties	37	24	25	25	37
A/C Effective Sorties	37	24	25 f	25	37
A/C Bombing	36 g	24	25	25	37
1st Priority	35	24	24	24	37
2nd Priority	1	0	1 h	1 i	0
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	111.0
(Frag)	79.0	54.0	53.5	52.6	0
2nd Priority (Frag)	2.3	0.	2.3	2.3	0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	2	0	0	0
Cat. "AC"	0	1	0	0	0
Cat. "E"	0	1	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	2	0	0	0
Other	0	2	0	0	0
Casualties					
Wounded	0	1	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

f One aircraft dropped leaflets.

g One aircraft - Royan Area Flak Bat. at 022034 on Illus. 731.

h One aircraft - Pointe de La Coubre No. 27.

i One aircraft - Pointe de Grave No. 19.

DECLASSIFIED

14 April 1945

DECLASSIFIED3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

TASK FORCE I (Continued)

	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 15</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 19</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 24</u>	<u>ROYAN FLAK BAT. 108005 ILLUS. 731 NO. 27 A</u>	<u>TOTAL - TASK FORCE I</u>
A/C Sorties	29	28	29	30	264
A/C Credited Sorties	29	28	29	30	264
A/C Effective Sorties	27	27	29 j	30	261
A/C Bombing	27	27	28	30	259
1st Priority	27	27	27	29	254
2nd Priority	0	0	1 k	1 l	5
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	111.0
(Frag)	61.2	61.1	61.5	65.0	487.9
2nd Priority (Frag)	0	0	2.3	2.3	11.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0	2
Cat. "AC"	0	0	0	0	1
Cat. "E"	0	0	0	0	1
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0	2
Other	0	0	0	0	2
Casualties					
Wounded	0	0	0	0	1
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

j One aircraft dropped leaflets.

k One aircraft - Royan Area No. 137.

l One aircraft - Royan Area No. 137.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

14 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

TASK FORCE II

	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 8</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 7</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 10</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 12</u>
A/C Sorties	28	48	20	48
A/C Credited Sorties	28	48	20	48
A/C Effective Sorties	28	48 m	19	48
A/C Bombing	28	47	19	48
1st Priority	28	47	19	48
Total Bombs (Tons)				
1st Priority (HE)	84.0	141.0	56.5	142.0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0

m One aircraft dropped leaflets.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

14 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

TASK FORCE II (Continued)

	ROYAN AREA NO. 11	ROYAN AREA NO. 137	TOTAL - TASK FORCE II	TOTAL 3RD DIV.	GRAND TOTAL
A/C Sorties	50	26	220	484	1161
A/C Credited Sorties	50	26	220	484	1146
A/C Effective Sorties	50 n	25	218	479	1132
A/C Bombing	49	25	216	475	1125
1st Priority	49	25	216	470	1097
2nd Priority	0	0	0	5	19
T.O.	0	0	0	0	9
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	146.8	75.0	645.3	756.3	2740.5
(IB)	0	0	0	0	1.4
(Frag)	0	0	0	487.9	487.9
2nd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	42.5
(Frag)	0	0	0	11.5	11.5
T.O.	0	0	0	0	26.0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	2
Unknown	0	0	0	0	2
Combat Damage	0	0	0	2	13
Cat. "A"	0	0	0	0	5
Cat. "AC"	0	0	0	1	1
Cat. "B"	0	0	0	0	2
Cat. "E"	0	0	0	1	5
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	2	13
M	0	0	0	0	5
Other	0	0	0	2	8
Casualties					
Killed	0	0	0	0	18
Wounded	0	0	0	0	9
M.I.A.	0	0	0	0	12
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

n One aircraft dropped leaflets.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

By authority of
C.G., VIII Fighter Cmd.
Initials. *W.M.*
Date. *13 Sept. 1945.*

COPY NO. 29

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

15 APRIL, 1945

FIELD ORDER NO.

1988

TARGETS

SIXTEEN (16) ENEMY DEFENSIVE
INSTALLATIONS, CONSISTING OF
ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ARTILLERY
POSITIONS AND STRONG POINTS
COVERING THE GIRONDE ESTUARY
IN SOUTHWEST FRANCE.

OPERATION NO.

951

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPORT OF OPERATIONS

ANNEXES

ROUTES & TARGETS

BOMBING

WEATHER

STATISTICS

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

REPORT OF

EIGHTH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

15 April 1945

1. IDENTIFICATION.

a. Operation No. 951 (Codeword: "Venerable")

b. Assigned Targets

Eighteen (18) enemy defensive installations, consisting of anti-aircraft and artillery positions and strong points covering the Gironde estuary in southwest France. (See paragraph 3.b. (3) for specific targets).

2. INTRODUCTION.

a. Under plan "Venerable" whereby the combined efforts of the First U.S. Tactical Air Force (the 42nd Bomb Wing and Western French Air Force), the Eighth Air Force, the Sixth Army Group (Army Detachment of the Atlantic-French ground troops), and French naval units were to be directed toward elimination of German pockets which were denying to the Allies the use of port facilities in the Bordeaux area, the following operations had been accomplished prior to this date:

13 April - Western French Air Force: 76 aircraft dropped 60 tons on "Venerable" targets.

14 April - Western French Air Force: 193 aircraft sortied. 104 aircraft were effective attacking "Venerable" targets.

42nd Bomb Wing: 90 aircraft sortied, 86 aircraft were effective dropping 120 tons on "Venerable" targets.

Eighth Air Force: 1161 aircraft sortied, 1125 aircraft dropped 3310 tons on "Venerable" targets (See Tactical Report of Operation No. 948).

b. The ground assault phase of the operation was to be launched immediately after the second day's attack by Eighth Air Force heavy bombers, a second large-scale operation against essentially the same strong points and gun positions as had been the objectives on 14 April. With weather a controlling factor in air cooperation, D-Day was to be determined by Eighth Air Force based upon forecast conditions on or before 15 April.

3. EIGHTH AIR FORCE PLANNING.

a. Weather

On 14 April 1945, at 0900 hours, the forecast for 15 April indicated that western France and northern Germany would probably be visual; other Continental areas were expected to be overcast. By 1500 hours general conditions had improved to the extent that all of the Continent, with the exception of a small strip from Amsterdam to Vienna, was indicated as having less than 5/10 low cloud. The 2200-hour forecast confirmed visual weather in France and predicted visual conditions in northeastern Germany and varying overcast in western Germany. The overcast in southern England (7-10/10 low cloud, 4-6/10 middle cloud and 4-6/10 high cloud). indicated by the latest forecast, was expected to become nil low and medium cloud south of 48° 30' N. and give unimpeded visibility in the Gironde estuary area. Base conditions were reported as satisfactory for take-off.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

b. Target Selection and Force Assignment

(1) When the operation against ground installations in the Gironde estuary area was accomplished on 14 April, it was expected that the attacks would be renewed on 15 April, weather permitting. On the morning of 14 April forecasts showed probable visual conditions in the Bordeaux area for 15 April, but it was not until the afternoon operations conference that the decision was made to employ the entire Eighth Air Force against "Venerable" targets. The objectives were, on the whole, to be the same as those attacked on 14 April. The commander of the ground forces was informed that this second heavy bomber operation would be the signal for launching the ground assault.

(2) As plans for the subject operation developed it was decided that inasmuch as stocks of Napalm incendiary bombs, originally intended for use against the Siegfried line, were on hand this would be a favorable opportunity to initiate their use by Eighth Air Force heavy bombers. It was believed that this type of incendiary would be ideally suited for use against the casemated and revetted emplacements (experimentation and use of this jellied gasoline bomb by fighter aircraft having indicated that upon impact a wave of flame sweeps over the surface filling depressions and rendering excavations and personnel shelters untenable.) Two varieties of these fire bombs were available, the British 108-gallon, paper, fighter belly tank reduced to a capacity of 85 gallons and the 75-gallon U.S. metal fighter belly tank modified for filling. These bombs were specified for use by the forces of two Air Divisions (2nd and 3rd) together with standard incendiary bombs. GP bombs of 1000 and 2000 lbs. were to be carried by both forces of the other Air Division (1st); its main force was to be dispatched against nine coastal batteries; a special force of three groups designated as a "circling fire brigade" was to orbit the initial point and at the discretion of the Air Commander was to be committed in six-aircraft sections against any installation which, after attacks by the main force, indicated combat effectiveness by the firing of its guns.

(3) The bombers, operating as four forces, were given specific assignments as follows:

<u>Target Number</u>	<u>Locality</u>	<u>Type of Target</u>	<u>Grid Reference GSGS 4246, 6M</u>	<u>Number of Units</u>
--------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------	---	----------------------------

Force I - 3rd Air Division (B-17's)

(Tactical Unit - group of three 13-aircraft or four 10-aircraft squadrons)

1	Royan-Medis	Strong point	408755	5 groups 19 sqdns
33A	Royan	Strong point; various batteries, possible head- quarters building railway AA guns.	388754	5 groups 18 sqdns
33	Royan (Fort de Royan)	3x75 mm AA guns; light AA positions; strong point.	365744	4 groups 12 sqdns

Force II - 2nd Air Division (B-24's)

(Tactical Unit - combat wing of 6-10 squadrons each consisting of 10 or 11 a/c)

7	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	3x155 mm guns; 4 heavy AA guns	353771	1 C W 9 sqdns
8	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strong point	349779	1 C W (7 sqdns
10	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strong point	348771	(3 sqdns

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

12	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	Strong point	348767	1 C W	9 sqdns
11	Royan/Vaux-sur-mer	6x155 mm guns (case-mated); 3x75 mm guns; 4x37 mm guns; ammunition depot	344760	1 C W	6 sqdns

Force III - 1st Air Division (B-17's)
(Tactical Unit - group of three 13-aircraft squadrons)

32	Royan/Pointe de Susac	6x75 mm coastal guns; 2x120 mm coastal guns; light AA guns.	401699	1 group	3 sqdns
17)	Pointe de Grave	4x155 mm guns (case-mated)	343693)	1 group	3 sqdns
38)	(in close proximity)	4x105 mm guns (case-mated)	340691)		
19	Pointe de Grave	4x165 mm guns (case-mated); 2x77 mm guns (case-mated); 3x75 mm AA guns	308650	1 group	3 sqdns
18	Pointe de Grave	3x77 mm AA guns (case-mated)	342628	1 group	3 sqdns
24	Pointe de la Coubre (LeFort)	2x105 mm AA guns (casemated)	302785	1 group	3 sqdns
29	Pointe de la Coubre	4x240 mm guns (case-mated)	239847	1 group	3 sqdns
26	Pointe de la Coubre	4x138 mm guns (case-mated)	239840	1 group	3 sqdns
27	Pointe de la Coubre	4x150 mm guns (case-mated)	229839	1 group	3 sqdns
28	Pointe de la Coubre	2x220 mm coastal guns (casemated); 4 medium AA guns.	214835	1 group	3 sqdns

Force IV - 1st Air Division (B-17's)

Three groups, each consisting of six 6-aircraft squadrons, to orbit initial point and attack in single squadron strength any Force III target designated by the Air Commander.

- Note:
- With the exception of target 33A, all target numbers refer to a target designation sheet submitted by the French ground forces to all air forces involved in operation "Venerable."
 - Second priority targets for all forces were to be any objective assigned to other units as their first priority targets. All bombing was to be accomplished visually and therefore no other priorities were established.

(4) Coordination of the air operation with the assault by ground forces resulted in the stipulation that no bombs would be dropped after 1200 hours by units of the command excepting those in the special force (Force IV) which was to be under the direct control of the Air Commander.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

c. Bomber Flight Plan

(1) In view of the unfavorable cloud conditions indicated for assembly in the normal areas of southern England, all forces were to effect Continental assemblies in northeastern France. After forming, the forces were to converge at the common point, Orleans, (Force I at 0856 hours, Force II at 0948 hours, Force III at 1008 hours and Force IV at 1026 hours) and proceed on a southwesterly heading to the initial point situated east of the target area. A westerly bomb run was prescribed for all forces, giving an upwind (wind forecast at 10 knots from 270°) and downsun (from 102° azimuth at 26° elevation) approach. It was necessary in the case of units carrying the Napalm bombs to attack as directly upwind as possible in order to avoid any cross trail effects which might cause these fire bombs to drift substantially; furthermore, the downsun approach was highly desirable to facilitate identification of the pin-point targets. Bombing altitudes of 15,000 feet were specified to promote accuracy, this being considered feasible in the light of the ineffective anti-aircraft opposition encountered on the earlier mission. Times of attack were set as follows: Force I (3rd Air Division) 1016-1055 hours; Force II (2nd Air Division) 1105-1119 hours; Force III (1st Air Division) 1127-1145 hours; and for Force IV as directed by the Air Commander. All forces were to rally to the west of the target area over the Bay of Biscay, withdraw in a northerly direction, and depart the Continental coast at the northeastern tip of the Normandy peninsula. Force I and II crossing in the English coast at Selsey Bill and Forces III and IV at Anvil Point.

(2) The usual B-17 and P-51 weather scouts were to be provided to report on route and target conditions. It was planned, furthermore, to provide Force III with a special screening force of four Mosquitoes in addition to the "carpet" and "chaff" measures normally employed by all forces.

(3) Special instructions primarily designed to prevent bomb-falls within friendly lines and to facilitate accuracy included:

(a) Extreme caution to be exercised to guard against early releases. If any doubt existed a sufficient interval of delay was to be introduced to insure "overs" rather than "shorts".

(b) Bomb bay doors, rack switches and intervalometers to be checked while crossing Channel as a precaution against accidental release over friendly troops.

(c) Specific briefing as to location of French encampment (GSGS 4249, Sheet 6M: 275855 to 280845 to 312842 to 328060 to 290868) situated in the Pointe de la Coubre area 2 5/8 miles due west of Target Numbers 26 and 29, and 3 5/8 miles due north of Target No. 24.

(d) Briefing to avoid French naval units lying off shore in vicinity of targets when jettisoning as well as when bombing.

(e) Bombing runs for units carrying Napalm to be as close to wind as possible to avoid high drift factor.

(f) All forces to attack in smallest practicable bombing unit.

(g) Second runs authorized and encouraged, with units undertaking such to return to point on penetration route prior to initial point before attempting new approaches.

Note: See "Routes and Targets" Annex for Over-all Plan showing details of bomber routes and timings and Flak Map for relationship of routes to known enemy anti-aircraft defenses. Target assignments (by units) and Flight Order Interval are also found in this Annex.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

d. Fighter Support

No enemy fighters were based in the Royan area and no enemy fighters could be expected to leave their distant bases in Germany to intercept the bomber formations operating in western France. Accordingly, none of the 15 Eighth Air Force fighter groups were required to support this mission.

4. EXECUTION

a. Targets Bombed

Sixteen (16) of the wighteen (18) first priority targets were bombed. Nine (9) of the first priority targets were attacked by other than assigned units as second priority objectives and two batteries were bombed as targets of opportunity (See paragraph 4.d. (6) for specific targets bombed).

b. Take-off and Assembly

Take-Offs were accomplished on schedule and all forces assembled over their designated beacon areas in northeastern France substantially as planned. In Force I, one group experienced some interference from another of its groups which was briefed to assemble 2,000 feet higher; a third group was forced to assemble using pilotage since its buncher was inoperative. Force II assembled without incident. One squadron of a Force III group failed to assemble with the forces and followed at the end of the column. Force IV, assembling together with Force III, experienced no difficulties. A total of 1340 heavy bombers sortied on this mission: 523 B-17's in Force I (3rd Air Division); 359 B-24's in Force II (2nd Air Division); 344 B-17's in Force III (1st Air Division) and 114 B-17's in Force IV (1st Air Division).

c. Penetration

Because of a tendency to narrow the interval between groups and forces, certain deviations from the prescribed penetration routes were necessitated in order to maintain the formations.

(1) As units of Force I approached the initial point each preceding group deviated to the left of the unit ahead in order to increase the interval. The last units were 35 to 40 miles left of the briefed course at the turn to the initial point, with the result that the runs were made on headings that varied from 262° to 300°. The last group of Force I lost visual contact with the other units prior to reaching the initial point area and cut inside the preceding group when the turn to the initial point was made. The group leader attempted to position his group in the wing column and did not discover his error in sufficient time to avoid interference with the other group. The Force I units reached the initial point at substantially the scheduled time (briefed 1001-1040 hours; actual 0958-1047 hours).

(2) Force II B-24's with their higher cruising speed than the preceding B-17's, gained more than the allotted three-minute differential to overrun Force I near the initial point. To avoid interference, all units maneuvered to lose time. The maneuver consisted generally of bearing off to the left and turning into the initial point several miles east of the briefed point. It was generally successful but it caused some units to make their bombing runs from initial points different than the briefed (headings varied from 265° to 323°). Timings at the initial point were essentially as planned (briefed 1050-1102 hours; actual 1054-1103 hours.)

(3) Force III flew its prescribed penetration route as planned, arriving at the initial point at 1110-1135 hours (briefed for 1110-1128 hours).

(4) The last three groups of 1st Air Division groups designated as Force IV arrived in the initial point area immediately after the units of

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Force III. They orbitted as planned, but were not called upon to cross the initial point on their bomb runs until an hour to an hour and a half thereafter (1249-1308 hours).

d. Target Area

(1) General

As predicted, the bomber forces found nil low cloud, nil medium cloud and 0-3/10 cirrus above bombing altitudes; downward visibility of about 25 miles was reported. With few exceptions the units attacked their assigned first priority targets by the prescribed visual technique. Due to smoke obscuration, some second runs were necessitated and some second priority and opportunity objectives were attacked through inability or failure to properly identify first priority targets.

(2) Force I (3rd Air Division)

(a) The 14 B-17 groups of this force, made up of 49 squadrons, were assigned their objectives, Targets Nos. 1, 33 and 33A, in the Royan area. All were attacked but there were several cases of faulty identification and second runs due to personnel errors, inadequate target briefing material, and smoke obscuration. One of the 19 squadrons assigned to the strong point designated as No. 1 bombed Target No. 24, a gun position, second priority. One of the 12 squadrons assigned to Fort de Royan, Target No. 33, was non-effective due to interference on its bomb run and the restriction against bombing after 1200 hours caused it to jettison in the Bay of Biscay. Four of the 18 squadrons dispatched against the strong point known as Target No. 33A attacked Target No. 33, second priority.

(b) Bombing was accomplished at 1010-1104 hours (briefed 1016-1055 hours) from 14,040-16,200 feet (briefed for 15,000 feet). In this force 504 B-17's participated in the attacks, dropping 800.8 tons; 455 aircraft releasing 725.1 tons on first priority targets and 49 releasing 75.7 tons on second priority targets.

(3) Force II (2nd Air Division)

(a) This force, made up of five B-24 combat wings having an aggregate of 34 squadrons, was assigned to five targets (Target Nos. 7, 8, 10, 12, 11), closely grouped in the Royan/Vaux-sur-mer area. Although smoke interfered with the sightings of numerous squadrons, and H2X aid was utilized in three instances all units attacked their designated objectives with the exception of two which bombed second priority targets.

(b) Attacks by Force II were made from altitudes of 13,100-17,500 feet (briefed 15,000 feet) and bombing times were 1108-1130 hours (briefed 1105-1119 hours), the intervals between wings having extended somewhat due to the maneuvers just prior to reaching the initial point. In this force 339 B-24's participated in the bombing, releasing 678.3 tons: 316 aircraft dropping 628.9 tons on first priority targets and 23 aircraft dropping 49.4 tons on second priority targets.

(4) Force III (1st Air Division)

(a) The nine B-17 groups, totalling 27 squadrons, comprising this force had for their objectives four installations on the south side of the estuary on the Pointe de Grave (Target Nos. 17, 19, 18 and 38), one target southeast of Royan at Pointe de Susac (Target No. 32), one target northwest of Royan at Le Fort (Target No. 24) and four targets situated further to the northwest at Pointe de la Coubre (Target Nos. 29, 26, 27 and 28). Many units reported difficulty in identifying their assigned aiming points due to smoke from bursts of preceding formations. Second runs were made in several cases

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

to overcome the limitations on visibility or to avoid collision courses. One squadron was unable to identify its target on the second run and returned its bombs to base as there was not sufficient time for a third run. With the exception of Targets 26 and 29, all first priority targets were attacked. The two groups assigned to these two targets were unable to identify their objectives due to smoke obscuration and bombed four second priority targets and two targets of opportunity.

(b) Bombs were released at 1123-1158 hours (briefed 1127-1145 hours), except for one squadron, which, contrary to instructions prohibiting bombing after 1200 hours for the first three forces, attacked at 1210 hours on its second run. Altitudes of release ranged from 14,500-16,600 feet (briefed 15,000 feet). In this 1st Air Division force a total of 325 B-17's bombed with 967.5 tons: 251 releasing 748.0 tons on first priority targets; 49 dropping 146.0 tons on second priority targets and 25 releasing 73.5 tons on targets of opportunity.

(5) Force IV (1st Air Division)

(a) This special "follow-up" force of 1st Air Division, consisted of three B-17 groups, a total of 18 six-aircraft squadrons. As previously related these units orbited east of the initial point awaiting instructions to attack such Force III targets as the Air Commander might designate. After circling for more than an hour instructions from the command aircraft sent six squadrons to bomb Targets 17 and 38 situated within 50 yards of each other; six squadrons to attack Target 18 and the last six squadrons to strike at Target 19. All squadrons bombed their designated targets, except one which as a consequence of an identification error missed its MPI by a mile and a half.

(b) Force IV squadrons carried out their attacks from altitudes of 14,400-17,200 feet (briefed 15,000 feet). Bombing times were from 1258-1327 hours, since no prohibition existed against bombing after 1200 hours for this force. A total of 112 B-17's released 333.5 tons on their first priority targets.

(6) Bombing Results

The assessment of available photographic cover of these attacks which involved 1280 heavy bombers dropping a total of 2780.0 tons, reveals the following results, with which are tabulated pertinent bombing data:

<u>Target Number</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Aircraft Attacking</u>	<u>Total Bombs Dropped</u>	<u>Results</u>
<u>FORCE I</u>				
1	189	175	893x550 Napalm 1050x70 IB 543x70 IB	Good
24(Second Priority)		13		
33A	189	149	662x550 Napalm 1502x70 IB	Good
33(Second Priority)		36	206x550 Napalm	Prob. Good
33	145	131	597x550 Napalm 1256x70 IB	
<hr/>				
	523	504	2358x550 Napalm 4351x70 IB	

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

FORCE II

7	97	91	619x550 Napalm 442x70 IB	Unobserved
8 (Second Priority)		1	8x550 Napalm	
8	70	67	5x500 HE 448x550 Napalm 286x70 IB	Unobserved
7 (Second Priority)		1	8x550 Napalm	
10	28	26	181x550 Napalm 104x70 IB	Unobserved
12 (Second Priority)		1	52x70 IB	
12	97	89	2x500 HE 572x550 Napalm 401x70 IB	Unobserved
11	67	43	264x550 Napalm 313x70 IB	Unobserved
8 (Second Priority)		10	78x550 Napalm 1x70 IB	
24 (Second Priority)		10	79x550 Napalm 1x70 IB	

359	339	7x500 HE 2257x550 Napalm 1600x70 IB
-----	-----	---

FORCE III

32	38	36	72x1000 HE 72x2000	Good-Very Good
17 and 38	42	42	84x1000 84x2000	Good-Very Good
19	42	40	80x1000 80x2000	Good-Very Good
24 (Second Priority)		1	1x1000 2x2000	
18	37	37	68x1000 74x2000	m Good-Very Good
24	31	31	62x1000 62x2000	Good-Very Good
29	37	(Not attacked)		
17 (Second Priority)		12	24x1000 24x2000	Good-Very Good
18 (Second Priority)		12	24x1000 24x2000	Unobserved
16 (Target of Opportunity)		12	24x1000 24x2000	Fair
26	39	(Not attacked)		
28 (Second Priority)		12	23x1000 24x2000	Good-Very Good
38 (Second Priority)		12	24x1000 24x2000	Good-Very Good

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

14 (Target of Opportunity)	13	25x1000 25x2000	Good
----------------------------	----	--------------------	------

27	39	26	51x1000 52x2000	Good
----	----	----	--------------------	------

28	39	39	77x1000 77x2000	Good-Very Good
----	----	----	--------------------	----------------

344	325	639x1000 HE 648x2000
-----	-----	-------------------------

FORCE IV

114	--	---
-----	----	-----

* 18	38	228x1000 HE	Good-Very Good
------	----	-------------	----------------

* 19	38	76x1000	Good-Very Good
------	----	---------	----------------

* 17	36	69x1000 71x2000	Good-Very Good
------	----	--------------------	----------------

114	112	373x1000 HE 147x2000
-----	-----	-------------------------

* Designated for attack by Air Commander.

Note: See "Bombing" Annex for diagrammatic bomb plots reconnaissance photographs, bomb plot and extracts of interpretation reports.

(7) Enemy Opposition

Some units of Forces I and II encountered meager, generally inaccurate fire over the target area, but no effective opposition developed.

e. Withdrawal

The briefed return routes were followed without important deviations. With the exception of Force IV, all forces were several minutes ahead of achedule on arrival at the English coast. Force IV, attacking targets by squadron at the discretion of the Air Commander, did not rally into group formation after bombing and each of the six-aircraft sections returned to base independently without untowards incident.

f. Sorties, Losses, Battle Damage and Claims

(1) Bombers

A total of 1340 bombers sortied on this operation and made 1285 effective sorties, including 4 aircraft dropping leaflets only and 1 scout aircraft. A total of 1280 bombers released 2780.0 tons: 1134 aircraft dropping 2435.4 tons on their first priority targets; 121 aircraft dropping 271.1 tons on second priority targets; and 25 aircraft dropping 73.5 tons on targets of opportunity. Aircraft of Forces I and II, assigned to carry Napalm bombs as well as other incendiaries and some HE, dropped 2628 Napalm bombs (722.7 tons). There were no losses arising out of this operation. Two instances of category "E" (salvage) damage and 12 cases of category "A" damage were the total battle damage from this operation (10 instances occasioned by anti-aircraft fire, and the remaining 4 by other causes). Force I reported 4 cases of category "A" damage, Force II experienced 8 instances of catégorie "A" damage and 2 of category "E"; Forces III and IV gave negative reports.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

(2) Fighters

A total of 20 P-51's made effective sorties as weather scouts.

5. COMMENTS.

As this mission represented the first operational use of Napalm fire bombs by heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force, a ground survey party was dispatched to the area to study effectiveness of this weapon. It was found that the Napalm tanks which fell in open fields and upon relatively soft surfaces had a tendency to bury to a depth which made them practically ineffective; those fire bombs which struck upon harder surfaces such as roads and strong point areas had a somewhat larger burning radius but were relatively ineffective as to heat intensity or scattering of fire. On an average, the effective, though far from deadly, radius of these incendiaries was 10-15 feet. Based on first-hand observation, prisoner of war interrogation, and information obtained from French Staff Officers, it was concluded that the pill boxes, gun encasements and underground shelters were not physically damaged by this weapon and that open trenches and dugouts were only slightly affected. The psychological effect upon troops was also found to be generally negligible. Enclosures in the "Bombing" Annex of this report summarize in some detail the experience of the Eighth Air Force in adapting the Napalm bomb to heavy bomber use and treat at considerable length the findings of the ground survey team.

DECLASSIFIED

DAY MONTH YEAR	
CIVIL TWILIGHT	0628
SUNRISE	0705
SUNSET	2057
END CIVIL TWILIGHT	2132
ALL TIMES IN LOCAL STANDARD TIME	

DAY 2 MONTH 10	
CIVIL TWILIGHT	0628
SUNRISE	0705
SUNSET	2057
END CIVIL TWILIGHT	2132
ALL TIMES IN LOCAL STANDARD TIME	

HEAVY GUNS
8450
14 APR 1945

SCANS RUN DRIFT

FLAK MAP # 115 15 APRIL 1945 (SECRET)

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

TARGET ASSIGNMENTS

15 April 1945

CHART REF NO.	TARGET	FORCE*	T.O.T.	ALTITUDE
------------------	--------	--------	--------	----------

1ST AIR DIVISION - FORCE III

A	(32	384th Gp (3 Sqs)	1126	15,000
	(17, 38	379th Gp (3 Sqs)	1128	15,000
	(19	303rd Gp (3 Sqs)	1130	15,000
	(18	381st Gp (3 Sqs)	1132	15,000
	(24	398th Gp (3 Sqs)	1134	15,000
	(29	91st Gp (3 Sqs)	1136	15,000
	(26	306th Gp (3 Sqs)	1138	15,000
	(27	305th Gp (3 Sqs)	1140	15,000
(28	92nd Gp (3 Sqs)	1142	15,000	

1ST AIR DIVISION - FORCE IV

401st, 457th and 351st Groups, each consisting of six 6-aircraft squadrons, to orbit at I.P. and attack in single squadron strength any Force III target designated by the Air Commander.

2ND AIR DIVISION - FORCE II

B	(7	14th CW: 392nd Gp (3 Sqs)	1105	15,000
	(491st Gp (3 Sqs)		
	(44th Gp (3 Sqs)		
	(8	96th CW: 466th (4 Sqs)	1109	15,000
	(467th (3 Sqs)		
	(10	96th CW: 458th (3 Sqs)	1111	15,000
	(12	20th CW: 93rd (3 Sqs)	1113	15,000
	(446th (3 Sqs)		
(448th (3 Sqs)			
(11	2nd CW: 389th (3 Sqs)	1117	15,000	
(445th (3 Sqs)			

3RD AIR DIVISION - FORCE I

C	(1	447th (4 Sqs), 486th (4 Sqs)	1016-1025	15,000
	(487th (4 Sqs), 94th (4 Sqs)		
	(34th (3 Sqs), Groups		
(33a	95th (4 Sqs), 390th (4 Sqs)	1028-1037	15,000	
(100th (4 Sqs), 385th (3 Sqs)			
(490th (3 Sqs)			
(33	388th (3 Sqs), 452nd (3 Sqs)	1040-1047	15,000	
(96th (3 Sqs), 493rd (3 Sqs) Group.			

- * Tactical Unit: 1st Air Division - Group of three 13-aircraft B-17 squadrons.
 2nd Air Division - Combat Wing of 6-10 Squadrons of 10 or 11 B-24's.
 3rd Air Division - Group of three 13 aircraft B-17 Squadrons or four 10 aircraft B-1 Squadrons.

Note: See Target Order and Interval.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

FLIGHT ORDER AND INTERVAL

15 April 1945

Force I - (T.O.T. 1016-1047 hours) - 3rd Air Division - to Royan area.

447th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;	486th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
487th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;	94th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
34th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;	95th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
390th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;	100th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes;
385th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;	490th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;
388th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;	452nd Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;
96th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;	493rd Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;

13 minute interval before next following unit reaches common point at Orleans.

Force II - (T.O.T. 1105-1117 hours) - 2nd Air Division - to Royan area.

14th CW (9 Sqs): 4 minutes;	96th CW (10 Sqs): 4 minutes;
20th CW (9 Sqs): 4 minutes;	2nd CW (6 Sqs).

8 minute interval before next following unit reaches common point at Orleans.

Force III - (T.O.T. 1126-1142 hours) - 1st Air Division - to Royan area.

384th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;	379th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
303rd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;	381st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
398th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;	91st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
306th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;	305th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
92nd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes.	

2 minute interval before next following unit reaches common point at Orleans.

Force IV - (T.O.T. Discretion of Air Commander) - 1st Air Division - to Royan area.

401st Gp (6 Sqs): 2 minutes;	457th Gp (6 Sqs): 2 minutes;
351st Gp (6 Sqs).	

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED


TRACK CHART

DATE 15 APRIL 1945

TARGETS

PRIMARIES AS LISTED ON TARGET ASSIGNMENT SHEET


ROUTE FOLLOWED BY 1st Air Div. A
2nd " " B
3rd " " C



DECLASSIFIED

TRACK CHART
Date 15 APRIL, 1945
1st A.D.

Route Followed by 1st DIVISION



DECLASSIFIED

TRACK CHART

TARGET
Primary

DECLASSIFIED
RECON AREA

DATE 15 APR. 1945


96CBW
D.A.D.

Route followed by BRIEFING

466 ACTUAL

458 "

467 "



COMBAT

P.W. 190 ○
M.E. 109 ○
J.U. 88 ○
M.E. 110 ○
D.O. 217 ○

FLACK
HEAVY ■
LIGHT ▲

	CP1	CP2	IP	CP3	ENGLISH COAST
96CBW	0858	0952	1054	1251	1316
BRIEFING	10000	10000	15000	5000	5000
466	0901	0949	1054 1/2	1246 1/2	133 1/2
ACTUAL	10000	10000	15000	5500	3200
467	0900	0953	1058 1/2	1248	1313
ACTUAL	11000	10500	15500	5000	3000
458	0904	0951	1106	1247	1313
ACTUAL	12100	12100	16000	6000	3000

DECLASSIFIED


TRACK CHART

TARGET
Primary

ROYAN AREA

DATE 15 APR. 1945
2ND A.D.

Route followed by BRIEFING
389 ACTUAL



COMBATS

F.W. 190 ○
M.E. 109 ○
J.U. 88 ○
M.E. 110 ○
D.O. 217 ○

FLACK

HEAVY ■
LIGHT ▲

	CP1	CP2	IP	T	CP3	ENGLISH COAST
2 CBW	0906	1000	1102	1117	1259	1324
BRIEFING	10000	10000	15000	15000	5000	5000
389	0903	0955	1103	1118	1250	1315
ACTUAL	12000	15300	15300	15300	4000	4000
445	0903	0956½	1106	1127	1255½	1327½
ACTUAL	13500	15000	15000	15000	4000	3500

TRACK CHART

TARGET
Primary ROYAN AREA

DATE 15 APR 1945

14CBW


2ND A.D.

Route followed by BRIEFING


392 ACTUAL

44


491



DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of
C.G., Eighth AF
Initials L.H.A.
Date 2 May 1945

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 634

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS SECTION

C O P Y

2 May, 1945

GROUND SURVEY OF THE EFFECT OF NAPALM FIRE BOMBS
AND H.E. BOMBS ON THE ROYAN AREA TACTICAL
TARGETS IN THE OPERATION "VENERABLE"

Operation "Venerable" was an air-ground coordinated attack against the German occupied Royan area. D-day was 15 ^{April} February 1945. Air operations took place from D-1 through D+1. Representatives from the Eighth Air Force were present from D to D+4 and this report is concerned with the observations and conclusion of such personnel.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Napalm fire bombs as used in this Operation on D-day by the Eighth Air Force had little or no effect against the structures and gun emplacements of the targets, no effect against personnel in shelters, and very little effect against personnel in the open.
2. The HE bombs dropped on D-1 day against the enemy emplacements were very effective in neutralizing the targets, but in general, not effective against personnel in heavily reinforced shelters.
3. The fragmentation bombs used were effective against guns and personnel in the open, but not against those in shelters.
4. It was the bombing by the Air Force that allowed the ground troops to move in on the enemy positions.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY

The team of observers from the Eighth Air Force were in the Royan area from D to D+4 day, observing the actual bombing on D-day and advancing with the French ground troops into some of the towns and strong points which are identified by the numbers on the attached mosaics. The following strong points were inspected and were among those covered by aerial bombardment: 1, 2, 7, 11, 12, 13, 33, 37, 110 and 137. No surveys were made at Pointe de Grave on the opposite side of the Gironde estuary from Royan.

In addition to making observations at a number of strong points for the purpose of determining the actual physical damage done, German prisoners were interrogated and their reactions to, and their impressions of, the aerial bombardment obtained; also discussions relative to the bombing effectiveness, both physical and psychological, were carried on with the commanding French officers and their staffs. The survey team was unable to examine all the MPI's assigned to the Eighth Air Force for the missions of 14 and 15 April 1945, owing to enemy occupation of some areas, restrictions due to enemy mines, and time limitations.

EFFECT OF NAPALM FILLED BELLY TANKS

On D-day, 15 April 1945, between 1000 and 1207 hours, the bombing by our heavies with Napalm filled belly tanks was observed from a vantage point at a regimental command post near Chaillonnais, three miles from the target areas. The belly tanks were observed in flight from the time of their release to the time of impact. As expected, the weapons tumbled badly during their entire flight -- some 10 to 15 tanks were observed to explode in mid-air, and a number of others were seen to disintegrate during their flight without exploding. It was estimated that approximately 40 to 50 belly tanks were destroyed in this manner in the air during the bombing operation. The size of a squadron pattern on the ground was observed to be approximately 1200 to 1500 feet wide, and 1500 to 1800 feet long, and these dimensions have now been confirmed from

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

strike photographs.

After an artillery barrage lasting from 1245 to 1330 hours, the tanks and infantry commenced moving in on the enemy positions that had been bombed.

The accuracy of the attacks was such that the assigned areas were covered and the fire bombs, in the main, fell well on their targets. The bombs within the patterns appeared to have hit on the average about 100 to 150 feet on centers. Although a number of the belly tanks were found that had not ignited upon striking the ground, there was no indication of a high percentage of duds. The tanks that hit in open fields and upon relatively soft surfaces had a very definite tendency to bury to a depth which made them practically ineffective. That is, they "plopped" into just one big "blob" or puddle of Napalm no bigger than the bomb itself which either partially or wholly burned there very slowly and harmlessly. Of course, a very small portion of the filling in the form of blotches was scattered about when the casing broke up upon impact, but of an insufficient quantity to do any harm. The fire bombs that hit upon harder surfaces such as roadways and strong point areas made a bigger "splash" but still not very large in size or fierce in intensity -- still forming one large "blob" that burned with a great billowing of smoke but very ineffectively as to heat intensity or the scattering of fire. On an average the effective (far from deadly) radius of these belly tanks in this operation was approximately 10 to 15 feet. It is evident that a large "fire ball" or initial flash was not made by the bombs upon impact. This fact was also borne out by the interrogation of German prisoners who stated that these fire bombs falling as close as 30 feet to them did them no harm and if a piece of Napalm did catch onto them they readily brushed it off with no serious effects. There was no suffocating effect upon these men, who merely said that the smoke was annoying and the smell bad. In one case a single prisoner was completely demoralized by the bombing, but this was the individual rather than the general case. One instance was cited where the belly tanks hit in among some tree tops which scattered the Napalm more effectively and caused it to burn more fiercely. One of the French officers made the statement that some of the fire bombs did burn through a number of land mine trip wires, causing the mines to become non-effectual.

The pill-boxes, gun encasements, and underground shelters were not affected in the least physically, and the open trenches and dugouts only very slightly. The psychological effect upon the troops was negligible except in one or two of the cases interrogated. It is of interest to note that one set of Germans who were interrogated had been in secure underground shelters during the HE bombing on the previous day but in the open and in trenches during the Napalm attack. The Napalm attack had very little psychological effect upon them but they made the statement that had they been in the open or in trenches during the previous day's HE attack they would have been terrified.

EFFECT OF HE BOMBS

HE bombs were dropped on defense areas and strong points in the Royan area on D-1 day by fighters, and medium and heavy bombers, and preceding the Napalm attack on D-day by fighters and medium bombers. Bombs carried by the heavy bombers were 500, 1000, 2000 lb. GPs, and fragmentation bombs, and their purpose was to neutralize the areas for the D-day attack by French ground troops.

Ground inspection of a number of these fortifications showed these types of weapons to be highly effective in disrupting the communications and facilities essential to organized resistance in the strong points. Personnel in the deep shelters were not seriously affected by the bombing, either physically or from a morale point of view. The heavy reinforced concrete encasements, approximately three meters thick, and the guns they contained were not destroyed or seriously damaged physically. However, in nearly every case the guns were made at least temporarily useless by rubble thrown over them by near misses, and in every case lines of communication and electrical controls were knocked out completely. Guns in open emplacements were, of course, highly vulnerable to all HE bombs, including frags, and also to artillery fire. The Fort of Royan

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

strong point, was an old construction made up in the main of stone masonry, some of which had been reinforced with concrete and timber. This particular construction, while massive, was vulnerable to our bombs and was structurally destroyed. Even here, however, in a number of cases the guns in the badly blasted emplacements were not too seriously damaged and could have been removed and, with some repair, used again.

The German officer in command of all the gun emplacements and flak batteries in this defense area was interrogated and he admitted that all of his batteries were put out of action by the complete disruption of his communication and control systems.

The field fortifications consisting of small protected gun emplacements, observation points and covered trenches were not vulnerable to the fragmentation bombs, except to keep the heads of the personnel down during the bombing - that is, the fragmentation bombs were only effective against the guns and personnel having no cover. The artillery, being more flexible and being able to be applied for longer periods of time, was much more effective against these positions.

COMMENTS

1. Due to the fact that the Napalm filled belly tank fire bombs as used on this operation by the Eighth Air Force heavy bombers were practically ineffective, both physically and psychologically, it is recommended that they not be used again on a similar attack.

It might be desirable, however, that further experimentation be done to determine what effect the very low temperatures, as encountered on an operation such as this, has on the dispersion and flashing properties of the Napalm fuel. Consideration might also be given to making the weapon more aimable, and to decrease its penetration tendency as well as improve its dispersion by a burster charge or a different type fuzing.

2. The evidence revealed by the ground survey indicates that attacks against modern heavy reinforced concrete gun emplacements with the weapons we have at present should be directed against communications, control systems, and other facilities, and for general disruption of the target area rather than an attempt to demolish the structures. The 500, 1000, and 2000 lb. HE bombs were sufficiently large, with the proper fuzing, to disrupt and bury effectively the targets, and for similar emplacements these size bombs are recommended.

3. Field fortifications consisting mainly of protected trenches, relatively small gun emplacements and observation points can be more efficiently attacked with the smaller bombs, such as the 100 and 250 lb. GPs, than with fragmentation bombs. If such field fortifications are to be attacked and cratering is no problem, then these smaller GP bombs are recommended for use.

The persons who participated in this survey were:

Lt. Col. R. L. Post, Intelligence, 2nd Air Division
Major W. E. Cooke, Ordnance/Chemical, 2nd Air Division
1st Lt. R. F. Thigpen, Ordnance/Chemical, 2nd Air Division
Lt. Col. J. H. Huckins, Intelligence, Hq. Eighth Air Force
Captain A.S. Chipley, OAS, Hq. Eighth Air Force
Mr. Alfred Hedefine, OAS, Hq. Eighth Air Force.

Operational Analysis Section

Prepared by:

Alfred Hedefine
OAS Consultant

Approved for release by:

Leslie H. Arps /s/
LESLIE H. ARPS
Lt. Col. A. C.
Director, OAS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE

AAF STATION 101

APO 634

C O P Y

Auth: CG, 8th AF

Init:

Date: 18 May 1945

319.1

18 May 1945

SUBJECT: The First Eighth Air Force Fire Bomb Mission, 15 April 1945.

TO : Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633.

1. The purpose of this report is to summarize the experience of the Eighth Air Force concerning the filling, loading, fuzing and dropping of fire bombs.

2. Introduction: The fire bomb attack on Royan, France, 15 April 1945, was the first attempt by the Eighth Air Force to drop large quantities of napalm gel from heavy bombers. A total of 843 B-17 and B-24 aircraft dropped 4,615 tanks containing approximately 375,000 gallons of gel. Originally, bomb bay tanks filled with napalm gel were to be dropped on the target, but due to limited availability and the difficulty encountered in release, an alternative plan was chosen. This was the use of paper fighter-belly-tanks, modified for suspension from regular bomb stations in B-17 and B-24 airplanes. After standardizing the bomb container, methods of filling, loading, fuzing and arming were successfully devised. Special bombing tables were also prepared. The target was a defensive area consisting of strong points composed of pill boxes, machine gun and rifle pits, trenches and barbed wire; also heavy gun installations.

3. Containers:

a. Two sizes of fire bombs were used:

- (1) The British 108 gallon, paper, fighter-belly fuel tank was reduced to a capacity of 85 gallons to fit the B-17 and B-24 bomb bays, and fitted with two (2) igniter holding plates. Reference Eighth Air Force drawing No. TSG-11.

b. The 75 gallon U.S. metal fighter-belly-tank was modified by cutting off the rear conical section from each tank at a cross section 21 inches aft of the center line of the rear carrying lug. A flat circular plate was welded to the open end of tank.

c. The loading for a B-17 was six (6) paper tanks and for a B-24, six (6) paper and two (2) metal tanks.

4. Method of Filling Containers:

a. This Air Force standardized upon the type A-6 Portable Refueling Pump for transferring napalm gel from drums to fire bomb containers. This method was more satisfactory than use of air pressure, because of the simplicity and availability of necessary equipment. Reference WD Bulletin CW 21, dated 3 February 1945, for description of air pressure method.

b. The following observations were made on filling operations:

- (1) The Type A-6 Pump unit required modification which consisted of replacing suction hose with 2½ feet of 2-inch diameter pipe or hose, and replacing the discharge hose by the suction hose.

DECLASSIFIED

- ~~DECLASSIFIED~~
- (2) A setting of 12 notches on the automatic pump control was found to give optimum results with thin and medium viscosity gels and 16 notches was found necessary for heavier gels. (Gel used was received on stations ready mixed from the National Oil Refineries, Ltd, in U.K. and from Zone of Interior.)
 - (3) The average time to empty one 50-gallon drum of napalm gel was 3 to 4 minutes. A bout three (3) gallons of gel remained in each drum.
 - (4) Approximately twelve (12) pumps were required per group for efficient filling. Average time of filling and loading a group of forty (40) B-17's, each with six (6) paper tanks was ten (10) hours; for a group of thirty (30) B-24's, each with six (6) paper and two (2) metal tanks was sixteen (16) hours.
 - (5) Two (2) methods of "bombing up" were tried:
 - (a) Loading fire bombs after being filled with gel.
 - (b) Loading empty tanks on bomb stations and then filling. The first method was found by experience to be more satisfactory.
 - (6) The few pump failures that occurred were due to air-locking. No damage was done to pump parts.
 - (7) Filling and loading was accomplished without accident in considerably less time than anticipated.

5. Loading of the filled tanks into bomb bays was accomplished in conventional manner. The paper tanks were received with two (2) red bands on the circumference indicating positions of the suspension bands. Fire bombs were suspended from 1000 lb. bomb stations.

6. Fuzing: On paper tanks, two (2) M-13 igniters were attached by assembling the igniter holding plate between the igniter fuze adapter and the WP grenade. This assembly was then fitted to the empty tanks before filling took place.

a. The metal tanks had one (1) B-14 igniter inserted in the filling hole.

b. In all cases, fuzes were removed from adapters prior to installation and were replaced only after "bombing up" operations were completed.

c. Arming wires fifteen (15) feet long and .036 inches diameter were used to insure arming of bombs only after clearing the airplane completely. Wires were secured to the highest position of bomb rack and coiled in the form of a spring to prevent premature arming of the fuze through kinking and also to insure complete extension of the wire.

d. Following difficulties were experienced on fuzing operations:

- (1) Standard American bolts were not used to secure igniter holding plates which necessitated the manufacture of special wrenches.
- (2) Varying dimensions on igniter plates precluded interchangeability between paper tanks.

7. Bombing Data:

a. Bombing Table, USSTAF BT-35, was used for both paper and

DECLASSIFIED

metal tanks. The intervalometer setting was 100 feet and the bombing altitude was 15,000 feet. Eleven (11) B-24 groups of 2nd Air Division and eleven (11) B-17 groups of 3rd Air Division took part in the operation.

b. Bombardiers had been previously instructed on the ballistics of fire bombs and dropping trials had been conducted to gain experience prior to the mission.

c. Since the fire bombs were not stabilized, they tumbled and approximately 40 to 50 bombs were destroyed in the air due to collision.

d. The size of a 10-aircraft squadron pattern on the ground was observed to be approximately 1200 to 1500 feet wide and 1500 to 1800 feet long, these dimensions being confirmed from strike photographs by Operational Analysis section.

e. The average effective radius of these tanks in this operation was approximately 10 to 15 feet.

8. Results:

a. The assigned target areas were hit using the bombing tables prepared in this theater. Bombs within the patterns appeared to hit about 100 to 150 feet on centers. Although some bombs failed to ignite upon impact, there was no indication of a large percentage of duds.

b. Bombs that hit in open fields and upon relatively soft surfaces had a tendency to crater which made them ineffective. Bombs that struck harder surfaces such as roadways and strong point areas did not scatter their contents, burning only in one large "Blob" with an immense amount of black smoke.

9. Comments:

a. The Eighth Air Force Ground Survey Party observed the dropping of the fire bombs from a vantage point on the ground, three (3) miles from the target areas. Their conclusion was "that the fire bombs of this operation had little or no effect against the structures and gun emplacements of the targets, no effect against personnel in shelters, and very little effect against personnel in the open". It is recommended that fire bombs not be used again on a similar attack.

b. Leakage of gel occurred at high altitude. This difficulty can be eliminated by providing tanks with a venting hole to permit pressure equalization.

c. The following comments are made on the M-3 fuze supplied with the M-13 and M-14 igniters:

- (1). Recommend this fuze be equipped with a wing-nut to facilitate assembly and removal from adapters. Present fuze requires a special tool.
- (2) A safety pin conspicuously tagged and having a suitable diameter ring to facilitate removal should be supplied with fuze.
- (3) Recommend that fuze be delay-arming. As the M-15 and M-16 igniters have a delay arming anemometer type fuze, it is recommended that all M-13 and M-14 igniters be replaced by these new style igniters.

d. In planning large scale use of napalm gel, at least 24 hours should be allowed for filling, loading and fuzeing a combat group. The above information is provided at the request of the Director of Armament, your Headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

B. A. ARNOLD
Lt. Col., AGD
Asst Adj General

1 Incl:

Hq 8th AF Memo
dtd 4/12/44, "Fire Bombs".

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Target: Royan Area (1st Priority)

Date : 15 April 1945

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 1280

Tons of Bombs Dropped : 2780.0

1. Diagrammatic Bomb Plots.
2. Reconnaissance photographs.
3. Excerpts from Interpretation Report S.A. 3578, Interpretation Report No. B 574(R), and Interpretation Report No. B 573 (R).


~~DECLASSIFIED~~



Map Background: G.S.G.S. 4250 6M/3
Neg. No. *PT 305651*



DECLASSIFIED



TARGET AREA



TARGET NO. 32

JOB 982/6



TARGET NO. 33

JOB NO 982/17A

3156

DECLASSIFIED

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3578.

TARGET: TACTICAL TARGETS IN ROYAN AREA.

DATE : 15 APRIL 1945.

TARGET NO. 1

Fire bombs completely blanket the entire target area and a concentration of incendiaries is seen across the West side. Scattered fire bombs are seen in open fields 1200 yards Northwest, 3000 yards South, and incendiaries are seen 1500 yards North, of the center of the target area.

TARGET NO. 7

Smoke obscures the target area and no bursts are visible but bombs are seen falling toward the general area of the objective.

TARGET NO. 8

Approximately ten scattered bursts are seen in open fields, 1000 yards East and 1700 yards North-Northwest, on smoke obscured photographs.

TARGET NO. 10

No bursts are visible on smoke obscured photographs but falling bombs may be estimated to strike in the immediate vicinity of the target and also at a point 2600 yards West-Northwest.

TARGET NO. 11

At least ten fire bombs are seen striking the Northern third of the target area with one hit visible on a 155 mm casemate. At least 15 bursts can be seen along the beach, starting in woods and a lightly built-up area 1500 yards Northwest.

TARGET NO. 12

Bombs are seen falling toward the general area of the target but no bursts are visible on smoke obscured photographs.

TARGET NO. 17

Six groups and a concentration totalling more than 225 H.E. bursts are seen extending across the target area, an unidentified group of buildings, TARGET NO. 16, the shore line, and into the water. At least three of the casemates have received very near hits and a fire is seen on another. One group of approximately 35 H.E. bursts is seen extending across the woods, railway sidings, TARGET NO. 16, and into the harbor. A group of at least 20 H.E. bursts is seen extending across TARGET NO. 14, and the two jettys, with one burst in the harbor. In woods just Southwest of the target is seen a group of approximately 20 H.E. bursts. A string of approximately 12 bursts is seen extending from the water just across the shore line.

TARGET NO. 18

Four groups totalling at least 150 bursts are seen blanketing the target and adjacent areas. On photographs taken late in the attack all three casemates are seen to be badly damaged. One section of a sea wall has been hit by at least three bursts and numerous bursts blanket a road. Six bursts are seen in open area 2000 yards West of the target.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A.3578 (Continued) 15 April 1945.

TARGET NO. 19

The center of the target area was hit by successive groups of H.E. bursts totalling at least 80, with definite near hits and possible direct hits on at least three casemates. Approximately 50 H.E. bursts are visible in the water and along the shore immediately West and Northwest of the target, while a group of bursts is seen in an open area as a partially built-up area of Soulac-Les-Bains, one mile South-Southwest of the target.

TARGET NO. 24

Two compact concentrations of at least 50 H.E. bursts are seen directly on the target area, scoring probable hits and near hits on both guns. Two H.E. bursts are visible on the beach 1300 yards East-Southeast. A scattered group of 11 fire bomb bursts can be seen in a wooded area 1700 yards Northeast.

A group of 50 H.E. bursts is noted in the ocean 700 yards west of the target.

TARGET NO. 26

The target is not visible on cloud and haze obscured photographs. Scattered I.B. bursts are seen in an open and wooded area four miles East-Northeast of the target, and although Napalm bombs are seen falling no resulting bursts are visible.

TARGET NO. 27

Approximately 40 H.E. bursts are seen across the central and Northern portion of the target area with possible hits, or at least near hits, visible on three of the four casemates. Other hits are seen on roads serving the installations.

TARGET NO. 28

The target and immediate area is heavily blanketed by four concentrations of H.E. bursts with probable hits on gun positions.

TARGET NO. 29

No bursts are visible on the target adjoining area on the photographs received.

TARGET NO. 32

A concentration of at least 60 H.E. bursts is seen blanketing the target area with several probable hits on the gun emplacements. Smoke prevents accurate pin-pointing of the bursts.

TARGET NO. 33

Approximately ten fire bombs are seen on the target area. Two large concentrations of bursts are seen immediately Northwest of the target area and extend approximately 1000 yards across the residential area. Another large concentration of bursts is seen on a residential area approximately 1800 yards East-Northeast of the target area. Several scattered bursts are seen in the water immediately Southwest of the target area and also along the coast and port facilities 700 yards to the East.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B.574(R)

TARGET: ROYAN AREA

DATE : 15 APRIL 1945

TARGET NO. 7

The target of the attack was three emplaced heavy flak guns. The attack is concentrated on the centre of the target and extended to the highway N. Two of three emplacements have received direct hits, one being destroyed and the other heavily damaged. Several near misses in the vicinity of the remaining emplacement have partially filled it with spoil and probably damaged the gun. A shelter in the target area shattered by a hit on one corner and the two near misses. Bombs falling East and north of the target have heavily damaged two strong points in these areas.

TARGET NO. 8

The target for the attack is a strong point. There are five craters in the target area, the weight of attack falling south of the strong point in the adjacent town. Three weapons, pits and part of a connecting trench have been filled with spoil from three near misses. A hit has shattered a small shed and probably damaged the house to the rear of the target.

TARGET NO. 10

The target of the attack is a strong point. The attack is concentrated directly on the target and craters have rendered the outline of the strongpoint unrecognizable. Several craters, two direct hits and three near misses, are seen on a possible underground shelter. The only discernable elements of the target remaining are three short sections of fire trench.

TARGET NO. 11

The target of the attack is a six gun casemated coastal battery. Bomb craters are concentrated throughout the target area. Casemated are still intact but all have suffered near misses or probably damaged. Only three of seven open emplacements in the battery are still visible after the attack. The wooded area to the rear of the battery containing ammunition stores and personnel, housing, has been completely blanketed by craters which have obliterated all installations in the area.

TARGET NO. 12

The target of the attack is a four gun flak battery. There are craters scattered throughout the target area with the main concentration in the South. One emplacement in South area has been demolished by a direct hit, and another is severely damaged by a hit on the perimeter of the emplacement which has probably damaged the gun. There are four hits on the perimeter firing trench of a small strong point. A near miss has probably damaged a small shelter in the centre of the target.

TARGET NO. 18

The target is composed of 3 casemated coastal guns and heavy A.A. Further damage is noted and a new group of coasters extends across the target and to the rear. One edge of the No. 1 casemate appear now to have been chipped by a direct hit. The large shelter casemate referred to in No. 10 of B. 573 (R) of 16 April 1945 has received another direct hit. There are

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO.B.574(R) Continued 15 April 1945.

TARGET NO. 18 (Continued)

now two holes approx. 10 ft in diameter in the roof. No other damage is noted.

TARGET NO. 32

The target of the attack is a six gun casemated coastal battery. Weight of the second attack is concentrated directly in the target area and spoil from numerous craters has been cast up around the enemy defence element in the battery. No. 3 casemate has been obliterated by several direct hits and near misses. No. 1 and No. 2 casemates are probably damaged from three near misses. No. 4 casemate has received a hit on one side but no structural damage is evident. Spoil from several craters is piled up around No. 5 casemate so as to almost extinguish its outline. No. 6 casemate has suffered probable damage from a hit on the West side but is still intact. Several direct hits have caved in the roof of an underground shelter in the rear of the area. One open emplacement to the rear of No. 4 casemate has been partially filled with spoil but the gun is still visible. A network of trenches N.W. of the battery have suffered heavy damage in the attack, only one section of trench being visible on these photographs.

ROYAN

The area within a hundred foot radius of the pinpoint designated as the target has received a heavy concentration of hits. All buildings on the actual site have been flattened. Damage extends over a wide radius, no building within four hundred feet of the pinpoint has escaped damage - being either gutted or roofless.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EXCERPTS FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B.573(R).

TARGET: ROYAN AREA.

DATE : 15 APRIL 1945.

TARGET NO. 28

A few more craters are seen on the Northern edge of the target area and extending to the beach. As a result of both attacks of the 14th, 15th April, 45, every installation has suffered at least one near miss. The only structural damage apparent is slight damage to one flak emplacement. Three of the flak positions are occupied.

TARGET NO. 27

The target for this attack is a four position casemated battery. The main concentration of craters is centered in the target area and extending North. A direct hit and two near misses on No. 3 casemates, reported after the first strike, are clearly seen in this cover, however, the casemate is still intact. A blast walled shelter to the rear of No. 1 casemate has suffered a direct hit on the corner, and two near misses have partially buried it with soil. There is a crater at the entrance to an underground shelter to the rear of No. 4 casemate. There are two craters within fifty feet of No. 1 casemate. A concentration of craters in the area of several small sheds to the rear of the battery is seen but no structural damage is evident.

TARGET NO. 26

The target of the attack is a four position casemated battery. The weight of the second attack is concentrated at the North side of the target area and extending into the adjacent wood. Near misses on No. 2 and No. 3 casemates from the first attack are discernable but no further structural damage to the elements of the battery is evident. One near miss has probably damaged an underground shelter to the rear of No. 2 casemate. There is a concentration of craters in the wood North of the target area in the vicinity of several small sheds which have suffered probable damage.

TARGET NO. 24

The target for the attack is a battery of three casemated positions. The main concentration of the second attack is directly on the target area. Several hits have destroyed a large building in the target area and probably damaged an adjoining shed. A near miss has heaped soil up on the rear of one casemate but no structural damage is evident. One hit has severely damaged one of four open emplacements in the battery and a near miss has probably damaged the gun in another open emplacement. Blast from several near misses has shattered a large building East of the target area.

TARGET NO. 17

The target of the attack is a four position casemated coastal battery. There are concentrations of craters South and East of the area but none on the target. Seven craters are seen in the vicinity of personnel shelters East of the target which are probably damaged.

TARGET NO. 38

The target of the attack is a six gun casemated coastal battery. There is a heavy concentration of craters in the Northern part of the battery

DECLASSIFIED

TARGET NO. 38 (Continued)

area and extending East through the adjacent wood. There are two near misses on casemates No. 1 and No. 2 but no structural damage is evident. A near miss on an open emplacement between casemates No. 1 and No. 2 has damaged the wall and probably damaged the gun. In the rear of the battery two underground shelters are blanketed with craters, one direct hit and three near misses. A near miss has probably damaged a personnel shelter East of the battery.

TARGET NO. 19

The target is a four gun casemated coastal battery. There is a good concentration of craters over the target area. Nos. 2, 3, and 4 casemates each suffered one near miss. An occupied emplacement in front of No. 4 casemate received a direct hit which destroyed part of the emplacement wall and probably damaged the gun. The observation post between No. 2 and No. 3 casemates suffered two near misses and immediately to the rear an underground shelter suffered a direct hit and a near miss, the blast removed the sand from one side. To the rear of the battery, three wooden personnel buildings were destroyed, all lines of a rail siding were cut and two occupied flak emplacements were destroyed or severely damaged.

TARGET NO. 18

Three casemated coastal guns and heavy A.A. comprise the target. The target area is completely blanketed with craters, some of which are on the sea wall. The craters are water filled and an area to the rear of the battery is partially flooded. A great amount of spoil has been blown up by the bombs. The casemates appear to have been damaged but there is a hole approximately 10 ft. in diameter in the roof of a large shelter casemate in the center of the battery. Only one flak position remains.

TARGET NO. 1

A very heavy concentration of craters is spread over the whole of this defence area covering the entire area with a layer of sand. The only remaining elements of defence installations are a few sections of trench on the far South and on the North. Two direct hits have caved in an underground shelter and one building within the area is severely shattered. There are three guns in open emplacements near the highway at the North of the area but their condition cannot be determined. Several small fires were still burning at the time of these photographs.

TARGET NO. 33A

An area of 110 yards radius about the pinpoint is completely blanketed with craters. No land forms or structures in the area are discernable.

TARGET NO. 33

The target is smothered with a heavy concentration of craters - no area being missed. All emplacements are destroyed or heavily damaged. The roof of the shelter in the centre of the fort has been caved in. Two guns remain in open emplacements but their condition cannot be determined. The area of crater concentration extends N.E. blanketing point 036030 where all installations are destroyed or heavily damaged.

Damage assessment photographs for targets 19 and 18 were flown before the final attack ending 1327 hours and this report on these targets covers only damage prior to the last attack.


~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

ATTACK ON ROYAN AREA

15 APRIL 1945

SCALE: APPROXIMATE 1 INCH = 1 MILE



OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS SECTION
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE

92 LE
92 LO
92 HI
306 LE

305 LE
305 HI

446 LE
446 LO
446 HI

398 LE
398 LO
398 HI

446 LO
93 LE
392 LO
389 LE
389 HI
445 HI
445 LE
389 LO
445 LO

390 HI
100 HI
100 LE
388 LO
388 LE
493 HI
95 LE
493 HI
493 LO
96 LO
452 LE
96 LE
452 LO
388 HI
491 LE
452 HI
490 HI
385 LE
448 HI
95 LO
385 LO
490 C
487 HI
44 HI
94 HI

100 DIA
390 LE
390 DIA
490 LE
44 LO
365 HI
100 LO
487 LO
487 DIA
34 LO
487 LE
34 LE
95 HI
486 LE
486 LO
447 DIA
446 HI

390 LO
95 DIA
491 LO
447 HI
44 LE
34 HI

384 LE
384 LO
94 LE
94 LO
384 HI

447 LE & LO, 486 LO & HI
ARE PLOTTED JUST OFF THE MAP

91 LE
457 LE 1
457 LE 2
457 LO 3
457 LO 4
457 HI 1
379 LE
379 LO
379 HI

306 LO
91 LE
306 HI

401 HI 5
401 LE 1
401 LE 2
401 LO 3
401 LO 4
303 LE
303 LO
303 HI

91 LO
351 LE
351 LE 2
351 LO 3
351 LO 4
351 HI 5
351 HI 6
381 LE
381 LO
381 HI

FIRST AIR DIVISION

VISUAL ATTACK
CLOUD COVER NONE
ALTITUDE OF ATTACK 15,000'
NO OF 12 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED 27
NO OF 6 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED 18
NO OF 12 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED 26
NO OF 6 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED 16
NO OF 12 A/C BOXES PLOTTED 26
NO OF 6 A/C BOXES PLOTTED 16
TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED 2,000 LB C.P.
1,000 LB C.P.

SECOND AIR DIVISION

VISUAL ATTACK
CLOUD COVER NONE
ALTITUDE OF ATTACK 15,000'
NO OF 7-11 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED 34
NO OF 3 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED 11
NO OF 7-11 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED 33
NO OF 3 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED 3
NO OF 7-11 A/C BOXES PLOTTED 33
NO OF 3 A/C BOXES PLOTTED 3
TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED NAPALM FIRE BOMBS
E M-47 1B'S

THIRD AIR DIVISION

VISUAL ATTACK
CLOUD COVER NONE
ALTITUDE OF ATTACK 15,000'
NO OF 9-13 A/C BOXES DISPATCHED 49
NO OF 9-13 A/C BOXES IDENTIFIED 48
NO OF 9-13 A/C BOXES PLOTTED 47
TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED NAPALM FIRE BOMBS
E M-47 1B'S

GENERAL AXIS OF ATTACK

AIMING POINTS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA

15 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
-------	---------------	---------------	----------	-----------------	-------------	-----------------	---------------	-----------------

Targets in German Occupied France

Target No. 32 (Pte de Susac)

384A	293	6 min	15,580	1123	X	22x2000HE 22x1000HE	1	10
384B	293	2 min	14,950	1123½	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12
384C	295	4 min	15,510	1124	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11

Target No. 17 & 38 (Pte de Grave)

379A	288	10 min	15,550	1126½	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
379B	285	10 min	14,500	1128½	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
379C	284	10 min	16,300	1130	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
306C	110	2 min	16,500	1147	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11
457A ¹	272	3 min	16,500	1258	X	23x2000HE 21x1000HE	1	11
457B ¹	286	3 min	15,900	1259	X	22x2000HE 22x1000HE	1	10
457C ¹	285	3 min	17,100	1301	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12

Target No. 19 (Pte de Grave)

303A	286	1 min	15,550	1129	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
303B	286	1 min	15,050	1130½	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11
303C	274	1 min	16,600	1158½	X	28x2000HE 28x1000HE	1	13
401A ¹	280	3 min	15,200	1322	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12
401B ¹	285	3 min	14,400	1321	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA

5 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
-------	-------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------	--------------------

1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Target No. 19 (pte de Grave) (Continued)

401C ¹	277	3 min	15,500	1327	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12
-------------------	-----	-------	--------	------	---	------------------------	---	----

Target No. 18 (Pte de Grave)

381A	286	8 min	15,550	1129½	X	24x2000HE 22x1000HE	1	11
381B	283	6 min	15,050	1130	X	24x2000HE 18x1000HE 4x1000 HE	1	11
381C	286	6 min	16,075	1131½	X	26x2000HE 20x1000HE 4x1000 HE	1	12
91B	140	2 min	15,050	1150	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11
351A ¹	280	3 min	15,000	1314½	X	72x1000HE	1	11
351B ¹	303	3 min	14,400	1311	X	78x1000HE	1	12
351C ¹	283	3 min	16,000	1306½	X	78x1000HE	1	12

Target No. 24 (le Fort - Royan Area)

398A	359	6 min	16,100	1147½	X	20x2000HE 20x1000HE	1	9
398B	350	17 min	15,200	1149	X	22x2000HE 22x1000HE	1	10
398C	305	3 min	16,130	1136	X	20x2000HE 20x1000HE	1	9

Target No. 16 (Pte de Grave)

91A	110	3 min	15,600	1147	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11
91C	119	4 min	16,100	1210	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11

Target No. 28 (La Coubre)

306A	280	4 min	15,391	1142	X	24x2000HE 23x1000HE	1	11
92A	281	3 min	15,550	1154½	X	23x2000HE 23x1000HE	1	11
92B	287	3 min	14,560	1155	X	30x2000HE 30x1000HE	1	14
92C	287	3 min	15,700	1154	X	24x2000HE 24x1000HE	1	11

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

15 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR
-------	----------------	---------------	----------	-----------------	-------------	-----------------	---------------	----------------

1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Target No. 14 (Pte de Grave)

306B	266	4 min	14,900	1139	X	25x2000HE 25x1000HE	1	12
------	-----	-------	--------	------	---	------------------------	---	----

Target No. 27 (la Coubre)

305A	284	1 min	15,500	1147	X	26x2000HE 25x1000HE	1	12
------	-----	-------	--------	------	---	------------------------	---	----

305B DID NOT BOMB

305C	288	3 min	16,050	1147	X	26x2000HE 26x1000HE	1	12
------	-----	-------	--------	------	---	------------------------	---	----

2ND AIR DIVISION

Royan Area

392	300	1 min	15,000	1108	X	84x550 IB	1	10
392	300	1 min	16,000	1108 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	70x550 IB	1	8
392	295	1 min	14,500	1109		X 46x550 IB 156xM47IB	1	8
491	284	4 min	15,500	1110	X	52x550 IB	1	6
491	285	2 min	16,000	1111 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	76x550 IB	1	9
491	292	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ min	14,500	1110-3/4		X 71x550 IB 156xM47IB	1	11
44	285	3 min	15,000	1110		X 78x550 IB	1	10
44	283	3 min	15,400	1110	X	76x550 IB	1	9
44	304	3 min	14,000	1110	X	74x550 IB	1	9
466	298	2 min	15,000	1115-3/4	X	70x550 IB	1	9
466	298	2 min	14,900	1116 $\frac{1}{4}$	X	69x550 IB	1	9
466	304	2 min	14,280	1114	X	76x550 IB	1	9
466	275	3 min	14,100	1116	X	43x550 IB 130xM47IB	1	7
467	301	2 min	15,500	1117	X	76x550 IB	1	9
467	285	2 min	15,400	1116-1/3	X	76x550 IB	1	9
467	299	1 min	15,150	1117	X	5x500 HE 38x550 IB 156xM47IB	1	8
458	286	45 sec	15,900	1118	X	52x550 IB	1	6

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

15 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
-------	------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------	--------------------

2ND AIR DIVISION (continued)

Royan Area (Continued)

458	286	1 min	15,500	1120	X	67x550 IB	1	8
458	303	1½ min	15,300	1122	X	62x550 IB 104xM47	2	9
93	296	3½ min	15,000	1121	X	57x550 IB	1	7
93	306	1 min	15,500	1122	X	44x550 IB 98xM47 IB	1	9
93	300	3 min	14,700	1121½	X	53x550 IB	1	7
446	304	3 min	16,500	1123		X 74x550 IB 52xM47 IB	1	10
446	310	4 min	17,000	1124	X	2x500 HE 61x550 IB 156xM47IB	1	11
446	312	4 min	15,560	1124	X	77x550 IB	1	9
448	295	2 min	15,000	1126	X	72x550 IB	1	9
448	295	2 min	16,500	1130	X	76x550 IB 1xM47 IB	1	9
448	286	2 min	15,500	1129	X	66x550 IB 1xM47	1	8
389	302	6 min	15,000	1118	X	67x550 IB	1	8
389	307	4 min	15,500	1118	X	61x550 IB	1	8
389	300	3 min	14,200	1118	X	68x550 IB	1	8
445	265	8 min	15,000	1127	X	68x550 IB 2xM47 IB	1	9
445	283	12 min	15,500	1129	X	79x550 IB 1xM47 IB	1	9
445	278	15 min	14,500	1127½	X	78x550 IB 1xM47 IB	1	9

3RD AIR DIVISION

Target No. 1

447A	282	6 min	15,500	1010	X	60x550 IB	1	9
447D	278	5 min	14,450	1013	X	54x550 IB	1	8
447C	271	6 min	14,990	1013	X	58x550 IB	1	9
447B	292	6 min	16,120	1030	X	57x550 IB	1	9
486A	289	6 min	15,400	1015	X	48x550 IB	1	7

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

15 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
-------	------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------	--------------------

3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Target No. 1 (Continued)

486B	288	6 min	16,060	1016	X	48x550 IB	1	7
486C	274	6 min	15,032	1018	X	60x550 IB	1	9
486D	288	6 min	14,520	1017	X	54x550 IB	1	8
487A	280	6 min	15,490	1020	X	52x550 IB	1	8
487B	285	6 min	15,900	1020	X	60x550 IB	1	9
487C	299	6 min	14,950	1021	X	54x550 IB	1	8
487D	285	7 min	14,500	1020	X	48x550 IB	1	7
94A	282	6 min	14,900	1023	X	60x550 IB	1	9
94B	284	6 min	16,016	1025	X	60x550 IB	1	9
94C	283	6 min	14,700	1030	X	60x550 IB	1	9
94D	288	6 min	14,225	1034	X	60x550 IB	1	9
34A	270	6 min	15,550	1030	X	504xM47IB	1	11
34C	300	6 min	15,050	1031	X	546xM47IB	1	12
95B	281	6 min	15,600	1034	X	66x550 IB	1	10
95C	282	6 min	15,000	1035	X	48x550 IB	1	8
95D	290	6 min	14,500	1035	X	54x550 IB	1	8
390A	282	6 min	15,550	1039	X	60x550 IB	1	9
390C	286	6 min	16,100	1040	X	52x550 IB	1	8
100B	280	5 min	15,950	1044	X	48x550 IB	1	8
100C	282	6 min	15,300	1046	X	47x550 IB	1	7
100D	280	6 min	14,900	1046	X	59x550 IB	1	9
385A	285	7 min	15,570	1047	X	72x550 IB	1	11
385B	292	7 min	16,084	1048	X	78x550 IB	1	12
385C	280	7 min	15,150	1049	X	78x550 IB	1	12
490A	286	7 min	15,550	1049	X	503xM47IB	1	11
490B	273	7 min	16,200	1050	X	497xM47IB	1	11
490C	285	7 min	14,700	1050	X	502xM47IB	1	11

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

15 April 1945

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	FACE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR
-------	------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	-------------	--------------------	------------------	-------------------

3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)Target No. 33

388A	278	6 min	15,543	1055	X	72x550 IB	1	11
388B	283	6 min	16,055	1057	X	75x550 IB	1	12
388C	283	6 min	15,150	1057	X	75x550 IB	1	12
452A	282	5 min	15,400	1059	X	69x550 IB	1	11
452B	275	5 min	16,100	1101	X	78x550 IB	1	12
452C	262	5 min	14,900	1101	X	78x550 IB	1	12
96A	275	6 min	15,500	1103	X	72x550 IB	1	11
96C	285	6 min	14,950	1103	X	78x550 IB	1	12
493A	281	6 min	15,200	1103	X	501xM47IB	1	11
493B	280	6 min	14,400	1103	X	378xM47IB	1	8
493C	275	6 min	14,040	1104		X 377xM47IB	1	8
95A	273	6 min	15,500	1034	X	50x550 IB	1	8
390B	287	6 min	15,460	1040	X	49x550 IB	1	8
390D	291	6 min	15,900	1041	X	60x550 IB	1	9
100A	279	6 min	15,530	1043	X	47x550 IB	1	7

Target No. 24

34B	269	5 min	16,080	1033	X	543xM47IB	1	12
-----	-----	-------	--------	------	---	-----------	---	----

DECLASSIFIED

WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO Rochefort, Royan area

Authorized for
reproduction
of _____ copies

Copy No. _____
Eight Air Force

Sig. _____
Date _____


1st 2nd 3rd BOMBARDMENT DIVISIONS

DATE 15 April 1945
0530 - 1500 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initial _____
Date _____


No Contrails

4 - 6/10 ci.



VIS. ALOFT: UNRESTRICTED 4 - 6/10 As. Downward Vis: 15 - 25 mi.

7 - 10/10 Sc. (layered) 6 - 8/10 Sc. (layered)



DECLASSIFIED


WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Rochefort, Royan

Authorized for
reproduction
of _____ copies
Copy No. _____
Eighth Air Force
Sig. _____
Date _____

1st BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 15 Apr 45
0630-1530 Hrs.

By authority of
C. G. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____



Sea Level
Bases
England
Channel
Continent
Targets

WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Roman area



Authorized for

reproduction of _____ copies

Copy No. _____

English Air Force

Sig. _____

Date _____

2nd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 15 Apr 45

0540-1449 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. English Air Force

Initials _____

Date _____

30,000

No contrails

0 - 3/10 Cl.

25,000

// // // // // //

20,000

1 - 3/10 Ac.

1 - 3/10 Ac.

15,000

10,000

7 - 10/10 Sc. 6 - 8/10 Sc.


Downward Vis:

15-25 Mi.

5,000

10/10 St.

Sea Level



Vis: 2-3000 Yds.

Bases England

Channel

Continent

Targets

WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Rohan area

3rd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 15 Apr 45

0520 - 1430 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force

Date _____

Authorized for
reproduction
of _____ copies
Copy No. _____
Eighth Air Force

Sig. _____

Date _____

No contrails

2 - 3/10 Cl.

" " " " " "

20,000

25,000

30,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

Sea Level

Vis: Unrestricted aloft

Downward: 25 Mi.

10/10 St. & Sc. 8 - 10/10 St. & Sc. 4 - 6/10 Sc.



Vis: 25-3500 Yds.
Bases

England

Sea

Continent

Targets

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

WEATHER OPERATIONAL FORECAST - 15 APRIL 1945

1. Base to Target.

Broken clouds to overcast clouds with haze, locally light fog, becoming scattered clouds north of 4830 N. with fog in patches becoming scattered clouds south of 4830 N. with fog in patches over France becoming nil by 1030 hours. 7-10/10 stratus or stratocumulus base 2-3000 feet, tops 8-10000 feet with patches base 500 feet, tops 1500 feet becoming 6-8/10 base 4-6000 feet, tops 7-9000 feet becoming nil south of 4830 N. Nil middle cloud becoming 4-6/10 altocumulus base 16-18,000 feet, tops 20,000 feet north of 50° N. and east of 03° E. becoming nil south of 50° N. 4-6/10 cirrostratus base 25-26,000 feet. Freezing level 7000 feet becoming 10,000 feet, light rime. Visibility 1-2 miles locally 1000 yards, unrestricted aloft, downward 15-25 miles.

2. Target to Base.

Scattered clouds becoming broken clouds with haze north of 4830 N. Reverse of route out except 6-9/10 stratocumulus and large cumulus base 2-3000 feet, tops 8-10,000 feet over bases. Freezing level reverse of route out. Visibility unrestricted becoming 4-6 miles over bases.

3. Winds.

	<u>Bases to 49° N.</u>		<u>49° N. to Target</u>	
Surface	250°	10 Knots	Light and Variable	
5,000 feet	260	15	Light and Variable	
10,000	270	20	Light and Variable	
15,000	280	25	300° 10 Knots	
20,000	300	30	320	20
25,000	300	35	330	30
30,000	310	40	340	35

Target (Note: Velocities vary from 0-10 Knots with Directions from the Northwest)

	<u>Light and Variable</u>		
Surface	"	"	"
5,000 feet	"	"	"
10,000	"	"	"
15,000	"	"	"
20,000	"	"	"
25,000	"	"	"
30,000	"	"	"

4. Temperatures.

	<u>Navigational</u>	<u>Target</u>
Surface	14 Deg. C	17 Deg. C
5,000 feet	08	10
10,000	00	00
15,000	-10	-09
20,000	-20	-19
25,000	-32	-31
30,000	-45	-44

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

WEATHER OPERATIONAL FORECAST (Continued)

15 April 1945

5. Indicated and True Altitude, and Mean Temperature.

<u>Indicated</u> <u>Altitude</u>	<u>True</u> <u>Altitude</u>	<u>Mean</u> <u>Temperature</u>
12,000 feet	12,518 feet	09° C
14,000	14,570	07.25
16,000	16,616	05
18,000	18,666	03
20,000	20,732	01.25
22,000	22,777	-01
24,000	24,837	-03
26,000	26,899	-05
28,000	28,957	-07

Pressure Altitude: Minus 266

6. Remarks.

No contrails at operational level.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED - 15 APRIL 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

Take-Off

(0630-0740 Hours) 9-10/10 layered stratocumulus base 500-1000 feet tops 5-7000 feet. Variable 3-5/10 altocumulus, base 10-12,000 feet. Visibility 2-4 miles.

Route Out

Low cloud decreased to 4-6/10, base 3000 feet top 4000 feet over southern England, channel and Northern France and decreased to nil south of Paris. Medium cloud decreased to nil at English coast. 3-5/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet over England, decreased to 0-3/10 over France. Horizontal visibility unrestricted.

Target

Royan (1145 Hours) Clear. Air to ground visibility 25-30 miles.

Return Route

Clear, becoming 5-7/10 cumulus, base 2-4000 feet top 6-7000 feet over England.

Bases on Return

(1417-1530 Hours) Variable 4-7/10 cumulus and stratocumulus, base 2-3000 feet tops 6-8000 feet. Visibility 10-15 miles.

Remarks

Nil contrails. Winds and temperatures satisfactory.

2ND AIR DIVISION

Bases at Take-Off

(0540-0620 Hours) 10/10 stratus, base 600-1000 feet, tops 15-2000 feet. 7-10/10 stratocumulus, base 3-4000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet. Nil to 3/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Visibility 2-3000 yards. Surface wind WSW-SW, 5-12 mph.

Route Out

10/10 stratus, base 600-1000 feet, tops 15-2000 feet becoming nil over continent. 7-10/10 stratocumulus, base 3-4000 feet, tops 6-8000 feet becoming 6-8/10, base 3-4000 feet, tops 4-6000 feet, but top to 10,000 feet in eastern portion of assembly area. Stratocumulus becoming nil south of 50° north. Nil medium cloud except for 1-3/10, base 16,000, tops 18,000 feet over eastern portion of assembly area becoming nil south of 50° north. Nil to 3/10 cirrus above 25,000.

Targets

Vaux sur Mer - Royan (1107-1155 Hours) Nil low cloud and nil medium cloud. Nil to 3/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Downward visibility 15-25 miles.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED (Continued)

15 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)

Return Route

Nil low cloud becoming 4-7/10 cumulus and stratocumulus, base 2-3000 feet, tops 5-7000 feet over southern England becoming 2-5/10 in Base area. Also nil to 3/10 high stratocumulus, base 5000 feet, tops 6000 feet over south England becoming 3-6/10 over bases. Nil to 3/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet.

Bases on Return

(1350-1449 Hours) 2-5/10 cumulus, base 2-3000 feet, tops 5-7000 feet and 3-6/10 high stratocumulus, base 5000 feet, tops 6000 feet with cumulus increasing and stratocumulus decreasing during the period. Visibility 5-10 miles. Surface wind SW-WNW, 9-14 mph.

Remarks

Nil contrails. Winds and temperatures as forecast.

3RD AIR DIVISION

Take-Off

(0520-0600 Hours) 10/10 stratus and stratocumulus base 800-1000 tops 15-2000 feet. Visibility 25-3500 yards becoming unrestricted aloft.

Route Out

8-10/10 stratus and stratocumulus over England breaking to 4-6/10 over channel and to nil in assembly area. 2-3/10 cirrus above 20,000 feet. Horizontal visibility unrestricted.

Target

Royan (1015-1110 Hours) Clear. Downward visibility 25 miles.

Return Route

Clear becoming 8/10 cumulus base 1500-2000 feet, tops 3-5000 feet and 4-6/10 altocumulus and altostratus base 6000 feet, tops 10,000 feet at 51° N. Horizontal visibility 8-10 miles in haze.

Bases on Return

1-2/10 cumulus base 2000 feet tops 5-6000 feet increasing to 5-6/10 by 1400 hours. 1-2/10 altocumulus base 8-10,000 feet. Visibility 5-6 miles in haze.

Remarks

None

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY

15 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

	<u>PTE de SUSAC ROYAN NO. 32</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 17</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 19</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 18</u>	<u>POINTE de GRAVE NO. 24</u>
A/C Sorties	38	42	42	37	31
A/C Credited Sorties	37	42	42	37	31
A/C Effective Sorties	36	42	42 a	37	31
A/C Bombing	36	42	41	37	31
1st Priority	36	42	40	37	31
2nd Priority	0	0	1 b	0	0
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	108.0	126.0	120.0	108.0	93.0
2nd Priority (HE)	0	0	2.5	0	0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

a One aircraft dropped leaflets only.

b One aircraft - Target No. 24 (Royan/Pointe de la Coubre).

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

15 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

	<u>POINTE de la COUBRE NO. 29</u>	<u>POINTE de la COUBRE NO. 26</u>	<u>POINTE de la COUBRE NO. 27</u>	<u>POINTE de la COUBRE NO. 28</u>	<u>TOTAL FORCE III</u>
A/C Sorties	37	39	39	39	344
A/C Credited Sorties	37	39	39	39	343
A/C Effective Sorties	37 c	38 c	26	39	328
A/C Bombing	36	37	26	39	325
1st Priority	0	0	26	39	251
2nd Priority	24 d	24 e	0	0	49
3rd Priority	12 f	13 g	0	0	25
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	0	0	77.5	115.5	748.0
2nd Priority (HE)	72.0	71.5	0	0	146.0
3rd Priority (HE)	36.0	37.5	0	0	73.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

c One aircraft dropped leaflets only.

d Twelve aircraft on Target No. 17 ; 12 aircraft on Target No. 18.

e Twelve aircraft on Target No. 28 ; 12 aircraft on Target No. 38.

f T.O. - Target No. 16 (Pointe de Grave).

g T.O. - Target No. 14 (Pointe de Grave).

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
- 2 -

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

15 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

	POINTE de GRAVE <u>NO. 18</u>	POINTE de GRAVE <u>NO. 19</u>	POINTE de GRAVE <u>NO. 17</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>FORCE IV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>1ST A.D.</u>
A/C Sorties	39	38	37	114	458
A/C Credited Sorties	39	38	37	114	457
A/C Effective Sorties	39 h	38	37 i	114	442
A/C Bombing	38	38	36	112	437
1st Priority	38	38	36	112	363
2nd Priority	0	0	0	0	49
3rd Priority	0	0	0	0	25
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	114.0	114.0	105.5	333.5	1081.5
2nd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	146.0
3rd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	73.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Cause of Damage	0	0	0	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

h One scouting aircraft.

i One aircraft dropped leaflets only.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

15 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION

	<u>NO. 11</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 12</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 7</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 10</u>	<u>ROYAN AREA NO. 8</u>	<u>TOTAL 2ND A.D.</u>
A/C Sorties	67	97	97	28	70	359
A/C Credited Sorties	63	91	93	27	68	342
A/C Effective Sorties	63	89	92	27	68	339
A/C Bombing	63	89	92	27	68	339
1st Priority	43	89	91	26	67	316
2nd Priority	20 j	0	1 k	1 m	1 n	23
Total Bombs (Tons)						
1st Priority (HE)	0	.5	0	0	1.2	1.7
1st Priority (IB)	83.6	171.3	185.7	53.4	133.2	627.2
2nd Priority (IB)	43.2	0	2.2	1.8	2.2	49.4
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	0	4	4	2	0	10
Cat. "A"	0	3	3	2	0	8
Cat. "E"	0	1	1	0	0	2
Cause of Damage	0	4	4	2	0	10
AA	0	2	3	2	0	7
Other	0	2	1	0	0	3
Casualties						
Killed	0	0	0	0	2	2
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0	0

j Ten aircraft on Target No. 8 (Royan/Vaux-sur-mer).
Ten aircraft on Target No. 24 (Royan/Pointe de la Coubre -- Le Fort).

k One aircraft on Target No. 8 (Royan/Vaux-sur-mer).

m One aircraft on Target No. 12 (Royan/Pointe de la Coubre).

n One aircraft on Royan Area No. 7.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

15 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION

	ROYAN AREA NO. 1 019052 <u>ILL. 734</u>	ROYAN AREA NO. 33A 100018 <u>ILL. 728/4</u>	ROYAN AREA NO. 33 043039 <u>ILL. 730</u>	TOTAL <u>3RD A.D.</u>	OPERATION <u>TOTAL</u>
A/C Sorties	189	189	145	523	1340
A/C Credited Sorties	189	189	145	523	1322
A/C Effective Sorties	188	185	131	504	1285
A/C Bombing	188	185	131	504	1280
1st Priority	175	149	131	455	1134
2nd Priority	13 o	36 p	0	49	121
3rd Priority	0	0	0	0	25
Total Bombs (Tons)					
1st Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	1083.2
1st Priority (IB)	282.3	234.6	208.2	725.1	1352.2
2nd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	146.0
2nd Priority (IB)	19.0	56.7	0	75.7	125.1
3rd Priority (HE)	0	0	0	0	73.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	2	1	1	4	14
Cat. "A"	2	1	1	4	12
Cat. "E"	0	0	0	0	2
Cause of Damage	2	1	1	4	14
AA	1	1	1	3	10
Other	1	0	0	1	4
Casualties					
Killed	0	0	0	0	2
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0	0

o Thirteen aircraft on Royan Area No. 24.

p Thirty-six aircraft on Royan Area No. 33 - 043039 Illus. 730.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

By authority of
CG, VIII Fighter Command
Initials.....
Date, 21 Sept 1945.....

COPY NO. 29

EIGHTH AIR FORCE
TACTICAL MISSION REPORT
16 APRIL 1945

FIELD ORDER NOS.

1997
1999

TARGETS

POINTE DE GRAVE
TRAUNSTEIN
ROSENHEIM
PLATTLING
STRAUBING
REGENSBURG/BURGWEINTING
REGENSBURG

OPERATIONS NOS.

954
955

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPORT OF OPERATIONS

Annexes

Routes

Bombing

Weather

Statistics

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

REPORT OF
EIGHTH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS
16 APRIL 1945

1. IDENTIFICATION.

a. Operations Nos. 955 and 954

b. Assigned Targets

(1) Morning Mission (Operation No. 955 - Codeword: Venerable)

- (a) Tank Ditch Defense Line, Pointe de Grave, (Northwest of Bordeaux), France

(2) Afternoon Mission (Operation No. 954)

- (a) Transformer Station, Traunstein, (East-Southeast of Munich), Germany
(b) Marshalling Yard, Traunstein, Germany
(c) Railway Bridge, Traunstein, Germany
(d) Marshalling Yard, Rosenheim, (Southeast of Munich), Germany
(e) Transformer and Switching Station, Rosenheim, Germany
(f) Marshalling Yard, Plattling, (Southeast of Regensburg) Germany
(g) Railway Bridge, near Straubing, (Southeast of Regensburg), Germany
(h) Railway Sidings, Regensburg/Burgweinting, Germany
(i) East Railway Bridge, Regensburg, Germany
(j) Main Marshalling Yard, Regensburg, Germany
(k) West (Marisort) Railway Bridge, Regensburg, Germany

Note: Above objectives are first priority targets assigned.
For targets actually bombed, see paragraph 3.e.

2. OVER-ALL PLANNING.

a. Weather

At the 0900-hour conference on the preceding day the weather forecast indicated that France, the whole of Germany excepting the Kiel area, and Denmark would have only low cloud of less than 4/10 density. By the afternoon conference there were indications that multi-layered cloud would prevail north of 50° North and east of 10° East and 2-4/10 medium and high cloud south of 50° except in western Germany and France where no cloud was anticipated. By 2200 hours there was evidence of somewhat unfavorable developments affecting southern Germany, layered low, medium and high cloud with large clear lanes between layers east of 09° East making their appearance in the forecast; otherwise previous predictions were essentially the same. A check-up on weather following a special request at 0345 hours, 16 April, for another mission to Royen in the Bordeaux area confirmed clear conditions.

b. Target Selection

On the basis of the initial weather forecasts indicating possible visual bombing conditions in Germany, a large number of transportation targets situated in the area between the Russian and American front

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

lines were submitted to USSTAF for clearance. The uncertainty of the ground situation led to the withholding of authorization for attacks in the central area and the entire selection of targets was confined to southern Germany. Marshalling yards, railway bridges and transformer and switching stations, associated with the electric railways in the area, were designated for attack by normal forces from the three Air Divisions. At 0245 hours on 16 April a message was received from the Atlantic Command Post of the First Tactical Air Force which had the responsibility for coordinating air activities in connection with the elimination of the German pockets of resistance in western France, requesting that the Eighth Air Force again operate under plan "Venerable" (see Tactical Mission Reports on Operations 14 and 15 April). Insufficient time for preparation made it impossible to allocate more than one of the three Air Divisions to this task; 3rd Air Division was designated and its originally assigned targets - marshalling yards at Karlsbad, Falkenau, Schwandorf, Cham, Zwiesel and Passau - were accordingly cancelled. The targets for 1st and 2nd Air Divisions in the Regensburg and Munich areas respectively were allowed to stand unchanged.

OPERATION NO. 955

MORNING OPERATION TO POINTE DE GRAVE IN BORDEAUX AREA

1. PLANNING.

a. Target Selection and Force Assignment

The Atlantic Command Post, First Tactical Air Force, specified the target for this mission, viz., a tank ditch defense line approximately three and one-half miles long extending across Pointe de Grave peninsula, which is situated on the south side of the Gironde Estuary opposite Royan. An estimated 5,000 enemy troops of the Royan Garrison (numbering around 8,600) were still holding out behind these defenses and the plan was to disrupt the defensive system to facilitate the ground assault. This was the third consecutive day on which the Eighth Air Force had been assigned targets under plan "Venerable". The entire 3rd Air Division force of almost 500 heavy bombers was scheduled against this objective, ten aiming points at strategic positions along the defense line were assigned as follows:

<u>Target</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Units</u>
(Tactical Unit - group, 3 or 4 squadrons, of 36 B-17's)		
Tank Ditch Defense Line	Pointe de Grave	13 groups

Aiming Points (Grid Reference - GSGS 4246, 6 M)

343622	1 group	(4 squadrons)
339619	1 group	(4 squadrons)
334617	1 group	(4 squadrons)
328610	2 groups	(7 squadrons)
320610	1 group	(3 squadrons)
314612	2 groups	(8 squadrons)
308613	1 group	(4 squadrons)
302612	2 groups	(6 squadrons)
298613	1 group	(3 squadrons)
282615	1 group	(3 squadrons)

No alternative targets were designated and it was stipulated that all bombing would cease by 1200 hours.

b. Bomber Flight Plan

(1) Departing the English coast at Beachy Head in Division formation the bomber groups were to proceed almost due south to the target area.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Northeast-southwest bombing runs were specified, this being chosen as the least likely to endanger friendly troops positioned approximately eight miles south of the tank ditch. Predicted winds at altitude from 190° at 20 knots were expected to introduce only a very small drift factor and the approach was sufficiently away from the sun so that glare would afford no problem. With little anti-aircraft opposition anticipated a bombing altitude of 15,000 feet was ordered. After attacking, the bombers were to swing out over the Bay of Biscay past the La Rochelle area where enemy pockets of resistance still existed and cross inland south of other enemy positions in the St. Nazaire area. Thence, an essentially northerly heading was to be followed to Beachy Head.

(2) Provision was made for a command aircraft to coordinate the air and ground operations. This aircraft preceding by 30 minutes the head of the bomber column at the target area, was to establish and maintain contact with a ground force VHF station as well as the bomber groups. In addition to the stipulation of visual bombing other safety measures included:

(a) Checking of bomb bay doors, rack switches and intervalometers over the Channel to guard against accidental releases in friendly territory.

(b) Warnings to guard against early releases and in case of doubt to delay sufficiently to insure "overs" rather than "shorts".

(c) Cautioning against jettisoning over water until H2X aircraft has scanned area for shipping.

(3) One P-51 was detailed to scout assembly weather and four P-51's and one B-17 were to precede the bomber formation to radio information on route and target conditions. Normal "carpet" and "cheff" radio counter-measures were to be utilized in the target area but no special aircraft were assigned for this purpose.

Note: See "Routes and Targets" Annex for Over-all Plan showing details of bomber routes and timings. Target Assignment (by units) and Flight Order and Interval data are also found in this Annex.

c. Fighter Support

No fighter support was considered necessary for this mission.

2. EXECUTION.

a. Target Bombed

Tank Ditch Defense Line, Pointe de Grave

b. Take-off and Assembly

The take-offs were essentially as planned, although visibilities were more restricted than anticipated. During assembly there was some interference and several groups were forced to "ess" to gain their proper positions but the briefed order was attained by the time the English coast was crossed. Due to slight haze which restricted air-to-air visibility the formations were only fair. There were 486 B-17's which sortied for this mission.

c. Penetration

(1) General

There were no major deviations from the briefed route and timings between England and the initial point. The formation was generally

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

spread out but groups in ninth and tenth positions were too close and the latter's attempt to remedy the situation by cutting short of the initial point was unsuccessful in that both groups were temporarily forced out of position.

(2) Enemy Opposition

As anticipated there was no air opposition to the uncorted bombers and as the flight to the target area was entirely over friendly territory there was no ground opposition.

d. Target Area

(1) General

(a) Weather at the target was as forecast with no cloud below 26,000 feet; the haze encountered over England and en route had dissipated and downward visibility of 20-30 miles was indicated. These conditions enabled all units to attack visually.

(b) Bombing was conducted essentially as planned with a few exceptions. Squadrons of groups in ninth and tenth positions, as a consequence of the interference experienced in the vicinity of the initial point, were intermingled on the bombing run with the result that units were not in their proper order. Intervals between other groups were considerably greater than briefed, the over-all formation requiring approximately 45 minutes to conduct the attack which was scheduled for accomplishment in less than 30 minutes; this does not include units which resorted to second or third bombing runs. The lead bombardier of a squadron in the second group as a result of faulty identification bombed 9.2 miles south of the assigned aiming point. Another squadron in the same group dropped 1.8 miles short of its target due to failure of the lead bombardier to remove his extended vision. Smoke obscuration caused one squadron of the third group to make a second approach on which it used an aiming point 0.7 miles beyond the designated aiming point. A squadron of the ninth group required three runs; an AFCE malfunction hindered synchronization on the first approach and the presence of another unit directly below forced the unit to hold its bombs on the second attempt.

(c) The bombing program was executed from 14,200-16,450 feet (briefed 15,000 feet) at 1107-1159 hours (briefed 1115-1142). All 486 B-17's which sortied, participated in the bombing with 1451.7 tons being dropped.

(2) Bombing Results

Assessment of available photographic cover indicated generally good results as will appear below:

Pointe de Grave, Tank Ditch Defense Line (436 aircraft dropped 99x2000 HE, 967x1000 HE, 3477x500 HE) - Strike attack photographs showed many concentrations of HE bursts, totalling at least 1700, on and across the greater portion of the tank ditch defense line, with several hits on a previously cratered strong point at the eastern end of the defense line. Approximately 65-70% of the line was affected, while the eastern half, unprotected by woods, was very heavily hit along nine-tenths of its length. Concentrations and groups of bursts totalling at least 900 were seen also in open and wooded areas about 1400 yards to the south and southwest of the target and as far as nine miles south and southeast of the central section of the defense line. One pattern fell on a road intersection and another on a partially built-up area. Approximately 30 bursts were visible in open country 2000 yards northwest of the

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

center of the ditch. Subsequent reconnaissance confirmed the effectiveness indicated by strike photographs. There was a heavy concentration of craters along the eastern end of the ditch from 331618 to 340623. Along the north side of this section the fire pits were destroyed. The outlines of a wire enclosed strongpoint at 335621 were obliterated by hits in the area. Craters within the strongpoint at 328617 cut the highway across the ditch in three places. Near misses threw soil into three small emplacements within the strongpoint and damaged a small shed in the area. There were five craters at 327614, near the hinge of the line in the vicinity of a row of unidentified objects. In the center of the line a heavy concentration was evident around point 315614; fire points in this area were destroyed. At 304618, where the railway crosses the ditch, the line was cut in three places by direct hits. Westward along the ditch between 298614 and 309617, a heavy concentration of craters was registered; the only remaining defensive elements visible along this section of the ditch were two short fire trenches. Near the western extremity, at 283616, there were many hits in an area of emplacements and fire trenches, completely blanketing the area. (See "Bombing" Annex for approximate bomb plot.)

(3) Enemy Opposition

There was no enemy aircraft opposition and only one group encountered anti-aircraft fire. This unit reported moderate, accurate tracking fire after making a right turn prior to a second bombing run on the target. (This fire came from the four-gun battery located about one and one-half miles north of and towards the west end of the tank ditch.)

e. Withdrawal

(1) General

The formation which was considerably extended at the target area became ever more so during the return flight. By the time the bombers reached Beachy Head the first group was approximately 23 minutes ahead of schedule while the last was about three minutes late. Deviations from the briefed course were insignificant.

(2) Enemy Opposition

There was no evidence of enemy opposition during the withdrawal.

f. Sorties, Losses, Battle Damage and Claims

(1) Bombers

A total of 486 B-17's sortied, all effectively and all attacked the primary target with 1451.7 tons HE. No aircraft were lost, but one B-17 sustained category "F" (salvage) damage as the result of a landing accident. There were 17 cases of limited battle damage (8 category "A" 9 category "AC"), 5 of which were attributed to anti-aircraft fire, the remaining 12 being caused by fragments from two 500-pound HE bombs which collided in mid-air and exploded. No claims were made against enemy aircraft.

(2) Fighters

Four P-51's sortied as weather scouts and were all effective. One sustained category "F" (salvage) damage, cause unknown.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

OPERATION NO. 954

AFTERNOON OPERATION TO SOUTHERN GERMANY

1. PLANNING.

a. Target Selection and Force Assignment

The target selections for 1st and 2nd Air Divisions were not affected by the decision to divert 3rd Air Division for the "Venerable" operation earlier in the day and the planning for this mission went forward with no significant changes other than the delay of target times by two hours - to approximately 1600 hours, in anticipation of better chances for visual conditions during the later afternoon. Specific assignments were made as follows:

<u>Target</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Units</u>
<u>Force I - 2nd Air Division (B-24's)</u>		
(Tactical Unit - combat wing of 6-10 squadrons of 10 aircraft)		
Transformer Station	Traunstein	1 combat wing (6 squadrons)
Marshalling Yard	Traunstein	(4 squadrons)
Railway Bridge	Traunstein	1 combat wing (6 squadrons)
Marshalling Yard	Rosenheim	2 combat wings (9 squadrons)
Transformer and Switching Station	Rosenheim	(6 squadrons)

<u>Force II - 1st Air Division (B-17's)</u>		
(Tactical Unit - group of 36 aircraft)		
Marshalling Yard	Plattling	2 groups
Railway Bridge	Straubling	2 groups
Railway Siding	Regensburg/Burgweinting	2 groups
East Railway Bridge	Regensburg	2 groups
Main Marshalling Yard	Regensburg	2 groups
West (Mariaort) Railway Bridge	Regensburg	2 groups

Note: See Target Priority schedule for other than first priority objectives and Target Assignment schedule for unit assignments and target illustration for relationship of objectives at Regensburg; all in "Routes and Targets" Annex.

b. Bomber Flight Plan

(1) The original plan involving the three Air Divisions called for three closely paralleling routes with 2nd Air Division preceding the other two by approximately 30 minutes. This scheme of maneuver was designed to evoke an enemy reaction against a well protected and compact lead formation - the 2nd Air Division was to be comprised of approximately 300 aircraft; the other forces of 400-500 aircraft - rather than present the German controller a choice of attacking any one of the three forces. Furthermore, this arrangement would permit the groups operating in support of the lead force to return to the areas from which enemy fighters were likely to operate and destroy aircraft in the process of landing or immediately afterwards. After the reassignment of 3rd Air Division to the "Venerable" mission with targets in the Bordeaux area which required no fighter protection, its allotted groups were made available to support the forces operating in Germany but otherwise the original plan remained intact.

(2) Recent advances of Allied troops made the penetrations into enemy territory relatively limited and while the avoidance of concentrated

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

anti-aircraft defenses was a definite consideration in laying out the routes it did not constitute a particular problem. Furthermore, only units with objectives in the immediate area of Regensburg were expected to encounter target defenses. For planning bombing runs winds at altitude were from 300° at 40 knots; the sun position was 200° azimuth at an altitude of 49°. More specific information as to the routing of the respective forces follows:

(a) Force I (2nd Air Division) was scheduled to depart Beachy Head at 1230 hours and proceed on a east-southeasterly heading directly to a point northeast of Munich where the units were to separate for their respective target areas at Traunstein and Rosenheim. Northwest-southeast runs generally downwind and away from the sun, were specified. Bombing altitudes of 18,000 feet were ordered in view of the absence of heavy defenses and attacks were to be conducted almost simultaneously in the two target areas - at 1526-1530 hours. The bomber units were to reform south of their targets and although order of combat wings would be changed and intervals between them somewhat greater than on the penetration the force was to regain its integrity. A northwesterly course was to be followed on the return, exit from the Continent to be made over the Scheldt Estuary and landfall over England at Great Yarmouth.

(b) Force II (1st Air Division) was to depart Clacton in East Anglia 30 minutes after Force I initiated its departure from southern England. Flying a parallel course several miles north of Force I, this formation was to begin breaking down approximately 80 miles west of Regensburg. At that point groups assigned to targets in that city were to veer north from the other units, which were to continue their east-southeasterly heading, to position themselves for northwest-southeast runs, downwind and away from the sun. The Plattling and Straubing groups were to begin their respective west-east bombing runs from initial points a few miles south of Regensburg. The target defenses of Regensburg dictated bombing altitudes of 24,000 feet; 18,000 foot levels were specified for the other objectives. Attacks on Regensburg were scheduled to begin at 1542 hours, approximately 15 minutes before those at Plattling and Straubing. A withdrawal route, slightly south of the penetration course was to be used by all units after they effected rallies south of their respective targets. The flight order for the return was to show a considerable rearrangement with the Regensburg units taking the lead and constituting one formation while the Plattling-Straubing groups were to make up another formation and follow at an interval of approximately 20 minutes. The fact that so great a part of the route was over territory in friendly hands made this lengthening of the bomber column of limited importance. Dungeness was designated as the point of entry to England.

(3) P-51 weather scouts were scheduled to precede each bomber force in order to radio information to the bombers on route and target conditions. In addition to normal radio countermeasures conducted by the participant bombers against ground defenses, four Mosquito aircraft were to dispense chaff ahead of Force II (1st Air Division) in the Regensburg area.

Note: See "Routes and Targets" for Over-all Plan showing details of bomber routes and timings and Flak Map for relationship of routes to anti-aircraft defenses. Flight Order and Interval data are also found in this Annex.

c. Fighter Support

(1) General

The 15 Eighth Air Force fighter groups (14 P-51, 1 P-47) were available for this mission. Originally it was planned to use all units on close escort, but when the 3rd Air Division was reassigned to operate in the Bordeaux area the five P-51 groups detailed to support that force were placed on free-lance patrols. Enemy fighter reaction was not expected to be

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

heavy. It was thought that the 25 to 30 Me-262's based in the Munich area might attempt interception, anywhere east of 10° East, with the lead force (2nd Air Division) the probable objective. The likelihood of conventional-type aircraft being directed against the bomber operation was considered remote.

(2) Specific Assignments

(a) Ten groups were to provide close support for the bomber forces. Five, four P-51 and one P-47, were to cover Force I (2nd Air Division assigned targets at Traunstein and Rosenheim), rendezvousing with the B-24 combat wings southwest of Mannheim to give penetration, target and withdrawal support; one of the P-51 groups was scheduled to fly five minutes ahead of the bomber column. The other five P-51 groups were to protect Force II (1st Air Division assigned targets in the Regensburg area), joining the B-17 groups east of Mannheim to furnish penetration, target and withdrawal support.

(b) Five P-51 groups were detailed for area support, each to initiate its patrol operations as the lead bomber force reached its fighter rendezvous point near Mannheim:

One group to patrol in vicinity of Traunstein and Rosenheim and withdraw with Force I bombers which were assigned to those targets.

One group to proceed from Salzburg to the Munich-Traunstein-Rosenheim sector and withdraw with Force I.

One group to sweep the Landshut area and withdraw with Force I.

One group to patrol Regensburg-Plattling-Straubing area and withdraw with Force II.

One group to arrive Pilsen area and patrol until bombers had withdrawn to 10° East.

Such of the above groups as were to augment withdrawal support were to accompany bombers only to 10° East; they were then to return to the general area, Prague-Linz-Salzburg-Munich-Karlsbad, where, at the discretion of fighter group leaders and under their direct orders, airfields could be strafed. Indiscriminate attacks by flights or single aircraft were prohibited and airfields were the only permissible targets for strafing activities. In view of the fact that Russian troops were immediately east of the Prague-Linz line and American forces were west of the Karlsbad-Regensburg line, pilots were urged to exercise extreme caution and attack only after the airfields and aircraft on them had been very clearly identified.

Note: For details of fighter rendezvous and patrol assignments, see Over-all Plan on "Routes and Targets" Annex.

2. EXECUTION.

a. Targets Bombed

(1) Force I

Marshalling Yard, Landshut (Northeast of Munich)
(Third Priority Target)

(2) Force II

- (a) Marshalling Yard, Plattling
- (b) Railway Bridge, Straubing
- (c) Railway Sidings, Regensburg/Burgweinting
- (d) East Railway Bridge, Regensburg
- (e) Main Marshalling Yard, Regensburg
- (f) West Mariasort Railway Bridge, Regensburg

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

b. Take-off and Assembly

(1) The four B-24 combat wings of 2nd Air Division, designated as Force I, accomplished their take-offs and assemblies without incident, and departed from Beachy Head on the English coast in the proper wing order. The interval between the second and third wings was somewhat greater than briefed, with the result that the third and fourth wings were a few minutes late at the English coast (briefed 1230-1237 hours). A total of 306 B-24's sortied in this force.

(2) After taking off as scheduled, the 12 B-17 groups of 1st Air Division constituting Force II, assembled with little or no difficulty although most units were forced by cloud to assemble 2,000 to 4,000 feet higher than the briefed altitude of 5,000 feet. Departures from the East Anglian coast at Clacton were on time (1300-1322 hours) with the groups flying in good formation. A total of 453 B-17's sortied.

(3) A total of 759 heavy bombers sortied in the two forces.

c. Penetration

(1) General

On the penetration the head of Force I was approximately 20 minutes in front of Force II as the bomber formations proceeded over their essentially parallel routes from England to their respective target areas. Force I units, flying the more southerly route, made only very minor deviations from the planned route. The interval between the second and third wings continued to be excessive and the third and last wings were about four minutes late at the French coast, and correspondingly late at their initial points. The groups in Force II generally adhered to their briefed course, but units assigned to Regensburg appears to have deviated slightly during the final stages of the penetration. This formation was slightly ahead of schedule when it separated approximately 80 miles west of Regensburg but the groups with objectives in that city lost time in executing their dog-leg to the north, and were several minutes behind schedule at the initial point, the last units in the Division column assigned to Plattling and Straubing followed more direct routes to their respective initial points and reached them a few minutes early.

(2) Fighter Support

The four P-51 groups and one P-47 group detailed to Force I rendezvoused with the assigned combat wings west of Mannheim essentially as planned. The "A" section of one group flew direct to the strafing area, arriving in the vicinity of Prague when the bombers were near Stuttgart. Force II, flying several minutes ahead of schedule, passed the designated rendezvous point before any of the five assigned P-51 groups made contact. Four of the groups joined the bombers to the east of Mannheim but one group did not contact its bomber groups until after they had attacked. The five P-51 free-lance groups proceeded towards their assigned patrol areas (Munich, Regensburg, Salzburg, Pilsen, Landshut) as planned.

(3) Enemy Opposition

No enemy aircraft were encountered by the bomber forces or by their supporting fighters during this phase of the operation. One group in Force II, which veered slightly north of course, encountered meager and inaccurate anti-aircraft fire at Nurnberg.

d. Target Area

(1) Force I (2nd Air Division)

(a) The four B-24 combat wings comprising this force found substantially overcast conditions prevailing over Traunstein and

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Rosenheim and were thereby prevented from attacking their first and second priority targets which required visual bombing (the first priority targets of units assigned to Traunstein were the second priority targets of units assigned to Rosenheim, and vice versa). Accordingly, all units turned to the third priority objectives, the marshalling yard at Landshut, about 38 miles northeast of Munich. Although prepared for Pathfinder bombing visual releases, some with H2X assists, were made on this target. All units participated except two squadrons which were forced to abandon their bombing runs due to interference from B-17's of Force II. These squadrons later jettisoned their bombs safely over enemy territory.

(b) Attacks on the third priority target were carried out from 16,200-20,500 feet (briefed for first priority: 18,000 feet) at 1531-1551 hours (briefed for first priority: 1526-1530 hours). A total of 272 B-24's attacked with 647.8 tons, all dropping on the Landshut marshalling yard. 1

(2) Force II (1st Air Division)

(a) The 12 B-17 groups of this force found visual conditions prevailing over its objectives in the Regensburg area, approximately 70 miles north of the cloud-obscured first and second priority targets of Force II. All units were able to execute attacks essentially as planned; two groups bombing the Plattling marshalling yard, two groups the Straubing railway bridge, two groups the Regensburg/Burgweinting railway sidings, two groups the main marshalling yard in Regensburg, two groups the East railway bridge, and two groups the West (Mariaort) railway bridge. Two squadrons of a group bombing the Burgweinting sidings experienced automatic pilot difficulties on their bombing runs but managed to make their releases, in one instance using manual control. Of the two groups on the main marshalling yard, one was forced to the right of course after crossing the initial point by another unit approaching on a different heading and the second group assigned to this target encountered considerable propwash.

(b) Bombs were released at Plattling and Straubing from 16,300-18,700 feet (briefed 18,000 feet) at 1550-1604 hours (briefed 1602-1605 hours); attacks at Regensburg were accomplished from 22,710-24,700 feet (briefed 24,000 feet) at 1549-1617 hours (briefed 1542-1554 hours). A total of 443 B-17's dropped 1327.0 tons on the first priority targets and one ton - part of a bomb load - on the third priority target, Ingolstadt marshalling yard.

(3) Bombing Results

The assessment of available photographic cover of these attacks, which involved 715 heavy bombers dropping a total of 1975.8 tons, reveals the following results:

FORCE I

Landshut, Marshalling Yard, Third Priority (272 aircraft dropped 226x1000 HE, 2031x500 HE, 104x500 IB and 29x70 IB) - Strike attack photographs showed that HE bursts blanketed the western two-thirds of the yard, except for the extreme west end, and that incendiaries covered the eastern end, with HE bursts on the tracks leading north from this end of the yard. HE hits caused a small explosion in an unidentified factory area just north of the east end of the yard. Reconnaissance photographs obtained on 17 April showed extensive damage caused by previous attacks including the Eighth Air Force attack on 11 April. A comparison of the strike photographs of this mission and the cumulative damage evidenced on the reconnaissance cover indicates that this attack caused damage to locomotive and repair facilities, the freight depot, the station sidings, through running lines, an unidentified factory northeast of the target and was responsible for scattered incidents in lightly built-up areas at the

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

south side and west end of the marshalling yard. In most every instance the aforementioned railway facilities in the target area had sustained previous damage. (See "Bombing" Annex for approximate bomb plot, reconnaissance photograph and extracts from damage assessment reports.)

FORCE II

Plattling, Marshalling Yard, First Priority (76 aircraft dropped 1056x500 HE) - Strike attack photographs indicated that at least six concentrations of bursts, totalling more than 650, blanketed the marshalling yard, locomotive depots, probable repair shops, the passenger station and adjacent business/residential sections, extending into open fields. There was one explosion among the storage sidings. All rail lines were cut and numerous freight cars damaged or destroyed. Subsequent reconnaissance revealed a heavy concentration of craters covering almost the entire area of the marshalling yard, with every track apparently hit at several points and large numbers of railway cars derailed and/or damaged. The most easterly roundhouse and turntable were completely destroyed, with a number of locomotives derailed and a nearby probable workshop almost destroyed. The remaining roundhouse suffered moderately severe roof damage, and a foot bridge at the east end of the yard was wrecked. The passenger station and platform canopies also were destroyed and at least seven fires left burning among rolling stock in widely dispersed parts of the yard. A concentration of craters was visible in open ground immediately north of the target area and a few were scattered through the business/residential area to the south. (See "Bombing" Annex for strike and reconnaissance photographs.)

Straubing, Railway Bridge, First Priority (75 aircraft dropped 967x500 HE) - Strike attack photographs showed that a heavy concentration of bursts blanketed the bridge (which spans the Danube River about five miles east-northeast of the town of Straubing), and extended into adjoining open areas, with four probable hits on the north central portion of the bridge, at least six hits on the southern approach, and numerous near hits along the entire length of the bridge. Reconnaissance flown later the same day revealed that without being completely destroyed, the bridge had been rendered totally unserviceable. The embankment approach to the bridge from Straubing was cut by seven craters; two spans between the embankment and the main bridge, totalling about 135 feet, were cut and broken down, and two spans over the island, about 115 feet in all, were collapsed. On both banks of the river in the vicinity of the bridge there were large concentrations of craters and many near misses to piers supporting the bridge both over the island and at the north-northeast approach. (See "Bombing" Annex for strike photograph and approximate bomb plot.)

Regensburg/Burgweinting, Rail Sidings, First Priority (78 aircraft dropped 140x500 HE, 970x250 HE, 32x300 HE and 153x500 IB) - Strike attack photographs indicated at least 55 bursts on the Burgweinting sidings, with possible hits on a rail-over-road bridge, a concentration and two groups of incendiaries in fields near the southeast end of the sidings, and approximately 26 bursts in fields to the south and southeast of the target. Subsequent reconnaissance disclosed that the attack was concentrated principally on the marshalling sidings, where all tracks appeared blocked and many items of rolling stock were damaged. A group of storage sidings to the south also were hard hit, and all through-running lines were cut. (See "Bombing" Annex for reconnaissance photograph.)

Regensburg, East Railway Bridge, First Priority (71 aircraft dropped 426x1000 HE) - Strike and reconnaissance photographs showed that

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

the bridge and its approaches were blanketed by six groups of bursts, totalling more than 275, additional bursts extending across the adjacent shipyard, river, river banks, docking area, and into open fields. Two spans were destroyed, one on the north bank, the other where the bridge crosses the area of land situated between the river and the dock on the south bank. At two other points, the southbound track was severed. The bridge was severely damaged and left 100% unserviceable. (See "Bombing" Annex for strike photograph and approximate bomb plot.)

Regensburg, Main Marshalling Yard, First Priority (70 aircraft dropped 438x500 HE, 524x250 HE, 66x500 IB) - Strike attack photographs indicated that three concentrations of HE bursts, totalling at least 250, and a group of incendiaries blanketed the center half of the yard, including the locomotive depots, the car repair shop, the transshipment shed, and the passenger station, causing at least one small explosion. Reconnaissance cover obtained the following day revealed extensive damage to the sidings, facilities and rolling stock in the yard. The car repair shop was almost a total loss and the adjoining locomotive depot was moderately damaged and the transshipment shed completely destroyed. The main repair building of the westernmost locomotive depot was more than three-quarters destroyed. In the storage sidings there was much destruction. All tracks were obstructed and many items of rolling stock derailed and damaged. All through lines appeared to have been cut. (See "Bombing" Annex for strike photograph and approximate bomb plot.)

Regensburg, West (Marlaort) Railway Bridge, First Priority (73 aircraft dropped 435x1000 HE) - Strike photographs showed that this bridge crossing the Danube River approximately three miles west of the main station at Regensburg, received four compact concentrations; that a total of at least 250 bursts fell on or near the bridge, with at least three probable hits on the bridge itself, four hits on the west approach and at least five hits on the east approach. A small village on the east bank of the river was blanketed with bursts. Subsequent reconnaissance disclosed that the bridge approaches were blocked on both banks of the river, the rail tracks having been cut in six places. Although intact, the bridge itself had been rendered impassable. (See "Bombing" Annex for strike photographs and approximate bomb plot.)

(4) Fighter Support

The P-47 group and four P-51 groups, assigned to Force I, less the section of one group which had proceeded directly to the strafing area, continued support of B-24 combat wings over the Plattling-Straubing-Landshut area; sections from another P-51 group and the P-47 group left the bombers immediately after the bombing to seek suitable airfield targets. The four P-51 groups which had rendezvoused with Force II on the penetration provided escort to the B-17 groups in the Regensburg area where the fifth P-51 group finally succeeded in contacting the bombers, although not before they had attacked; the assault section of this last-mentioned P-51 group broke off almost immediately for the purpose of strafing airfields. The five P-51 groups on free-lance patrols operated in their designated areas while the bomber forces were over their targets.

(5) Enemy Opposition

No enemy aircraft were sighted in the air by either bombers or fighters. Force I encountered no anti-aircraft gunfire at Landshut, which all units attacked. Force II reported meager to moderate and fairly accurate fire at Regensburg, but none at Plattling and Straubing. Normal evasive action was taken over the Regensburg objectives.

- 12 -
DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

c. Withdrawal

(1) General

(a) As previously noted, all four combat wings of Force I attacked their third priority target at Landshut, located northeast of Munich. The route planning, based on the first priority targets at Traunstein and Rosenheim, approximately 50 miles south of Munich, provided for a return course well south of the Munich defenses and other anti-aircraft concentrations immediately to the west. When the Landshut objective was attacked as an alternative, it was more practicable to make a tight right turn, skirt north of the Munich anti-aircraft zone and use the approximate reciprocal of the final stage of the penetration route for the initial phase of the withdrawal. This resulted in a considerably more direct flight to the Rhine River near which the briefed course was intercepted and as a consequence the formation as a whole reached Great Yarmouth 30-40 minutes ahead of schedule. The anticipated rearrangement of the combat wings for the return flight did not occur, as the formation did not break down for the respective first priority target areas.

(b) The return flight of Force II groups followed the briefed route without important deviations. The anticipated rearrangement of the groups occurred, placing the units on the Regensburg target in the lead with those on Plattling and Straubing following at an interval of approximately 20 minutes. The Force II groups reached Dungeness on an average of 15 minutes early, with indications that head winds were somewhat lighter than forecast.

(2) Fighter Support

Fighter escort for both forces was continued generally to the area between 10° East and the Rhine, but sections from a number of groups broke escort earlier and returned to the strafing area. After the bombers had withdrawn, the free-lance groups also went down to strafe, with the exception of two squadrons, one augmenting escort for Force I and the other giving additional support to Force II. After leaving the bombers the remainder of the fighter units returned to the strafing areas (Prague-Linz-Salzburg-Munich-Regensburg-Karlsbad), where over 40 airfields were strafed and many more inspected for enemy aircraft.

(3) Enemy Opposition

(a) No enemy aircraft were sighted by the bombers during the course of the mission, nor did supporting fighters have encounters while escorting the bombers. Two combat wings of Force I which was withdrawing considerably north of the briefed route as a consequence of bombing an alternative target, passed within range of anti-aircraft guns of the northern Augsburg defenses where they were engaged, by moderate fairly accurate predictor fire. No other ground defense activity was indicated by the bomber units.

(b) Fighters which proceeded to the designated strafing area encountered a few enemy aircraft. One jet aircraft at low altitude was unsuccessfully bounced, two Me-262's were chased uneventfully in the Munich area, one Me-262 was destroyed as it attempted to land on Horsching Airfield near Linz and two out of three Me-109's taking off from Deiningen Airfield, southwest of Nurnberg, were destroyed. Strafing fighters met intense, accurate light anti-aircraft fire over 17 of the airfields and fire varying from meager and inaccurate to moderate and accurate over the others. A large number of fighters were lost and damaged in the course of these attacks.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
-13-

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

f. Fighter Summary

(1) General Effectiveness.

The ten fighter groups, one P-47 and nine P-51's, detailed as close support of the bombers carried out their assignments generally as planned except for one P-51 group which did not effect rendezvous with Force II units until they had executed their attacks. The five P-51 groups scheduled for patrol activities in support of the bomber forces performed according to plan. From the standpoint of bomber cover the fighter missions were uneventful.

(2) Strafing Activities

Aircraft in varying numbers from all 15 groups participated in strafing operations against airfields in the designated Prague-Linz-Salzburg-Munich-Regensburg-Karlsbad area. More than 40 landing grounds and installations were attacked and a record number of claims against enemy aircraft on the ground were registered, viz, 747 destroyed and 391 damaged. In addition while proceeding to the strafing zone 3 enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air while in the process of taking off or landing. Automatic weapons fire caused the loss of 21 fighters and was probably responsible for the failure to return of 13 others which were listed to "unknown causes."

g. Sorties, Losses, Battle Damage and Claims

(1) Bombers

A total of 759 aircraft (453 B-17's, 306 B-24's) sortied for this operation against German targets. Of this number 720, including four leaflet-dispensing B-17's and one B-17 scout aircraft, made effective sorties and a total of 715 bombers dropped 1975.8 tons as follows: 272 B-24's dropped 647.8 tons on the third priority target, 443 B-17's dropped 1327.0 tons on first priority objectives and one ton on a tertiary target. There was only one loss, a B-24 shot down by anti-aircraft gunfire. There were 2 cases of category "E" (salvage) damage, and 7 cases of limited battle damage (5 category "A", 2 category "AC"), 6 of which were caused by anti-aircraft fire and one by other causes. No claims were made against enemy aircraft.

(2) Fighters

Fighter sorties totalled 870 (816 P-51's, 54 P-47's) of which 826 were effective. Thirty-four (33 P-51's, 1 P-47) were lost, 21 attributed to anti-aircraft fire and 13 to unknown causes. There were six cases of category "E" (salvage) damage, one as a result of combat and the others of unspecified causes; also, 74 aircraft sustained limited battle damage (44 category "A", 1 category "B", 29 category "AC"). Three enemy aircraft (jets) were destroyed in the air, and the all-time high score of 747 destroyed and 391 damaged registered against aircraft on the ground. As weather scouts, 17 P-51's sortied and 16 were effective, with no losses. One P-51 scout sustained category "E" (salvage) damage as a result of unknown causes.

3. ENEMY REACTION.

There was no evidence of an attempt by the G.A.F. to oppose this heavy bomber operation.

* * * * *

The two operations described above entailed a total effort of 1245 heavy bomber sorties, 1206 being effective, and 1201 aircraft attacking with 3427.5 tons; and a total of 891 fighter sorties, of which 846 were effective.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED



FLAK MAP #116 16 APRIL 1945 (SECRET)

DECLASSIFIED

TARGET ASSIGNMENTS

Operation No. 955

Morning Mission
16 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION - FORCE I

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>AIMING POINTS</u> (Grid Reference - GSGS4246. 5M)	<u>FORCE*</u>	<u>T.O.T.</u>	<u>ALTITUDE</u>
Pointe De Grave (Tank Ditch Defense Line)	282615	34th Group	1115)
)
	298613	385th Group	1117)
)
	302612	490th, 493rd Groups	1119-)
			1121)
)
	308613	390th Group	1124)
)
	314612	100th, 95th Groups	1126-)
			1128)
)
	320610	452nd Group	1131)
)
	328610	388th, 486th Groups	1133-)
			1136)
)
	334617	487th Group	1138)
)
	339619	94th Group	1140)
)
	343622	447th Group	1142)

15,000
feet

* Tactical Unit: 3rd Air Division - Group of 36 B-17's.

NOTE: See Flight Order and Interval.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TARGET ASSIGNMENTS

Operation No. 954

Afternoon Mission
16 April 1945

<u>CHART REF.</u> <u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>FORCE*</u>	<u>T.O.T.</u>	<u>ALTITUDE</u>
<u>1ST AIR DIVISION - FORCE II</u>				
1	Plattling M/Y	306th and 92nd Groups	1602	18,000
2	Straubing Railway Bridge	305th and 303rd Groups	1603	18,000
3a	Regensburg/Burg- weinting Railway Sidings	379th and 384th Groups	1542	24,000
3b	Regensburg M/Y	351st and 398th Groups	1546	24,000
4	Regensburg East Railway Bridge	457th and 401st Groups	1550	24,000
5	Regensburg West (Mariaort) Rail- way Bridge	91st and 381st Groups	1554	24,000
<u>2ND AIR DIVISION - FORCE I</u>				
6	Traunstein Trans- former Station	96th CW: 467th Gp (3 Sqs) 458th Gp (3 Sqs))) 1526	18,000
7	Traunstein M/Y	96th CW: 466th Gp (4 Sqs)	1526	18,000
8	Traunstein Railway Bridge	20th CW: 446th & 93rd Comp. Gps (3 Sqs) 448th & 93rd Comp. Gps (3 Sqs))))) 1529	18,000
9a	Rosenheim Railway Center	2nd CW: 445th Gp (3 Sqs) 389th Gp (3 Sqs) 14th CW: 44th Gp (3 Sqs))))) 1530- 1532	18,000
9b	Rosenheim Trans- former Station	14th CW: 392nd Gp (3 Sqs) 491st Gp (3 Sqs))))	

* Tactical Unit: 1st Air Division - Group of 36 B-17's.
2nd Air Division - Combat Wing of 6 to 10 Squadrons of
10 B-24's.

NOTE: See Flight Order and Interval.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

16 APRIL 1945

TARGET PRIORITIES

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Method of Attack</u>
-----------------	---------------	-----------------	-------------------------

Afternoon Operation

Force I - 2nd Air Division

First	Transformer Station	Traunstein	Visual
Second	Marshalling Yard	Rosenheim	Visual
First	Marshalling Yard	Traunstein	Visual
Second	Marshalling Yard	Rosenheim	Visual
First	Railway Bridge	Traunstein	Visual
Second	Transformer Station	Rosenheim	Visual
First	Marshalling Yard	Rosenheim	Visual
Second	Transformer Station (6 Sqs)	Traunstein	Visual
First	Marshalling Yard, (3 Sqs)	Traunstein	
	Transformer and Switching Station	Rosenheim	Visual
Second	railway Bridge	Traunstein	Visual
Third (All Squadrons)	Marshalling Yard	Landshut	H2X

Force II - 1st Air Division

First	Marshalling Yard	Plattling	Visual
First	Railway Bridge	Straubing	Visual
First	Marshalling Yard	Regensburg/Burgweinting	Visual
First	East Railway Bridge	Regensburg	Visual
First	Main Marshalling Yard	Regensburg	Visual
First	West Railway Bridge	Regensburg	Visual
Second (All Groups)	Any first priority target assigned to other Eighth Air Force Units.		Visual
Third (All Groups)	Marshalling Yard	Regensburg	H2X

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 634

FLIGHT ORDER AND INTERVAL

Operation No. 955

Morning Mission
16 April 1945

Force I, 3rd Air Division to: Pointe de Grave.

34th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 385th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
490th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 493rd Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes;
390th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 minutes; 100th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 minutes;
95th Gp (4 Sqs): 3 minutes; 452nd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
388th Gp (3 Sqs): 3 minutes; 486th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 minutes;
487th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 minutes; 94th Gp (4 Sqs): 2 minutes;
447th Gp (4 Sqs).

Operation No. 954

Afternoon Mission
16 April 1945

Force I, 2nd Air Division to: Traunstein and Resenheim.

96th CW (10 Sqs): 3 minutes; 20th CW (6 Sqs): 2 minutes;
2nd CW (6 Sqs): 2 minutes; 14th CW (9 Sqs).

Force II, 1st Air Division to: Plattling, Straubing and Regensburg.

306th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 92nd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
305th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 303rd Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
379th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 384th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
457th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 401st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
351st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 398th Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes;
91st Gp (3 Sqs): 2 minutes; 381st Gp (3 Sqs).

DECLASSIFIED

S

PRIMARY TANK DITCH DEFENSE LINE near POINTE DE GRAVE

TRACK CHART

DATE 16 APRIL 1945


EIGHTH AIR FORCE PLAN.

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY 3rd AD-34th, 385th, 490th,

493d, 390th, 100th, 95th,

452d, 388th, 486th, 487th,

94th, & 447th Gps




DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED



TARGET ILLUSTRATION


16 APRIL 1945

REGENSBURG



RECEIVED

approx. scale-1:63,360



DECLASSIFIED

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY 1st AD
2d AD

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY 1st AL

2d AD

PRIMARY AS LISTED ON TARGET ASSIGNMENT SHEET



TRACK CHART


DATE 16 APRIL 1945

1ST A.D.

TARGETS
PRIMARY
REGENSBURG - 1ST A.B.C & 41ST B.C & 94TH A.B.C.
PLATTLING - 40TH A.B.
STRAUBLING - 40TH C & 41ST

APPROX ROUTE FOR 1ST DIVISION

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

TARGETS
PRIMARY


TRAUNSTEIN

DECLASSIFIED

TRACK CHART
DATE 16 APR. 1945

20 CBW - 2°AD

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY
BRIEFING
448 ACTUAL
446




DECLASSIFIED

16 APR. 1945

96 CBW-2°A.D

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY
BRIEFING
466 ACTUAL
458 "
467 "



	ENG. COAST	ENEMY COAST	IP	T	ENEMY COAST	ENGLISH COAST
96 CBW	1230	1251	1520	1530	1837	1915
BRIEFING	—	—	—	18000	—	—
467	1231	1252	1518	1531	1759½	1834
ACTUAL	8000	8000	18000	18000	5000	1200
458	1233	1253	1519	1532	1758	1833
ACTUAL	8500	8500	18000	18000	5000	2000
466	1233	1252	1520	1534	1800	1830
ACTUAL	10000	10000	19000	19000	7000	3000

DECLASSIFIED

TARGETS

PRIMARY

ROSENHEIM

TRACK CHART

DATE

16 APR. 1945

14 CBW - 2^D A.D.

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY


BRIEFING

44 ACTUAL

491 "

392 "

DECLASSIFIED



	ENGLISH COAST	ENEMY COAST	IP	T	ENEMY COAST	ENGLISH COAST
14CBW	1237	1258	1521	1532	1828	1906
BRIEFING	—	—	—	18000	—	—
44	1241	1303	1531	1546	1814	1853
ACTUAL	9000	9000	18000	17300	6000	2080
392	1241	1302	1534	1555	1815	1848
ACTUAL	7800	7800	17000	16800	4000	2500
491	1240	1303	1535	1549½	1819	1858
ACTUAL	10000	10000	18000	18000	6000	3600

DECLASSIFIED

TARGETS
PRIMARY

ROSENHEIM

TRACK CHART

DATE


16 APR. 1945

2 CBW - 2^D A.D.

ROUTE FOLLOWED BY

BRIEFING
445 ACTUAL
389

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

Target: Landshut Marshalling Yard (Third Priority).

Date: 16 April, 1945.

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 272.

Number of Bombs Dropped: 226x1000 HE.
2031x500 HE.
104x500 IB.
29x70 IB.

1. Approximate Bomb Plot.
2. Extract from Interpretation Report S.A. 3581.
3. Reconnaissance photograph obtained at 1130 hours on 17 April, 1945.
4. Extract from Immediate Interpretation Report No. K-4301.

DECLASSIFIED



DIRECTION
OF ATTACK

SA 3581
LANDSHUT MARSHALLING YARD
16 April 1945

APPROXIMATE BOMB PLOT

/// Area of H.E. bursts.

○ Area of incendiary bursts.

⊕ Explosion.

--- Outline of target area.

Photographic background SAV 100/1579-4

Neg. No. PT 304675

EXTRACT FROM INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3581

TARGET: LANDSHUT MARSHALLING YARD

DATE: 16 APRIL, 1945

Details of the Attack

H.E. bursts blanket the western two-thirds of the yard, excepting the extreme west end. Incendiaries blanket the eastern end of the yard, and H.E. bursts are seen on the tracks leading north from this end of the yard. H.E. hits cause a small explosion in an unidentified factory area located just north of the east end of the yard.

Small patches of cloud obscure the target at various intervals during the attack. Smoke from early bursts combined with the cloud cover and some ground haze renders interpretation very difficult and, in some instances, impossible.

Bursts are seen on the various parts of the Marshalling Yard as follows:

Station Sidings

The western two-thirds is blanketed by H.E. bursts scoring hits on the trackage and rolling stock.

Goods Depot

Western - Blanketed by H.E. bursts.
Eastern - Blanketed by Incendiaries.

Wagon Repair Shop -

Blanketed by H.E. bursts.

Locomotive Depot

Scattered H.E. bursts are seen in southwest half of the area.

Rail Over Road Bridge

Probable hits by H.E.

Rail Over Stream Bridge

Probable hits by H.E.

Other Bursts:

A large group of H.E. bursts are seen across the Neumarkt rail line which runs south from the west end of the yard.

Scattered H.E. bursts are seen in an unidentified factory area just north of the east end of the yard. A small explosion is seen.

Scattered H.E. bursts extend into open fields and lightly built-up areas at the south side and west end of the yard. Incendiaries are seen in a residential area just southeast of the yard.

One H.E. burst is visible in fields near the small town of Almoos, 51 miles west of Landshut. Three H.E. bursts are seen 7 miles further west. Nine bursts are seen in an unplotted open area.

4029



DECLASSIFIED

EXTRACT FROM IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K-4301

TARGET: LANDSHUT MARSHALLING YARD

DATE: 16 April, 1945

Provisional Statement on Damage

A very heavy concentration of craters cover the entire target and adjoining areas. All sections of the Marshalling Yard, all the facilities, and all through lines are very severely damaged and are 100% unserviceable.

The heaviest damage resulted from an unknown attack or attacks between 16 March, 1945, and 11 April, 1945. However, the two attacks by aircraft of U.S. Eighth Air Force resulted in additional severe damage or destruction of facilities, rolling stock and installations at all parts of the Marshalling Yard.

Details are as follows:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Unknown Attacks Between 16 March - 11 April, 1945</u>	<u>Attacks U.S. Eighth A.F. 11 and 16 April, 1945</u>
<u>Locomotive and Repair Facilities</u>		
Locomotive Depot	1/2 destroyed	Almost completely destroyed.
Turntable		Damaged by at least two hits.
Wagon Repair Shop (South of Locomotive Depot)		3/4 gutted, remainder damaged. Two adjoining small buildings damaged by blast.
Sidings adjoining Locomotive Depot to southeast	Moderate loading. Several railway wagons are damaged, destroyed or derailed.	Additional new damage. Many wagons are new damaged or destroyed.
<u>Terminal Facilities</u>		
Goods Depot (East of Passenger Station)	1/5 destroyed. Several railway wagons nearby damaged, destroyed or derailed. Small building damaged.	Goods Depot totally destroyed. Medium building gutted. Two small buildings damaged. Many railway wagons now damaged or destroyed.
Large Warehouse Type Building (East of Goods Depot)		Gutted and also damaged by H.E.
Passenger Station	Platform sheds completely destroyed	
Probable Offices and Waiting Rooms	3/4 destroyed. Seven small buildings destroyed.	

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EXTRACT FROM IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K-4301 (Continued)

16 April, 1945

<u>Name</u>	<u>Unknown Attacks Between 16 March - 11 April, 1945</u>	<u>Attacks U.S. Eighth A.F. 11 and 16 April, 1945</u>
<u>Marshalling Yards</u>		
Station Sidings	Moderate to heavy loading. All rail lines cut in very many places. Many wagons are damaged, destroyed or derailed.	New heavy damage. Many more wagons are now damaged or destroyed. Relatively few wagons remain undamaged.
Storage Sidings (East end of Yard)	Few wagons are damaged, destroyed or derailed. Few rail lines are cut.	New damage to several wagons. Several new hits on rail lines. Probably all lines are now cut.
Four small build- ings (Near Stor- age Sidings)	Three destroyed. One damaged.	
<u>Through Running Lines</u>		
Converging Lines (West end of Yard)	Few craters.	Additional damage to rail lines. All are cut.
Rail over Stream Bridge (West end of Yard)	Damaged by at least two hits	
Road over Rail Bridge (East end of Yard)		Section of north approach destroyed.
Rail over Road Bridge (East end of Yard)		Few rails of north approach cut by at least three craters.
<u>Outside Target Area</u>		
Business/Residential Property Adjoining Marshalling Yard	Many buildings severely damaged or destroyed.	Moderate new damage.
Unidentified Factory (Northeast of Mar- shalling Yard)		Three small buildings destroyed. Large main building seriously damaged.
Large Warehouse Type Building (East of Mar- shalling Yard)		On fire.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Target: Plattling Marshalling Yard (First Priority).

Date: 16 April, 1945.

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 76.

Number of Bombs Dropped: 1056x500 HE.

1. Strike photograph showing first concentration of bursts blanketing the eastern half of the marshalling yard.
2. Reconnaissance photograph obtained at 1800 hours on 16 April, 1945.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

16 APR 1945 S.A. 3579
SAV 306/1618-9 PRATTLING MARSHALLING YARD
Neg. No. PT 305668 ANNOTATED PRINT



DECLASSIFIED

Target: Straubing Railway Bridge (First Priority).

Date: 16 April, 1945.

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 75.

Number of Bombs Dropped: 967x500 HE.

1. Strike photograph and approximate bomb plot.

DECLASSIFIED
RESTRICTED



SAV 305/1393-10



DIRECTION
OF ATTACK

S.A. 3580
STRAUBING RAILWAY BRIDGE
16 APR 1945

APPROXIMATE BOMB PLOT AND
ANNOTATED PRINT

/// Concentration of H.E. bursts
• Single H.E. burst

Photographic Background: SAV 303/1979-4
Neg. No. PT 305672

DECLASSIFIED

Target: Regensburg/Burgweinting Rail Sidings (First Priority).
(See Routes and Target Annex for Target Illustration
for relationship of objectives at Regensburg.)

Date: 16 April, 1945.

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 78.

Number of Bombs Dropped: 140x500 HE.
970x250 HE.
32x300 HE.
153x500 IB.

1. Reconnaissance photograph obtained at 1800 hours on 17 April, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

↑
REGENSBURG

M/Y

K4281 (SUPP.)

24E



~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Target: Regensburg East Railway Bridge (First Priority).
(See Routes and Target Annex for Target Illustration
for relationship of objectives at Regensburg.)

Date: 16 April, 1945.

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 71.

Number of Bombs Dropped: 426x1000 HE.

1. Strike photograph and Approximate Bomb Plot.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DIRECTION
OF ATTACK



SAV 457/1200-9

S.A. 3585
REGENSBURG EAST RAILWAY BRIDGE
16 APR 1945

APPROXIMATE BOMB PLOT AND
ANNOTATED PRINT

XXX Concentration of H.E. bursts
/// Area of H.E. bursts
Single H.E. burst

Photographic Background: US7/2024-4066
Neg. No. 8T 305674

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Target: Regensburg Main Marshalling Yard (First Priority).
(See Routes and Target Annex for Target Illustration
for relationship of objectives at Regensburg.

Date: 16 April, 1945.

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 70.

Number of Bombs Dropped: 438x500 HE.
524x250 HE.
66x500 IB.

1. Strike photograph showing the last wave of the attack
on the main marshalling yard and smoke from earlier waves.
2. Approximate Bomb Plot.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~



DECLASSIFIED

S.A. 3582
REGENSBURG MARSHALLING YARD
16 APR 1945

ANNOTATED PRINT

SAV 398/961 - 8
Neg. No. PT 305669







DIRECTION
OF ATTACK



S.A. 3582
REGENSBURG MARSHALLING YARD
16 APR 1945

APPROXIMATE BOMB PLOT NO.2

-  Concentration of H.E. bursts
-  Area of H.E. bursts
-  Area of I.B. bursts
-  Outline of target area

Photographic Background: SAV 379/1258-4
Neg. No. PT 305670

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Target: Regensburg West Railway Bridge (First Priority).
(See Routes and Target Annex for Target Illustration
for relationship of objectives at Regensburg.)

Date: 16 April, 1945.

Number of Aircraft Attacking: 73.

Number of Bombs Dropped: 435x1000 HE.

1. Strike photographs and Approximate Bomb Plot.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~



SAV 381/1379-10



SAV 381/1381-8



SAV 91/1275-9



SAV 91/1273-8



DIRECTION
OF ATTACK



S. A. 3584
REGENSBURG/MARIAORT RAILWAY BRIDGE
16 APR 1945

APPROXIMATE BOMB PLOT
AND ANNOTATED PRINT

- Scattered bursts
- /// Area of H.E. bursts
- XXX Concentration of H.E. bursts

Photographic Background: US25/263-1015
Neg. No. PT 305676

BOMBING DATA

16 April 1945.
Operation No. 954

1ST AIR DIVISION

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
<u>Plattling</u>								
306A	79	5 min	17,820	1550½	X	182x500 HE	1	12
306B	72	10 min	16,300	1552	X	182x500 HE	1	12
306C	79	9 min	18,380	1551½	X	154x500 HE	1	10
92A	67	3 min	17,350	1555	X	164x500 HE	1	11
92B	75	3 min	16,850	1557	X	208x500 HE	1	14
92C	74	3 min	17,850	1555½	X	166x500 HE	1	11
<u>Straubling</u>								
305A	73	3 min	17,550	1603	X	(14x500 HE 140x500 HE	1	10
305B	72	5 min	17,100	1604	X	181x500 HE	1	12
305C	71	3 min	17,800	1603½	X	182x500 HE	1	12
303A	70	10 min	18,000	1559½	X	152x500 HE	1	12
303B	75	5 min	17,200	1600	X	144x500 HE	1	11
303C	66	6 min	18,700	1600½	X	154x500 HE	1	12
<u>Regensburg (Burgweinting)</u>								
379A	121	4 min	23,400	1550½	X	140x500 HE 28x500 IB	1	13
379B	104	3 min	22,850	1549	X	210x250 HE 26x500 IB	1	13
379C	121	4 min	24,700	1550	X	224x250 HE 28x500 IB	1	13
384A	110	5 min	23,700	1551	X	159x250 HE 32x300 HE 24x500 IB	1	11
384B	135	5 min	22,600	1551	X	186x250 HE 23x500 IB	1	11
384C	108	6 min	24,500	1551	X	191x250 HE 24x500 IB	1	11

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

DECLASSIFIED
16 April 1945
Operation No. 954
1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
-------	-------------------	------------------	----------	--------------------	----------------	--------------------	------------------	--------------------

Regensburg (East RR Bridge)

457A	115	3 min	24,000	1555	X	72x1000 HE	1	11
457B	117	3 min	23,400	1555½	X	60x1000 HE	1	9
457C	112	3 min	25,100	1556	X	78x1000 HE	1	12
401A	118	3 min	24,000	1557½	X	72x1000 HE	1	11
401B	113	3 min	23,400	1558	X	72x1000 HE	1	11
401C	122	3 min	24,500	1600	X	72x1000 HE	1	11

Regensburg M/Y

351A	79	3 min	24,000	1555½	X	141x500 HE	1	11
351B	75	3 min	23,000	1556½	X	154x500 HE	1	12
351C	74	3 min	24,300	1557	X	143x500 HE	1	11
398A	126	6 min	23,290	1558	X	174x250 HE 22x500 IB	1	10
398B	127	6 min	22,800	1559	X	175x250 HE 22x500 IB	1	10
398C	85	5 min	23,770	1617	X	175x250 HE 22x500 IB	1	10

Regensburg (West RR Bridge)

91A	118	2 min	23,275	1559	X	72x1000 HE	1	11
91B	126	3 min	22,710	1600	X	72x1000 HE	1	11
91C	114	3 min	23,800	1601	X	72x1000 HE	1	11
381A	107	8 min	23,480	1557	X	71x1000 HE	1	11
381B	119	7½ min	22,770	1557½	X	71x1000 HE	1	11
381C	99	8½ min	23,970	1558½	X	77x1000 HE	1	12

2ND AIR DIVISIONLandshut M/Y

467	124	3 min	18,000	1531	X	85x500 HE	1	8
467	122	3 min	17,700	1531	X	92x500 HE	1	8
467	118	3 min	17,300	1531½	X	83x500 HE	1	8
458	105	2 min	18,550	1532½	X	74x500 HE	1	7
458	105	2 min	18,000	1533	X	81x500 HE	1	8
458	104	2 min	17,500	1534½	X	103x500 HE	1	8
466	102	1 min	19,000	1534	X	74x500 HE	1	6

DECLASSIFIED
2

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

DECLASSIFIED

16 April 1945

Operation No. 954

2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)

GROUP	DIRECT. OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	& DEFL. ON LDR	DROPPED
<u>Landshut M/Y (continued)</u>								
466	96	2 min	18,700	1534 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	81x500 HE	1	8
466	113	1 min	18,300	1535	X	92x500 HE	1	8
466	106	1 min	18,000	1535	X	103x500 HE	1	9
446	100	1 min	18,000	1535	X	34x1000 HE 2x500 HE	1	8
446	105	1 min	17,500	1536	X	42x1000 HE	1	8
448	123	10 min	19,500	1537	X	29x1000 HE	1	6
448	93	10 min	19,500	1537	X	37x1000 HE 1xM47 IB	1	7
93	99	7 min	19,150	1537	X	42x1000 HE	1	8
93	97	8 min	20,500	1539	X	42x1000 HE	1	8
445	107	4 min	18,000	1539 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	87x500 HE 2xM47 IB	1	9
445	99	5 min	18,500	1540	X	114x500 HE 1xM47 IB	1	10
445	102	3 min	17,500	1540 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	103x500 HE 1xM47 IB	1	9
389	80	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ min	19,400	1541 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	96x500 HE	1	9
389	82	2 min	19,500	1542	X	114x500 HE	1	10
389	94	2 min	18,900	1542 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	103x500 HE	1	9
44	129	2 min	17,500	1547 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	104x500 IB	1	10
392	190	20 sec	16,800	1555	X	88x500 HE 4xM47 IB	1	9
392	128	30 sec	17,250	1548	X	94x500 HE 3xM47 IB	1	9
392	122	30 sec	16,200	1549	X	104x500 HE 3xM47 IB	1	10
491	155	4 min	18,000	1549 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	70x500 HE 4xM47 IB	1	8
491	113	2 min	18,600	1550	X	94x500 HE 5xM47 IB	1	9
491	110	-	17,500	1550 $\frac{1}{2}$	X	94x500 HE 5xM47 IB	1	9

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

DECLASSIFIED

11 April 1945

Operation No. 955

3RD AIR DIVISION

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
<u>Tank Ditch</u>								
34A	217	5 min	15,470	1107	X	144x500 HE	1	11
34B	230	5 min	15,740	1107	X	156x500 HE	1	12
34C	215	5 min	15,100	1108	X	156x500 HE	1	12
385A	211	4 min	15,400	1111	X	144x500 HE	1	11
385B	220	4 min	16,450	1108	X	78x1000 HE	1	12
385C	225	4 min	14,910	1109	X	29x1000 HE 23x2000 HE	1	12
490A	235	5 min	15,420	1112	X	144x500 HE	1	11
490B	225	6 min	15,900	1154	X	156x500 HE	1	12
490C	224	6 min	14,400	1113	X	156x500 HE	1	12
493A	226	6 min	15,350	1114	X	108x500 HE	1	8
493B	214	6 min	15,970	1115	X	144x500 HE	1	11
493C	214	6 min	14,600	1117	X	108x500 HE	1	8
390A	240	6 min	15,950	1118	X	19x1000 HE 20x2000 IB	1	9
390B	237	6 min	15,600	1119	X	17x1000 HE 18x2000 HE	1	8
390C	229	6 min	15,300	1119	X	18x1000 HE 18x2000 HE	1	8
390D	244	6 min	15,100	1120	X	20x1000 HE 20x2000 HE	1	9
100A	239	6 min	15,400	1122	X	108x500 HE	1	8
100B	235	6 min	15,800	1122	X	120x500 HE	1	9
100C	214	6 min	14,900	1123	X	106x500 HE	1	8
100D	212	6 min	14,600	1124	X	120x500 HE	1	9
95A	235	6 min	15,350	1127	X	108x500 HE	1	8
95B	234	6 min	15,850	1127	X	120x500 HE	1	9
95C	233	6 min	14,850	1128	X	107x500 HE	1	8
95D	239	6 min	14,200	1129	X	120x500 HE	1	9
452A	224	6 min	14,500	1134	X	72x1000 HE	1	11
452B	228	6 min	15,980	1132	X	76x1000 HE	1	12

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBING DATA (Continued)

16 April 1945.
Operation No. 955

3RD AIR DIVISION (Continued)

GROUP	DIRECT OF RUN	LENGTH OF RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME OF RELEASE	AFCE MANUAL	NUMBER OF BOMBS	RANGE & DEFL.	DROPPED ON LDR.
452C	216	6 min	14,950	1132	X	78x1000 HE	1	12
388A	232	6 min	15,470	1134	X	70x1000 HE	1	11
388B	260	4 min	15,990	1159	X	78x1000 HE	1	12
388C	213	6 min	15,020	1137	X	78x1000 HE	1	11
486A	210	6 min	15,470	1134	X	108x500 HE	1	8
486B	214	6 min	15,990	1134	X	108x500 HE	1	9
486C	220	6 min	14,950	1136	X	120x500 HE	1	9
486D	222	6 min	14,430	1136	X	120x500 HE	1	9
487A	221	6 min	15,400	1137	X	54x1000 HE	1	8
487B	225	6 min	15,950	1137	X	60x1000 HE	1	9
487C	215	6 min	14,950	1139	X	52x1000 HE	1	8
487D	222	6 min	14,450	1137	X	60x1000 HE	1	9
94A	222	6 min	15,470	1145	X	108x500 HE	1	8
94B	222	6 min	16,000	1145	X	120x500 HE	1	9
94C	221	6 min	14,900	1147	X	120x500 HE	1	9
94D	218	6 min	14,430	1147	X	108x500 HE	1	8
447A	220	6 min	15,400	1148	X	108x500 HE	1	8
447B	217	6 min	15,990	1149	X	12x500 HE 54x1000 HE	1	9
447C	222	6 min	14,925	1151	X	120x500 HE	1	9
447D	220	6 min	14,430	1151	X	54x1000 HE	1	8

DECLASSIFIED

WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO Landshut, Regensburg-Plattling


DECLASSIFIED

Authorized for
reproduction
of _____ copies
Copy No. _____
Eighth Air Force
Sig _____
Date _____

1st 2nd BOMBARDMENT DIVISIONS

DATE 16 Apr. '45
1000 - 2100 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____




Authorized for
reproduction of _____ copies
Copy No. _____
Eighth Air Force
Sig _____
Date _____

WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Regensburg-Plattling

1st BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 16 Apr. 45
1100 - 2030 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____




Authorized for
reproduction
of _____ copies
Copy No. _____
Eighth Air Force
Sig _____
Date _____

WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Landshut

2nd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 16 Apr. 45
0955 - 1935 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____




WEATHER FORECAST FOR MISSION TO Bordeaux area

Authorized for
reproduction
of _____ copies
Copy No. _____
Eighth Air Force
Sig. _____
Date _____

3rd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
DATE 16 Apr. 45
0600 - 1600 Hrs.

~~SECRET~~
By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____




Authorized for reproduction
of _____ copies
Copy No _____
Eighth Air Force
Sig _____
Date _____

WEATHER ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION TO Bordeaux area

3rd BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

DATE 16 Apr. 45
0700-1430 Hrs.

By authority of
C. C. Eighth Air Force
Initials _____
Date _____



OPERATIONAL FORECAST (1ST AND 2ND AIR DIVISIONS) - 16 APRIL 1945

Operation No. 954

1. Base to Target.
Cloudless and haze becoming scattered clouds over the Continent becoming broken clouds east of 09 degrees east. Nil low cloud becoming 2-4/10 small cumulus, bases 3-4000 feet, tops 5000 feet, over the Continent becoming 4-7/10, tops 6000 feet at 09 degrees east, becoming 3-5/10 at the target. Nil medium cloud becoming at 09 degrees east 6-8/10 thin layered medium cloud 10-12,000 feet, tops 16-18,000 feet. Nil to 2/10 cirrus, base 26-28,000 feet becoming at 09 degrees east 6-8/10. Freezing level 10,000 feet. Nil to light rime ice in medium cloud. Visibility 3-5 miles, locally 2 miles on the east coast becoming unrestricted aloft.

2. Target to Base.
Broken clouds east of 09 degrees east becoming scattered cloud over bases. Low cloud similar on return. Medium cloud reverse on return except 2-4/10 altocumulus, base 10,000 feet, tops 14,000 feet over the bases. High cloud reverse on return except 3-5/10 over the bases. Freezing level 10,000 feet. Nil to light rime ice in medium cloud. Visibility unrestricted aloft becoming 6 plus miles on return.

3. Winds.

	Base to 02 Deg E		02 Deg E to 04 Deg E		04 Deg E to 09 Deg E	
Surface	140	Deg 05 Knots	120	Deg 05 Knots	120	Deg 05 Knots
2,000 feet	180	15	140	05	120	05
5,000	190	20	210	10	240	15
10,000	200	25	220	15	300	20
15,000	210	25	230	15	310	25
20,000	210	30	230	20	320	30
25,000	220	35	240	20	330	30
30,000	220	40	240	25	330	35

09 Deg E to Target & Target

Surface	090	Deg 05 Knots
2,000 feet	120	05
5,000	040	15
10,000	340	20
15,000	340	30
20,000	340	40
25,000	340	45
30,000	340	50

4. Temperatures.

	<u>Navigational Temperatures</u>	<u>Target Temperatures</u>
Surface	-----	11 Deg C
2,000 feet	12 Deg C	-----
5,000	06	03
10,000	-03	-05
15,000	-13	-15
20,000	-24	-26
25,000	-36	-36
30,000	-48	-48

[REDACTED]

5. Indicated and True Altitude - Mean Temperatures.

<u>Indicated Altitude</u>	<u>True Altitude</u>	<u>Mean Temperatures</u>	<u>Pressure Altitude</u>
8,000 feet	8,296 feet	04.0 Deg C	Minus 400.
10,000	10,290	02.5	
12,000	12,292	01.0	
14,000	14,298	-00.5	
16,000	16,292	-02.5	
18,000	18,285	-04.5	
20,000	20,316	-06.0	
22,000	22,316	-08.0	
24,000	24,314	-10.0	

6. Remarks.

Light non-persistent contrails at 25,000 feet. Moderate semi-persistent contrails in medium cloud.

3RD ATR DIVISION

Operation No. 955

1. Base to Target to Base.

Scattered clouds with haze, locally light fog. Nil low and middle cloud entire route with 1-3/10 cirrus base 26,000 feet. Freezing level 10,000 feet. Nil ice. Visibility 1-2 miles, locally 1000 yards on coastal bases.

2. Winds and Temperatures.

	<u>Base to 49 Deg N</u>		<u>S of 49 Deg N To Target.</u>		<u>Temperatures</u>
Surface	180 Deg	15 Knots	170 Deg	10 Knots	16 Deg C
5,000 feet	190	20	180	15	09
10,000	200	25	190	15	01
15,000	210	25	190	20	-09
20,000	220	30	190	20	-20
25,000	220	30	200	25	-32
30,000	230	30	210	30	-43

3. Base altimeter setting on return: 30.21 inches.

<u>Indicated Altitude</u>	<u>True Altitude</u>	<u>Mean Temperatures</u>	
10,000 feet	10,332 feet	10,000 feet	10.0 Deg C
12,000	12,370	12,000	08.0
14,000	14,430	14,000	06.5
16,000	16,510	16,000	05.0
18,000	18,564	18,000	03.0
20,000	20,618	20,000	01.0

Pressure Altitude - Minus 156

4. Remarks

Nil contrails.

SUMMARY OF WEATHER ENCOUNTERED - 16 APRIL 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

Operation No. 954

Take-Off.

(1100-1200) 3-5/10 cumulus, base 4000 feet top 6000 feet. 4-7/10 cirrus, base above 20,000 feet. Visibility 2-5 miles.

Route Out.

Cumulus decreased to nil over eastern England and Channel, becoming 0-3/10 over continent with a local increase to 4-6/10 between 6 degrees and 7 degrees east. High Cloud decreased to 3-5/10 over channel, 2-4/10 over western Europe and 0-2/10 at target. Horizontal visibility unrestricted.

Target - Regensburg and Plattling

(1550) 0-2/10 low cloud, top 6-8000 feet. 0-2/10 high cloud, base 24,000 feet. Air to ground visibility, 20-30 miles.

Return Route.

0-3/10 low cloud, base 4-5000 feet tops 6-8000 feet, entire route except 4-6/10 from 7 degrees to 6 degrees east. Cirrus increased to 4-6/10, base 20,000 feet over eastern England and to 9-10/10 in base area.

Bases on Return.

(1930-2030) 0-3/10 low cloud, base 4-5000 feet top 6-8000 feet. 9-10/10 high cloud, base 20,000 feet. Visibility 6-10 miles.

Remarks.

No contrails. Temperatures aloft, 4 degrees to 6 degrees warmer than forecast. Wind direction good, but 10-15 knots lighter than forecast.

2ND AIR DIVISIONBases at Take-Off

(0955-1101) Nil to 4/10 stratocumulus, bases 3-4000 feet, tops 5-7000 feet. Nil to 4/10 medium cloud, bases 12-14,000 feet, tops 14-16,000 feet. Cirrus increasing rapidly to 5-9/10 above 25,000 feet. Visibility 3-6 miles in haze. Surface wind SSE-ESE, 10-15 mph.

Route Out

Nil to 3/10 cumulus, tops 4-5000 feet over south England and the Channel increasing near 07 degrees east to 3-6/10 small cumulus, tops 5-9000 feet becoming 2-5/10 in the target area. Medium cloud dissipated rapidly over England. 5-9/10 high thin cirrus above 25,000 feet decreased to patchy nil to 3/10 over the Continent.

Target- Landshut

(1531-1555) Visual target with 2-5/10 cumulus, tops 5-8000 feet. 7-9/10 cumulus, tops 12-16,000 feet covered primary targets to the south and east. Nil medium cloud. Nil to 3/10 high thin cirrus above 25,000 feet. Downward visibility 10-20 miles.

DECLASSIFIED

2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)
DECLASSIFIED

Operation No. 954

Return Route.

Similar to route out except cirrus became 2-4/10 at 04 degrees east and haze over the Channel restricted visibility to 10-15 miles.

Bases on Return.

(1835-1935) Nil low or medium cloud with 6-9/10 cirrus estimated at 20,000 feet. Visibility 6-10 miles. Surface wind S-SE, 10-20 mph.

Remarks.

Nil contrails. Winds 30-40 degrees more northerly than briefed in the target area and 5-10 knots lighter than briefed. Temperatures near 05 degrees warmer than briefed.

3RD AIR DIVISION

Operation No. 955

Take-Off.

(0700-0730) 2-5/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Visibility 800-3000 yards.

Route Out.

Nil low except for occasional fog patches over eastern England and Channel tops 1000 feet. 2-5/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Downward visibility 10-20 miles in haze.

Target

(1108-1128) 2-5/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Downward visibility 20-30 miles.

Return Route.

Same as route out.

Bases on Return.

(1405-1430) 3-6/10 cirrus above 25,000 feet. Visibility 3-7 miles.

Remarks.

None.

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY

Operation No. 954
16 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION

1st Priority	Regensburg West Railroad Bridge	Straubing Railroad Bridge	Plattling Marshalling Yard
Sorties	74	77	77
Credited Sorties	74	77	77
Effective Sorties	74 a	76 a	77 a
A/C Bombing	73	75	76
1st Priority	73	75	76
3rd Priority		1 b	
Total Bombs (Tons)			
1st Priority HE	217.5	241.7	264.0
3rd Priority HE		1.0	
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0
Combat Damage	1	0	0
Cat "A"	1	0	0
Cause of Damage	1	0	0
AA	1	0	0
Casualties	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0

a Includes 1 aircraft dropping leaflets only.

b Bombs dropped by 1 aircraft on Ingolstadt Marshalling Yard.

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

Operation No. 954
16 April 1945

1ST AIR DIVISION (Continued)

1st Priority	Regensburg M/Y	Regensburg Burgweinting M/Y	Regensburg East Railroad Bridge	1ST A.D. TOTAL
Sorties	71	81	73	453
Credited Sorties	71	79	72	450
Effective Sorties	70	79 c	72 d	448
A/C Bombing	70	78	71	443
1st Priority	70	78	71	443
3rd Priority	0	0	0	1
Total Bombs (Tons)				
1st Priority HE	175.0	161.1	213.0	1272.3
IB	16.5	38.2		54.7
3rd Priority HE	0	0	0	1.0
Number A/C Lost	0	0	0	0
Combat Damage	2	0	1	4
Cat "A"	1	0	1	3
Cat "AC"	1	0	0	1
Cause of Damage	2	0	1	4
AA	1	0	1	3
Other	1	0	0	1
Casualties	0	0	0	0
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0

c Includes 1 Scout aircraft.

d Includes 1 aircraft dropping leaflets only.

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

Operation No. 954
16 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION

1st Priority	<u>Traunstein Trans- former Station</u>	<u>Traunstein Marshalling Yard</u>	<u>Traunstein Railroad Bridge</u>
Sorties	56	37	54
Credited Sorties	54	35	54
Effective Sorties	53	35	51
A/C Bombing	53	35	51
3rd Priority	53 e	35 e	51 e
Total Bombs (Tons)			
3rd Priority HE	129.5	87.5	113.5
Number A/C Lost	0	0	1
AA	0	0	1
Combat Damage	0	1	2
Cat "A"	0	0	1
Cat "AC"	0	0	1
Cat "E"	0	1	0
Cause of Damage	0	1	2
AA	0	0	2
Other	0	1	0
Casualties	0	0	9
M.I.A.	0	0	9

e Landshut Marshalling Yard

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY (Continued)

Operation No. 954
16 April 1945

2ND AIR DIVISION (Continued)

	<u>Rosenheim</u> <u>M/Y</u>	<u>Rosenheim</u> <u>Trans. Sta.</u>	<u>2nd A.D.</u> <u>Total</u>	<u>Operation</u> <u>Total</u>
A/C Sorties	97	62	306	759
A/C Credited Sorties	96	60	299	749
A/C Effective Sorties	73	60	272	720
A/C Bombing	73	60	272	715
1st Priority	0	0	0	443
3rd Priority	73 e	60 e	272	273
Total Bombs (Tons)				
1st Priority HE	0	0	0	1272.3
IB	0	0	0	54.7
3rd Priority HE	154.2	136.0	620.7	621.7
IB	26.2	..9	27.1	27.1
Number A/C Lost	0	0	1	1
AA	0	0	1	1
Combat Damage	1	1	5	9
Cat. "A"	1	0	2	5
Cat. "AC"	0	0	1	2
Cat. "E"	0	1	2	2
Cause of Damage	1	1	5	9
AA	1	0	3	6
Other	0	1	2	3
Casualties				
M.I.A .	0	0	9	9
E/A Encounters	0	0	0	0

e Landshtut Marshalling Yard.

DECLASSIFIED

BOMBER SUMMARY

Operation No. 955
16 April 1945

3RD AIR DIVISION

<u>1st Priority</u>	<u>Rovan Area</u>	<u>OPERATION TOTAL</u>
Sorties	486	486
Credited Sorties	486	486
Effective Sorties	486	486
A/C Bombing	486	486
1st Priority	486	486
 Total Bombs (Tons)		
1st Priority HE	1451.7	1451.7
 Number A/C Lost	0	0
 Combat Damage	18	18
Cat "A"	8	8
Cat "AC"	9	9
Cat "E"	1*	1
 Cause of Damage	18	18
AA	5	5
Other	13*	13
 Casualties		
Wounded	1	1
 E/A Encounters	0	0

* 1 Cat "E" nosed over on landing.

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 634

FIGHTER SUMMARY

16 April, 1945
Operation No. 954

UNIT	A/C TYPE	TYPE SUPPORT	SOR-TIES	CRED. SOR.	EFF. SOR.	A/C LOST	CAT. "E"	DAM. OTH.	KIA MIA	CLAIMS WND. DES.	PROB. DAM.	
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FORCE I - DISPATCHED AGAINST TARGETS AT ROSENHEIM AND TRAUNSTEIN												
479*	P-51	Sweep Bomber Route	71	69	69	4	0	6	4	0	0(54)	0(10)
361*	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D	63	63	60	2	0	1	2	0	0(16)	0(4)
355*	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D	67	64	62	6	1	4	6	1	0(70)	0(48)
4*	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D	60	56	56	8	0	17	8	1	0(102)	0(54)
56*	P-47	Pen. Tgt. W/D	54	54	51	1	0	3	1	0	0(2)	0(5)
Sub-Total			315	306	298	21	1	31	21	2	0(244)	0(121)
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FORCE II - DISPATCHED AGAINST TARGETS AT PLATTING, STRAUBING AND REGENSBURG												
359*	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D	54	54	51	0	1	0	0	0	0(5)	0(3)
364*	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D	55	51	51	1	0	7	1	1	2(42)	0(40)
356*	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D	48	48	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
352*	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D	53	51	48	2	1	5	2	0	0(43)	0(26)
20*	P-51	Pen. Tgt. W/D	48	48	47	0	0	0	0	0	0(1)	0
Sub-Total			258	252	242	3	2	12	3	1	2(91)	0(69)
FREE LANCE GROUPS												
353*	P-51	F/L Munich	68	64	64	3	2	18	3	0	0(116)	0(50)
339*	P-51	F/L Regensburg	63	63	60	0	0	0	0	1	0(118)	0(36)
55*	P-51	F/L Salzburg	57	57	57	4	0	0	4	0	1(52)	0(26)
78*	P-51	F/L Pilsen	56	54	54	3	1	12	3	0	0(129)	0(90)
357*	P-51	F/L Landshut	53	51	51	0	0	1	0	0	0(2)	0(2)
Sub-Total			297	289	286	10	3	31	10	1	1(417)	0(204)
TOTAL SUP. FORCES			870	847	826	34	6	74	34	4	3(752)	0(394)

SECRET

FIGHTER SUMMARY (Continued)

DECLASSIFIED

18 April, 1945
Operation No. 954

UNIT	A/C TYPE	TYPE SUPPORT	SOR- TIES	CRED. SOR.	EFF. SOR.	A/C LOST	CAT. "E"	DAM. OTH.	KIA MIA	WND.	CLAIMS DES.	PROB.	DAM.
WEATHER SCOUTING FORCES													
2nd SF P-51 355	Weather Scouting		9	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1st SF P-51 857 B Sq.	Weather Scouting		8	8	8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sub-Total			17	16	16	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATION TOTAL			887	863	842	34	7	74	34	4	3(752)	0	0(394)

() Aircraft destroyed on the ground.

* Executed strafing attacks.

1 Squadron of the 353rd Group escorted Force I on withdrawal.

1 Squadron of the 339th Group escorted Force II on withdrawal.

OPERATION NO. 955

WEATHER SCOUTING FORCE

OPERATION AROUND GIRENDE ESTUARY

862	P-51	Weather Scouting	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATION TOTAL			4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED